MONARCHY
ASSERTED
OR
The STATE Of
MONARCHICALL & POPULAR
Government
IN
Vindication of the Conſiderations Upon
Mr *HARRINGTON'S*
OCEANA.

By *M. WREN.*

Scinditur incertum ſtudia in contraria vulgus.

OXFORD,
Printed by W. HALL for F. BOWMAN.
Anno Domini M. DC. LIX.

Alfred Bull Apr. 29, 1920 1/6 + postage

To The

REVEREND

Dr WILKINS

WARDEN OF

Wadham College

IN

OXFORD.

THE Present I am about to make You is like the Legacy, of that old Græcian, who be-

queath'd

queath'd his Friend, a Widow without a Joynture, and a Daughter without a Portion: These Papers come to live upon You, and to put You to charges to maintain them. My first Application to you in the Considerations on the Commonwealth of Oceana, *having made the Author of that Book look upon you as one averse from his Principles and Designes, It is very likely that these Discourses which now address themselves to you, (being augmented in their Offence to*

Him as well as their Bulke) *will excite the utmoſt rage of that Paſſionate Gentleman. But this being a matter* Sir, *I have ſo often ſeen you laugh at, takes up no part of my Cares. But I muſt profeſs my ſelf deeply afflicted, that I have been uſed as an Occaſion of throwing ſo diſingenious a Contumely upon your Univerſity, as* Mr Harrington *in his laſt Book goes about to faſten upon it. Though I never was a Member of your Body, I have alwaies had thoughts of the higheſt Vene-*

ration

ration for you, And my inclinations are thus far founded upon Gratitude, that I have for some yeares breathed your Aire, and been admitted to a Familiarity with your geateſt, both Dead and Living Treaſuries of Learning. Though I have no confidence that theſe Diſcourſes beare Teſtimony of my profiting by that Converſe, I muſt alwaies own my obligation for it, both to the Univerſity in Common, and to thoſe particular Perſons with whoſe Friendſhip I have been honoured: That you

you are one of these, Sir, *it is my Glory to declare, and to be known for*

Yonr most constant

Humble Servant.

M. WREN.

DEDICATORY.

THE PREFACE
To The
READER

THAT Mr *Harrington who* undertakes to vindicate the reason of Popular Government *and I who have professed my selfe a Friend to Monarchy, should from the observation of the same Naturall Causes, and of the same Actions in Historie, forme different Judgements, is no more a wonder then that two Men viewing the same Object by various lights, should judge it to be of various Colours. But it seems a little strange that even in such things where We both make use of the same light, and where it is my interest to be of his Opinion, our* *In Epist.*

Judgements

Jugements should not be reconcileable. I speak this in reference to the Apologie He makes for Private Mens dealing in State Affaires, and obtruding Models of Government upon the World, or teaching new arts of Policy to those Men whose Experience has rendred them Masters of that Trade: Which though I alwaies reputed a great Vanity, I conclude more blamable since I have seen the Excuses he is able to make for it. For though it is not to be denied that Aristotle, Machiavel, *and* Sr Thomas More *are great Persons, and may by their Authority give Protection to any man who is admitted into their Train, yet the Question still remains, Whether this Privilege can be extended to every little Writer that puts himself into their Livery. The workes of those Persons have met with an applause in the World equall to their merit, because keeping themselves within generall Terms, The have preserved the Freedome of Philosophers; Or if at any time They have descended to particulars, it has been without any reflection upon a particular Time or Place; This can be no justification to a Book which professes to have nothing of* Fiction or Romance, *but to be adapted to the Occasions or Necessities of a particular Juncture, And is not proposed with the Temper and Moderation becoming a Philosophic all Opinion, but with the heat and passion belonging to a Design. Which way of writing has no more affinity with the other, then a Libell has with a serious Tract, or a*

Pas-

I ſpeak Raſquin with Hiſtory; Thoſe men indeed who can Prefat.
be perſwaded that Chriſtoph. Columbus made a Card in his Cabinet that found out the Indies *may perhaps believe alſo that* Mr Harrington *may frame a good Commonwealth without any Experience in State Affaires; But they who underſtand that* Columbus *muſt firſt have been at the* Indies *before he could make a Card to teach other Men the way thither, will goe neere to ſuſpect* Mr Harrington's *Abilities in Modelling a Commonwealth, till he has ſpent ſome yeares in the Miniſtry of State. I muſt therefore acknowledge that I doe not lay claim to Pardon for having thruſt my ſelf into a Diſpute of Government, by any part of the Apologie* Mr Harrington *has made for it: But I do not deſpaire of doing it by repreſenting, That what I have ſaid is all by way of Univerſall Poſition, without any private Aime or Deſign; That I was not without reluctancy at firſt drawn to it by the Authority of ſome Friends, from whom* Mr Harrington *did by all imaginable Importunity endeavour to extort ſomething by way of Objection; That afterward I was willing to preſerve the Freedome of my own and other Mens Opinions, and not ſuffer that They who pretend ſo much to Liberty, ſhould with inſupportable Tyranny bring a ſlavery upon our Diſcourſe and Reaſon.*

I wiſh that this could have been effected by ſome other Method then by managing a Controverſie; For that way of writing has a ſuſpi-

tion

tion of ill Nature upon it, and looks more like an improvement of Contention, then an inquiry into Truth. It is by a very happy Metaphor called drawing the Saw, For the Noise We make teares the Eares of such as stand by, And the Dust We raise puts out their Eies. Besides when one Book is shackled to another (like Spaniels in Couples) It is impossible by ranging to spring new Matter, or to give the Reader any thing of Delight or Diversion.

But I am more then ordinarily unfortunate by having to deale with an Adversary who multiplies upon Me all the inconveniencies of Controversie, by having banished from it that Calmness of which it is Capable, and that Sincerity with which it ought to be managed; For to speak modestly, Mr Harrington's Arguments are not alwaies Demonstrations nor his Expressions Complements. But for my part I intend not to enter into Competition with him for being either an able Sophister or Calumniator; but I will preserve that Temper which belongs to a Man who disliking Passion in other People, ought to detest it in himself; And notwithstanding all his provocations, I will more consider what it is fit for Me to speake then Him to heare. In my present Answer to his Reply to the Considerations on Oceana, I have not been curious of any other Method then his own, but have made twelve Chapters confronting his, in discussion of the twelve Questions he has propounded; And in the Margin I have by the

letter

leter H. cited ſuch Paſſages of his Book to which my Anſwers are particularly applyed.

To confeſs a ſecret, I am ſo much gratifyed by ſomething in Mr Harrington's Booke, that I know not how to be offended with Him. In ſeverall places he inſinuates as if the Conſiderations on his Commonwealth of Oceana were not my own, but had been compoſed by the Univerſity, or at leaſt by ſome eminent Perſons in it: This is beyond meaſure obliging. For with thoſe men who are perſuaded by him that the Conſiderations had not much of ſence in them, the Diſcredit ſlides off from me upon other People; But if any man ſhall ſtill retain a good Opinion of that Pamphlet, It muſt need be infinitely advanced by the thought, That ſo renowned an Univerſity ſhould in any meaſure concur to it.

Yet I could have been well contented He would have afforded me his Belief, when I aſſured him I had no relation to the Univerſity: That would I am ſure have ſaved him a great deale of unneceſſary Paines, And He ſhould not need ſo vainly to have purſued Me through the various ſhapes of a Divine, a Doctor, an Head of a Colledg, a Profeſſor, a Prevaricator, a Mathematician. He might alſo by that have concealed the Pique He has ſo unjuſtly taken up againſt Univerſities and Mathematiques, and ſome particular perſons who have an intereſt in both. One paſſage of his referring to this Head, is a little leſs intelligible then ſo fine a piece ought to be, and therefore I will

do

do Him and the World the right to make a short Comment upon it. He has said in his Epistle Dedicatory, That the University Wits or good Companies, are good at two things, at diminishing a Commonwealth and at Multiplying a Louse. *In the first place it must be known that the thing he alludes to is a limbe of Mathematiques, and therefore it is not to be expected that* Mr Harrington, *who holds no understanding either with Mathematiques or Mathematicians, should take care for expressing himself properly about it; What he calls Multiplying a Louse ought to have been Magnifying, for the thing is done by a Microscope or Magnifying Glass; But about this no man need be troubled. We are then to understand That a Gentleman in the* University *who is both a Divine, a Doctor, an head of a College, and a Mathematician, has the Satisfaction to see frequently at his Lodging an assembly of Men who are known both at home and abroad to be of the most learned persons of this Age. The imployment of this Company is by making Experiments and by communicating their Observations to carry on a discovery of Nature, in order to which They have sometimes had occasion to inquire, by the help of a Microscope, into the Figure and position of those smaller parts of which all Bodies are composed; At other times applying the Microscope to some little Animals, as a Flea, a Louse, or a Mite, They have been convinced that the Fabrik of*

them

them is Artificiall to wonder, and that the Wiſedome of the great Architect of Nature is not more conſpicuous in the larger Bulks of an Elephant or Camel, then in theſe little Creatures. The pictures of theſe Animals in that enlarged proportion which the Glaſs repreſents them in are drawn by a Mathematician a member of this Aſſembly, who has invented a way to meaſure the apparent magnitude of them, and are ſeen with Delight and Inſtruction by all Strangers; And not only ſo, but have been received with applauſe by Foreign Princes. This is that multiplying a Louſe, for which Mr Harrington *laughs at the Univerſity wits, though he might have made a more ſerious and profitable uſe of it; As it is ſaid* Monſieur Peiresk *did, who having put a Louſe and a Flea into a Microſcope, He obſerved that the* Louſe growing angry, his blood ran up and down from head to foot, and from foot to head again; Whence he gathered how great a Commotion of Humours and Spirits, and what a diſturbance of all the Faculties, Anger muſt needs make, And what harme that man avoides who ſhuns paſſion. *I know not whether this ſight would have had the ſame operation upon* Mr Harrington, *in freeing him from his Choler, But I am ſure it inclines me to no unpleaſant thoughts, by putting me in mind of a certain Author, who æſtuates and torments himſelf, and yet an haire is enough to hold him.*

Gaſſend. in vita Peresk. lib. 6.

The

The only Complement I have for the Reader remaines, which is to assure him That this is the last time He shall receive a Trouble from Me in this Controversie, I doe not expect that Mr Harrington *should give over, but I promise my selfe He cannot reply any thing to which an Answer may not be easily fitted out of those Reasons and Maximes which I have already laid down. I have cause to think by his last Book, that his stores of Reason and Argument are brought very low, but withall I believe his Treasures of Reproaches are inexhaustible. And to silence such a person is as impossible as to disarme that Man who can use the next Dung-hill for a Magazin.*

MONARCHY

MONARCHY ASSERTED.

OR,

THE STATE OF MONARCHICALL AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

CHAP. I.

Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Antient and Moderne.

FOr the Vindicating the Considerations on the Commonwealth of Oceana, I shall not need to do much more then give a true and accurate state of the Points that fell in question between Mr *Harrington* and Me; for He being equally careless of what I have said, and what He himselfe saies, does almost alwaies fly of from the true subject of the debate between us. And I do not know any more proper Method of reclaiming such Extravagant Writers, then what men take with starting Horses, To bring them close up to take a View of that at which before they

boggled. In effecting which if Mr *Harrington* be sometimes put to feele the Rebukes both of the Spur and Bit, no blame can justly befall Me, who am necessitated to so rough a Manage.

Mr *Harrington* at the very beginning of his Common-wealth of Oceana, had laid downe a division of Government (pretended to be taken out of Giannotti) into Antient and Moderne Prudence, the Antient unanimously followed by the Greeks and Romans ending with Cæsar, the Moderne introduced by the Barbarous Nations: Now knowing that Antiquity is considered with Veneration by almost all Men, and that even They who professe to slight it, make great Advantage of it when they imagine it is on their side, He intitles to Antient Prudence that way of Popular Government which his Book applauds, and fastens upon Modern Prudence that Monarchicall Government which it Decries. And that He is not wronged by this Interpretation of his Designe, appeares manifestly by his subsequent Definitions of Government. Against this Partition of Prudence into Antient and Modern, and the Application of it that way, the Author of the Considerations advanced these objections.

Oceana p. 2.

1. That though the Greeks and Romans despised all the World but themselves, We had no Reason to do so, it being in them no better then Pride, Pedantry, and slavery to narrow thoughts.

2. That the Examples of the Assyrian, Persian, and Egyptian Monarchies would not consist with this Division, all of which were more antient then the Greeks and Romans.

3 That

3. That Macedon one of the Nobleſt parts of Greece it ſelfe, had alwaies been under the Power of Monarchs.

4. That in the reſt of Greece Regall Government was more Antient then Popular; for which (to avoid the uſeleſſe Prolixity of particular Proofs, which are almoſt infinite) one Generall Authority was produced out of Thucydides.

5. That in Rome alſo Popular Government muſt give the precedence of Time to Monarchy.

He that after all this, will maintaine Prudence to have been well diſtinguiſht into Antient & Modern, and that by Antient Prudence is to be underſtood the Policy of a Common-wealth, gives us great Occaſion to expect from him Evident and Satisfactory Anſwers to every one of theſe Objections.

But to the firſt of them Mr *Harrington's* Anſwer (when all the Foame is wiped away) comes only to this, that the Greeks and Romans who were *H.* p. 52 ſuch Jealous Conſervators of Liberty, and Maſters of ſuch excellent parts of knowledge can not with any Truth or Sence be charged with Pedantry, or ſlavery to narrow Principles. To which it may be replied in ſhort (for the diſpute taken thus is become very remote from the Principall matter) that both Romans and Greeks were indeed a brave and a wiſe People, and ſuch as put a great Value upon themſelves, which when done upon juſt grounds is an effect of Magnanimity; But they have withall been ever Reſponſible to the learned part of the World, for their Arrogance in not acknowledging how much they profited by the Eaſterne Nations, from whom it is demonſtrable

They borrowed the greatest part of what they had of Arts and Sciences. The Greeks and Romans possest Much, yet what they wanted was More; But they taking the Much to be All, were in that Slaves to their owne thoughts which were much Narrower then the Nature of things.

To the second Objection, Mr *Harrington* gives somewhat an unexpected Answer; *That having opened the Policy of Turky, He has not neglected that of the Babylonians and Persians, which are summed up in the other.* The Controversie is about the Antiquity of Regall and Popular Government, And becaus it is manifest that many Commonwealths are more Antient then the Turkish Monarchy, which is of about three or foure hundred yeares, Must it therefore be concluded also that they are Antienter then the Assyrian and Persian Monarchies, which are of three or foure thousand yeares standing? We are not more beholding to Mr *Harrington* for his Discovery of the Ballance, then for the Invention of this excellent forme of Arguing.

ibid.

The third Instance is by Mr *Harrington* passed over in wise silence.

As little Answer is returned to the Fourth. But upon occasion of a Citation out of *Thucydides*, Mr *Harrington* pleases himself that He has found something in that Author that makes for the Ballance, which (slipping from the subject in hand) He runs away with, and prosecutes at large. But this Discourse being somewhat unfortunately scattered in this Place, with Mr *Harrington's* Permission it shall be transplanted to the Chapter of the Ballance, a soile more proper for it. And well

See cahp. 3.

well we can part ſo; For it is to be doubted whether the Conſiderer is like to get ſo well off another place of the ſame Author; *Never*, ſaies Mr *Harrington*, *did man make a more unlucky Choice for himſelfe then the Conſiderer has of Thucydides, ſeeing what He affirmeth to have been Antient Prudence, is depoſed by his own Witneſs to have been the Imbecility of Antient Times. Thucyd. lib.* 1. *pag.* 3. Truly the Conſiderer is a very unhappy Man, but his unhappineſs lies not in the miſtaking of *Thucydides*, but of Mr *Harrington*, from whom he expected to have ſeen ſome Probation, that the Prudence which was Antient belonged not to Monarchies; But He finds the Queſtion fraudulently transferred from the Antiquity, to the Prudence of Monarchicall Government, which in this Place came never before into Debate, and was ſuppoſed by Mr *Harrington* himſelfe both in his Diviſion and Definitions of Government. The Conſiderer will thank any man to tell him, Who is the Prevaricator now? *H.* p. 3.

Having thus detected the Cheat which was out of *Thucydides* put upon us concerning the Antiquity of Monarchicall Government among the Græcians, I ſhall not need to do more then admoniſh, That (in anſwer to the fift Objection) the ſame is indeavoured out of *Florus* in Reference to the Romans.

I make no Doubt there is enough ſaid for my own Vindication; but it were a criminall Injuſtice to the memory of the excellent Giannotti, if I ſhould not extend this Vindication

to Him also, and bring him off from that share of the Absurdity into which Mr *Harrington* has drawen him, by making him Author of the Division of Prudence into Antient and Modern. It is no longer a Wonder to Me that Mr *Harrington's* Adversaries are used with so little Civility, when I see his Friends meet with so little Honesty; The injury he does Giannotti is very apparent, seeing the two Limits or Epocha's of time which Giannotti fixes have no reference to Prudence, or Monarchicall and Popular Government, but respect only the afflicted Condition of Italy; *One of these,* saies He, *in which was the beginning of the ruine of Italy and the Roman Empire, was when Rome was oppresst by the Arms of Cæsar: The other, in which was the height of the Italian misery, was when Italy was overrunne and sackt by the Hunnes, &c.* This surely has nothing to do with the Government of King and People, or Antient and Modern Prudence; That Distinction is Mr *Harrington's* own, & Giannotti is not at all Responsible for the Impropriety of it, then which nothing can be greater.

Gian. p. 7.

There is besides these Answers to my Objections something in Mr *Harrington's* first Chapter relating to the University (for which He had not from Me the least shadow of an Occasion) which approaches very neere to Raving, and gives Me cause to suspect I have fallen into a wrong Course of curing his Politicall distemper, For whereas I think to do it by giving him more Light, knowing men are of Opinion, that

that I ought to have closed up the Windowes, and admitted no Light at all.

Now then after all, I resolve to joyne issue with Mr *Harrington*, and let the Reader know *He need look no farther then this Chapter to see what Answer has been made* to the Considerations on the Common-wealth of Oceana.

CHAP. II.

Whether a Common-wealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws, and not of Men, And a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Laws.

IN the very Entrance of this Chapter I am charged by Mr *Harrington* with an Habituall Falshood and Fraudulence in reciting his Words, for which I am thankfull to him, as for a seasonable Discovery of his good Nature. The only Evidence to make good this Accusation will be found to be, that instead of the Word Art, as it was in his Book, Act is twice printed in the Considerations. That this is an Error of the Presse, I might appeale to my own Copie, if it were not sufficient to appeale to the Indifferent Reader, whether there can be any fraudulence in such a Variation, of which I make no Use, and which is not in the least conducing to my Design. I envy Mr *Harrington* this handsome Confidence, that having been himselfe so miserably handled by Printers, He should

think fit to make Me reſponſible for all the ſinnes of the Preſs. But though I praiſe his Confidence, I cannot imitate his ſlender Ingenuity, by laying at his Doore the Nonſenſe and Miſtakes in this laſt Book, though order be there taken, that they ſhould be imputed unto the Author himſelfe, In as much as the Printer pretends (upon the laſt Page) to have corrected the Errors of his Preſs.

The Queſtion under Debate in this Chapter is little more then a Controverſie about Words and Names, yet cannot be ſafely omitted becauſe by the uſe of thoſe Names the People have been alwaies deluded, and have (taking a Cloud for Juno) embraced them as Subſtantiall Goods: Lawes and Liberty being the only True Charms, that I know of, in Nature, which by the meere ſound of Words produce Great and Reall Effects.

That Law *proceeds from the Will of Man*, I
H. p. 7. have Mr *Harrington's* owne Confeſſion, and conſequently am juſtified for having ſaid, That Government is not in the Law, but in the Perſon whoſe Will gave a being to that Law. But I am complained of for wanting *Honeſty to Conſider* that this Will muſt have a Mover, and that this Mover is Intereſt. I never knew, that to be Honeſt, it was neceſſary to ſee more in another Man's buſineſſe then He ſees himſelf: I was at that time only concerned to find ſomewhat in Government beyond Lawes, and ſuch was the Will of the Perſon which creates thoſe Lawes; If Mr *Harrington* does now think fit to conſider

conſider that this Will muſt be moved by Intereſt, I neither need nor meane to oppoſe him in it. I can be not only Honeſt but Liberall to Mr *Harrington*, yet not to that Exceſs as to give him an Almes, when he begs no leſs then the whole Queſtion; For ſo much it amounts to where he ſaies, *That the Intereſt of the whole People coming up to the Publique Intereſt may be truly called the Empire of Lawes and not of Men*, In order to this, let Me demand of him Whether the Commands impoſed upon the Publique by One or a few Men are to be accounted Lawes? He has already taught Us they are to be ſo accounted where he ſaies *That Law equally proceeds from Will, whither of the whole People as in a Common-wealth, of one Man, as in an Abſolute, of few Men as in a Regulated Monarchy* If ſo, what pretence of Reaſon can there be, That an Abſolute or Regulated Monarchy ſhould be eſteemed leſs a Government of Lawes then is a Common-wealth? On the other ſide let Me aske Him, Whether though one ſingle Perſon, or Ten or an Hundred Perſons making Lawes are to be lookt on as Men, yet if they amount to Ten or an hundred thouſand Perſons, or include the whole People, They ſhall then ceaſe to be Men? Unleſs He will affirm this, How is it poſſible that a Common-wealth ſhould be leſs a Government of Men, then either an Abſolute or a Regulated Monarchy? To be plaine, If the Declared Will of the Supream Power be conſidered as the Immediate Cauſe of Government, then a Monarchy is as much

ibid.

ibid.

as

as a Common-wealth an Empire of Lawes and not of men: If we look further back, and consider the Persons whose Will is received as Law, a Common-wealth is as much as a Monarchy an Empire of Men and not of Lawes. This is so manifest, and yet Mr *Harrington* so firmely resolved not to understand it, that considering his Temper I must needs applaud his Resolution of having nothing to do with the Mathematiques, For halfe this Obstinacy would be enough to keep him from apprehending, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equall to two Right Angles.

Though I have said more then enough in Answer to this double Question, Whether a Common-wealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Lawes, and not of Men, And a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Lawes; Yet I may seeme to have said too little, unlesse I take notice of an Argument which by Occasion of this Dispute has been started against Monarchy. Let it be admitted, may some Democratique say, that Monarchy is as much as a Commonwealth an Empire of Lawes, yet a Common-wealth must necessarily be an Empire of better Lawes then a Monarchy; *For in a Monarchy the Lawes being made according to the Interest of one Man or a few Men, must needs be more private and Partiall then suites with the Nature of Justice, Whereas in a Common-wealth Lawes being made by the whole People, They come up to the Publique Interest, which is Common Right and Justice.* This Proposition has indeed Sence in it, which

ibid.

the

the other wanted, but not any more Truth, as will be apparent if We examine the Differing Tempers of a ſingle Perſon, and of a Multitude enacting Lawes.

When a ſingle Perſon or Monarch begins to think of eſtabliſhing any Law, He muſt in all Reaſon be then moſt ſenſible of thoſe Vaſt Cares which are never ſo preſſing as at the undertaking an Action which drawes after it a long Traine of Conſequences; For upon the Eſtabliſhment and Execution of Good Lawes depends that Juſtice which preſerves every Man in his owne; The fruits of Juſtice are the Satisfaction and Welfare of the People, and from theſe flow Publique Peace and Security, which are a Princes firſt and Greateſt Intereſt: Hence it is evident that when a Monarch acts the Legiſlator's part, He ought to be ſo farre from Partiality or reſpecting his owne private Intereſt, that He is then chiefly to Direct his Thoughts to the Common Good, and take the largeſt Proſpect of Publique Utility, in which his owne is ſo eminently included. Nor do I believe there can be many Examples produced of Princes who in enacting Lawes have conſidered their owne private Perſonall Intereſt, ſince almoſt every where We ſee that in buying and ſelling, and other private Contracts, Princes are Content to tye themſelves up to the ſame Rules which they preſcribe to others. And even in thoſe Caſes where the Lawes made by Princes ſeeme moſt directed to their owne Intereſt, before We condemne them, It ought

to

to be examined, Whether such Lawes be not Requisite to the attaining the Ends of Government, And Whether the Advantages in Power which Princes gaine by them be not absolutely Necessary for the Conservation of Publique Peace and Tranquillity; For then the Private Interest of the Prince, and the Publique Interest do no longer differ, but are one and the same thing.

On the other side there cannot be a fonder Imagination then to think That when a Multitude is assembled to enact Lawes, is is necessary their Resolutions should be consonant to Publique Justice, and the Universall Interest; For a great Part will not for want of Capacity comprehend what this Justice and Interest is; The abler sort will presently be divided into factions and Iuntas, and under Pretence of Publique Interest will prosecute their own Designs. I cannot understand how it is the Publique Interest of the whole People to Govern and make Lawes, but indeed to be so Governed and live under such Lawes, that Justice may be impartially administred, and Every Man preserved in the Injoyment of his Own, which I have shown to be a Monarch's chiefe Care. It is to be remembred also that the greatest Part of Lawes concern such Matters as are the continuall Occasion of Controversie between the People of a Nation; Such are the Lawes which respect the Regulation of all Contracts and Bargains, the Privileges of Companies and Corporations, the Encouragements and Limitations of Manufactures, the Licences

cences and Prohibitions of Traffique, with many more of the ſame Nature, by all which ſome Part of the People being Gainers, and another Part Looſers, They cannot where their Intereſts are thus divided be ſo fitly qualified for Legiſlators, as is a *Prince* who having no private Concernment going, can have no aime but the Common good. After all, it being eſſentiall to *Popular* Aſſemblies that the *Plurality* of Votes ſhould oblige the whole Body, thoſe Lawes which lay claime to the Conſent of all, are very often the Reſolutions of but a little more then halfe, And muſt conſequently go leſſe in their *Pretenſions* to *Publique* Intereſt.

Let Us ſee how theſe Things have been carried in Experience: And We ſhall every where find, That thoſe Lawes which are reputed the *People's* greateſt Security againſt Injuſtice and Oppreſſion have been eſtabliſht by the Authority of ſome *Prince*; Thus *Alfred*, *Edward*, *Lewis*, *Alfonſo*, in their ſeverall Ages and Dominions, haue been excellent Legiſlators; But above all, Severall of the Roman Emperours, and chiefly *Juſtinian*, have (by the Advice of a few private Men whoſe Aſſiſtance they voluntarily thought fit to make uſe of) fabricated thoſe Lawes ſo much admired for their Reaſon and Equity, which have ſtretcht themſelves further then ever the Roman Legions were able to march, and which are ſtill embraced by thoſe *People* who have long ſince ceaſed to acknowledge the Roman Empire.

But on the other ſide, Thoſe Commonwealths which

which have beene most celebrated for their Lawes, have received them from the hands of a sole Legislator, as Athens and Sparta; Or else the People conscious of their owne Incapacity that way, have invested some few Men with a Supreme Power for the Constitution of Laws, as the Romans did the *Decem viri*. And therefore it may well be doubted, whether these People thought so well of themselves as Mr *Harrington* seemes to do of all Popular Assemblies, while He with such repeated Confidence asserts that the People never faile to judge truly of the Publique Interest where the Senate discharge their Duty; If the Senate divide well He undertakes for the People they shall be sure, to make a good Choice. For my part I confesse that this is too hard for my Faith, and that I rather think if *Anacharsis* were againe in the World, He would meet with Occasion to renew the Observation He made of the Grecian Popular Assemblies, *That wise Men propounded Matters, and Fooles decided them.*

Oceana p. 183.

Plut. in Solon.

To discover all the weake Arguments and false Inferences of Mr *Harrington* is a Work, to Others of so small Profit, and to my selfe of so little Glory, that I resolve to passe very slightly over that Paragraph where He tells Us, That it is not the Declaration of the Will of the Sovereigne Power which constitutes and revokes Lawes, but that it is with Lawes as with a Bond, which continues in force till all the Parties agree to repeal or Cancell it: He foresaw the objection against this Example, *That it is a private One*, And therefore

therefore *puts the Caſe between ſeverall Princes States, or Governments, or between ſeverall States of the ſame Principality or Government.* But though it may ſute very well with Mr *Harrington's* Occaſions to Put this Caſe, it will not become Us to admit of it, who ought to underſtand that the Leagues and Confederacies between ſeverall Princes or States have nothing of the Nature of a Bond in them; For when either Party thinks fit to recede from them (though in it ſelfe it may be an Act of Injuſtice) there is no ſuperiour Tribunall to appeale to, by which the Party can be conſtrained to ſtand to the Obligation, but the Buſineſſe muſt be determined by a War. Much leſſe have they any thing of the Nature of Law in them, unleſſe, as Mr *Harrington* ſeemes to be of Opinion, Princes or States may make Lawes not only for themſelves but for their Neighbours too; Which *Maxime* agreeing ſo well with his Legiſlative humour, may one day ſerve to produce as fine Models of Government for France or Spaine, as he has given us for England. Nor is the Caſe altered by putting it *betweene the ſeverall States of the ſame Principality or Government*, For if any one of theſe States have, in Caſe of Difference, a juſt Power to force the obedience of the Other, it is all one as if they were private Perſons; But if no One of them be acknowledged to have ſuch Power over the Reſt, Then in caſe of their Diſagreement, there remaines no knowne Sovereigne Power, but that Nation is reduced to the State

H. p. 8.

ibid.

of

of War; From whence it is evident That they were not at first to have been considered as severall States of the same Government, but as equall Independent Ones which were only joyned together by some League or Union.

Before I finish this Chapter I must retract an Error of which Mr *Harrington* has convinced Me: He had affirmed That for Mr *Hobs* to say *Aristotle* and *Cicero* wrote not the Rules of their Politiques from the Principles of Nature but transcribed them into their Books out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, was as if a Man should say of famous *Harvey* that He transcribed his Circulation of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body: To which I replied, That the whole force of the Objection amounted but to this, That because *Harvey* in his Circulation hath followed the Principles of Nature, therefore *Aristotle* and *Cicero* have done so in their Discourses of Government. I confess, The Affirmation not being of it selfe manifest, and I ignorant of any Obligation to take it upon Mr *Harrington's* Word, I thought the Probation of it must lye in the Resemblance of *Aristotle's* and *Livie's* Books of Government with *Harveys* of Circulation: But this was an Error in Me; and an Injury to Mr *Harrington*, For in his last book He has assured Me, that He produced it only as a *Similitude*, and never intended that any Man should look for *Reason* or *Argument* in it. I heartily crave his Pardon, and by way of Reparation to him,

H. p. 9.

I

I make here a ſolemn Declaration, That for the future He ſhall have no Cauſe to accuſe Me for expecting Reaſon or Argument in any of his Diſcourſes.

CHAP. III.

Whether the Ballance of Dominion in Land be the Naturall Cauſe of Empire.

I Shall lye under a very great Diſcouragement in the Proſecution of this Conteſt with Mr *Harrington*, unleſs ſome ſuch Rules may be eſtabliſh't between Us, as are obſerved by the Champions at a Country Wake; That He who gets a broken Head is for that Time *Hors du jeu*, and muſt not take up the Cudgels any more. For if Mr *Harrington* may continue the Liberty of repeating (notwithſtanding my Anſwers) whole Pages of his *Oceana* without any Addition of Argument, It will be eaſy for him every Month to impregnate the Preſs with a New great Book. Of this his Repitition I give Notice once for all, being unwilling to be ſo frequent in the Admonition as He is in the Practiſe of it.

Yet We are not to think that there is nothing New in his laſt Book, for though his Reaſons ſtand at a ſtay, his Confidence improves hugely, and He now tels Us, that (in Deſpight of Mathematiques) *by the Doctrine of the Ballance He has made the Politiques the moſt Demonſtrable of any Art whatſoever.* I am ſorry I have ſo little Credit with Him, elſe I ſhould ſoberly adviſe *H.* p. 11.

him to obtain from this Word Demonstration; for though it fills his Mouth admirably, some have taken Occasion to doubt it has left a great dealeof empty roome in his Head.

The Invention of the Ballance He jealously asserts to be his own; Though in another place he begins to doubt that *Phaleas* the Chalcedonian may dispute it with Him; And that with great Reason, seeing it is evident out of *Aristotle* (though it be rejected by him, as I shall hereafter discover) that *Phaleas* did many Ages since light upon the same Phansie, I feare also that He will in another Respect prove of the younger house, for many Months before the Publication of his Oceana, there came forth a Letter, pretended to be sent *from an Officer of the Army in Ireland to his Highness the* LORD PROTECTOR, *concerning his changing of the Government*, in which the Doctrine of the Ballance, was not obscurely hinted. But this last will (it may be) trouble Mr *Harrington* but little, since it is not unlikely the Author of that Letter goes a share in the Commonwealth of Oceana. However, I shall not make my selfe Judge of this Controversie, but rather, being Mr *Harrington* has thought fit to walk over the same Ground again in this Chapter of the Ballance, take that Occasion to apply my selfe to a more accurate Discussion of the whole Question, then I before thought Necessary. Which will be best performed by these Graduall Assertions.

First, That Dominion in Land is a meere Effect

Effect of Empire, and therefore cannot be the Cauſe of it, unleſs to be the Cauſe and the Effect be but one and the ſame thing. Originally every man had Right to every thing, and no One Man had more Title to one Piece of Land, then He had to any other Piece, and then Every Man had to the ſame Piece: Or if this Aſſertion be thought too large, at leaſt There was no ſetled Propriety before the Eſtabliſhment of Empire, nor could any Man be ſaid to have the Dominion of that Land, from whence He might be immediatly ejected by the Violence of the next Invader. But after the Eſtabliſhment of Empire, when the United Force of thoſe who became Subject to One Sovereign Power was grown greater then could be reſiſted by Particular Men, Then and not before was Propriety and Dominion in Land fixed according to ſuch Rule and Proportion as the Sovereign Power thought Requiſite. As for thoſe two waies of *Naturall and Violent Revolution* by which Mr *Harrington* imagines *Propriety may come to have a being before Empire*, they are not to be admitted further then in Reference to this or that particular Empire, and ſo indeed Propriety may be ſaid to be before Empire, as the Propriety of the Families of *Naſſau* or *Brederode* to their Lands, was before the Empire of the States of *Holland*: But then this Propriety depended upon ſome former Empire, and would no longer continue to be Propriety if the ſucceeding Empire, (be it either by Naturall or Violent Revolution) did not allow and Authorize it.

Wherefore it is evident, That seeing Dominion in Land depends meerly upon Empire, it must needs be a gross Absurdity to say, *That the Ballance of Dominion in Land is the Naturall Cause of Empire.* If notwithstanding this it can be made out, that there is such a Complication of Empire with the Ballance in Land that the Conformity of the Ballance is necessary to the health and long Life of Empire, To fit Empire to the Ballance is to set the Sun by the Clock, The Dominion in Land being in that Case to be reduced to such a Ballance as best suites with the Empire: Which inverts the Aime, and at once overthrows the whole Modell of the Commowealth of *Oceana.*

But in the second Place, This Illation need not be persued, because I think it may with very good Reason be asserted That Justice is that by which all Empires subsist, and come to be (as far as humane Instability permits) Eternall. It is an Error to think (as has been already touched) that the Generality of a People are infected with a Desire of Sovereign Power, and will not be satisfied with Protection in their present Possessions, and Incouragement in Acquiring more by the way of a Regular Industrie. The Multitude, saies *Aristotle*, are not disgusted at being excluded from the Government, but rather are very well pleased to sit Quiet and be at leasure to follow their own Business, unless they are oppresst and see their Governours make havock of the Publique. If a Prince be carefull of the Administration of Justice, and do not by any Publique,

Arist. Polit. lib. 4. cap. 13. & lib. 4. cap. 8.

Publique, or ſignall private Violation of it exaſperate his Subjects, He need not fear the want of their Aſſiſtance for the Defence of his Throne, All Popular Commotions that happen in a Nation being grounded upon Pretence, at leaſt, of ſome Injuſtice in the Governour. And though this Prince be overballanced in Land by any Part of the People, it does not therefore follow, That they will refuſe to continue under his Government, as long as it is adminiſtred with Juſtice: For it is a chief Part of the Function of the Supream Magiſtrate to be as it were a Publique Arbitrator, to whom the Deciſion of all Controverſies among his Subjects is referred, and We know that in an Arbitrator, it is not Riches but Integrity and Ability that Men look after; Nor have I heard any reaſon why a Poore Man, if known to be honeſt, may not be truſted to keep ſtakes in a Wager for more then his Eſtate comes to.

Yet becauſe the Actions of a Prince though in themſelves juſt, may through Miſtake or Malice not be conſidered as ſuch by a People, I do not meane that a Prince ſhould be deveſted of all Power but what He gains by the Opinion of his Juſtice and Innocence; And therefore in the third Place *I* deſcend to examine how far Riches conduce to Sovereign Power, and Whether an Eſtate in Land is naturally Productive of Empire more then any other Revenue.

The Reparation of our Subſtance by conti-

nuall Supplies of Meat and Drink, And the Defence of our Bodies (in cold Countreys especially) from the Injuries of the Weather by Garments and Habitations, are the first and most Naturall Cares of Mankind; We did not long continue satisfied with what was purely necessary of this Sort, but soon grew up to desire Convenience and the Reall pleasing our Senses, And at last came to seek after things of Luxurie and Vanity, which depend altogether upon Opinion. And becausе no Man by his single Power could be secure in the Possession of any of these Things, there was an early Willingness in Men to submit to Empire, that by their United Force (which is that We call Sovereign Power) They might be maintained (upon such Terms as the Sovereign Power pleased to establish) in the Acquiring and Possessing such Things as tended to the Ends already mentioned: This was the Introduction of Propriety. At first this consisted only in the Fruits of the Earth and Cattle, And He who had Land enough to bring forth more of these then He could consume, was a Rich Man, and might with the Superfluity drive some little Commerce by way of Exchange with the Neighbourhood. But after that Men had found out a way of Entercourse with People far remote, and a more considerable Traffique began to be set on foot, Something was fixed upon by generall Consent which might be the Common Measure of the Value of all Things needfull to Man; This is called Mony, which

by

by it's Portability and Currentneſs having a great Advantage in the Uſe of it, a Value came alſo to be put upon That, known by the Name of Uſury or Intereſt. And now He that abounds with Mony, need not be in want of ſuch Things as are Uſefull to him, becauſe other Men will for his Mony be glad to let him have part of their Superfluity.

Out of this We may infer, That ſince the Eſtabliſhment of Propriety by the Sovereign Power has rendred it neither Free nor Safe for particular Men to make Uſe of Force in gaining ſuch Things as they ſtand in need of; Riches do highly conduce to Power; For Men that are unprovided of other meanes of acquiring ſuch Things as They can not want, are faine to apply themſelves to the Rich for obtaining of them, Who do not uſe to part with them, but in Exchange of ſome Service or Subjection by which they grow Powerfull. Yet this Power gained by Riches is alwaies dependant upon the Sovereign Power which Inſtitutes and preſerves Propriety; For againſt a Force ſtrong enough (ſuch as are Conqueſts and ſucceſſull Rebellions) to overthrow the ſetled Propriety by the Subverſion of the Sovereign Power, Riches are not of any Defence, but rather matter of Invitation to an Enemy by the greatneſs of the Booty.

We may alſo infer That where there is no Traffique or Mony, as in new Plantations, the Riches which conduce to Power conſiſt in Dominion of Land able to produce ſuch Things as

are necessary or Convenient to Subsistence; But in other Places where the Estimate and Purchase of all usefull things is reduced to Mony, there the Influence which Riches have upon Power flows not from an Estate in Land only, but principally and immediatly from ready Mony; Or to make use of Mr *Harrington's* Words, The Ballance of Dominion in Land is not the Naturall Cause of Empire.

This was of old known to Aristotle, who having related the Project of *Phaleas* the Chalcedonian to settle a Government by reducing Estates to an Equality, with the expedient invented by him to bring it to pass, At last He rejects it for this Reason chiefly; *That He had not considered aright of this equality, having only indeavoured to introduce it in Land,* (What is this but Mr *Harrington's* Ballance in Land?) *Whereas Riches consisted as well in Slaves, and Cattle, and Mony, and Furniture, in all of which He ought to have setled the same Equality or Moderate Proportion, or else altogether to have omitted that Phansie.*

Arist. Polit. lib. 2. cap. 7.

In this Particular also Mr *Harrington* seems to have lost ground to the Considerer; for whereas He at first maintained that the Ballance in Mony can be equall to that of Land only in Places of great Trade and little or no Land as *Holland* and *Genoa*, He is now faine to confess that in *Israel* and *Lacedæmon* too, the Countreys being narrow and the Lots at a low

Oceana p. 5.

H. p. 14.

low scantling, if Usury in the One and in the other Mony had not been forbid, Mony would have eaten out the Ballance of Land. This is upon the Matter to surrender the whole Question, and to Allow that in all Places where there is mony enough to hold any considerable Proportion to the Land (And the Considerer was not so senseless to think there could be weight in empty Bags) There the Ballance in Mony does concur to Empire as much as that in Land.

So then Mr *Harrington's* Assertion is not a little streightned, and He that undertook to make good in the Generall that Empire rests upon the Ballance in Land, is content it should prove so only *in a Territory of such extent as Spain or England, where the Land can not be overballanced by Mony.* For this He offers three Arguments, the first of which belongs not it seems to the Matter but the Man. The Considerer had said that to make Wisedome or Riches the first Principle of Government, were as unjust as it would be to oblige Mr *Harrington* to give his Cloths or Mony to the next Man he meets Wiser or Richer then himself. *If he had said stronger*, saies Mr *Harrington*, *he had spoiled all.* Tis very true, the Considerer knew that, and therefore did not say so. Is that a Crime? He has in more then one place of the Considerations made appeare what Influence He thinks force had Originally upon Government, and therefore there is no Reason to take it ill that

H. p. 15.

ibid.

that He did not in this place contradict his own Opinion. But, Mr *Harrington* continues to urge, *The Richer as to the Case in Debate is the stronger, and if the People have Riches, that is Clothes or Mony of their own, they must rise out of the Propriety or Cultivation of Land, and so the Ballance of Land must of Necessity be in the People themselves, who having that will never give their Clothes or Mony or Obedience unto a single Person or a Nobility, though these should be the richer in Mony, whence it is evident that in such a Territry as England or Spain, Mony can never come to overballance Land.* A fine Modest Argument this, which though it be called a Demonstration, I should never suspected to have been meant for a Mathematicall One, but that I find it going upon certain *Data* or *Postulata*, two of which by Misfortune happen to be the very things which were to be proved, As first, that if the People have Riches they must rise out of the Propriety or Cultivation of Land, And then that Ready Mony though in never so great a Quantity cannot outweigh the Ballance in Land. To speak freely, This whole Passage has so little Affinity with sense, that I must believe Mr *Harrington* was in Choler, and intended it as a Piece of Revenge against the Considerer, for having dared to put a Supposition that any Man could be Wiser then the *Author of Oceana.*

H. p. 16.

His second Argument (and that's called a Demonstration too) is *that Henry the seventh, though the richest in Mony of English Princes did*

ibid.

by

by making Farms of a Standard, and cutting of Retainers begin that Breach in the Ballance of Land, which hath since ruin'd the Government. But did that Ruine swallow up the Government while that ready mony was in being? Or did not his Son *Henry* the eight by his Pleasures and unprofitable Wars exhaust all that Treasure in a few of the first years of his Reign? I may with Modesty and Truth enough let Mr *Harrington* know that if the Exchecquer had eighteen years agoe been as well furnisht as *Henry* the seventh left it, He might now probably have wanted the Occasion of shewing his Skill in Modelling a Commonwealth.

The third Argument is, *That the Monarchy of Spain since that King had the Indies, stands upon the same Ballance in the Lands of the Nobility, on which it alwaies stood.* This it seems We must believe for Mr *Harrington*'s sake without any further Proof, though the Opposite Assertion, That it does not stand upon the same Ballance, was profered as an Instance against him by the Consider; Who can now fortify his Side by this Observation, That from the Discovery of the *American* Mines to the yeare 1640 (a Tract of time of more then 120 years) the Crown of Spain has not been disturbed by any Domestick sedition of the Nobility, for which there cannot any so Probable Reason be assigned, as the Increase of the King's Revenue in ready Mony by which he is inabled to maintain a Force that overballances their Estates in Land.

Mr

Mr *Harrington's* Arguments being thus fitted with Replies, it will be expedient to resume the Consideration of those waies by which a Revenue both Private and Publique may be raised, that so We may the better judge, Whether in such a Territory as Spain or England Mony may not come to overballance Land: But I do not think it belongs to Me to do this with the Accurateness either of a Philosopher who discourses (as *Aristotle* does in the second of his *Oeconomicks*) of all the severall possible waies of managing an Estate, Or of a *Financier* who makes a Proposition for the raising a present summe of Ready Mony. It will be enough to observe in generall the most ready and Naturall Methods by which a Considerable Revenue may be obtained.

The First of these is by the Propriety and Cultivation of Lands, which is a very generall Way, and the sole Considerable One in such Places where the Methods hereafter expresst are not practicable. Out of this, in some Places, a certain Tax or Proportion is payable to the Sovereign Power, by which the Owner looses no part of his Propriety, yet has as it were a Rent Charge laid upon his Estate.

The second is taken from the Bowels of the Earth, which in some Parts are fertile of those Metals that need only the stroke of an Hammer to make them Current Mony; These are either belonging solely to the Supream Power though taken out of other Men's Ground, as here

here in England, Or at least a great share of them belongs to the *Prince*, as it is with the King of Spain in respect of all the Gold and Silver of *America*.

The third is by Traffique and Commerce; And that either *Private* and Domestick, as carrying the Commodities of a *Man's* own Grouth to *Market*, and *Mean Artisans* selling their Work to the Neighbourhood, which are often charged by the *Publique* with some Excise or Gabell; Or else *Publique* and Forreign, when by *Publique* Authority Companies are formed for the better Exportation and Importation of Goods and *Manufacture*: And out of these some considerable Duties and Customes, do almost every where issue to the *Publique* Revenue.

The fourth and last is from the *Profit* of *Mony* by Usury, And that also either *Private*, when every *Man* puts out his own *Mony*, upon which some Assessement, payable by the Lender, to the *Publique* ought in all Reason to be imposed, Usurers being otherwise very unprofitable *Members* of a State, and the only Men who contribute nothing to the Publique Charge: Or else Publique under the Inspection and Security of the Supream Power, commonly known by the name of Banks, by which no small Revenue uses to accrue to the Publique.

Now to shew that in Spain or England the three last waies of raising a Revenue may be

be more considerable then the first, Or, which is all One, that Mony may overballance Land, will not be difficult, if We consider that Spain (And if *Henry* the seventh had given eare to *Columbus* his Profer England had been Mistress of the same Treasures) is possest of all the Bullion of the West Indies amounting annually (not to mention greater Summes gained at the first Discovery of those Countries) to 3 or 4 millions of our Mony, which is by Mr *Harrington's* Calculation a full third of all the Land in England. Next, Spain or England are either of them by Nature endowed with all Advantages for taking the whole Traffique of the World into their Hands, and are inferiour to the Dutch who injoy it, in nothing but Industrie: What the Importance of this is or might be, the Dutch will best help Us to Understand, Who by that alone without any considerable Land, have been able to baffle Spain, and contest with England. And if Spain or England have or may have such a Traffique; They may also when they please erect a Bank for any the Greatest summe of Mony.

Against this Mr *Harrington* has but One Objection in store, which is, *That the Purse of a Prince never yet made a Banke, nor till Spending and Trading Mony be all one, ever shall; Where there is a Bank, Ten to One there is a Commonwealth.* This does Us no hurt, For if England or Spain were a Commonwealth, their Ballance in Mony might then outweigh that in Land, which is the Thing contended for. But

H. p. 17.

He

He will be in Danger to loose his Wager, and his Credit to boot; For some Monarchs have been as great Traders as any Commonwealths. The example of the *Medices* he yields Me, to that I will adde the Crown of *Portugall*, which presently after the Discovery of the Cape of good Hope did manage that mighty *Lucrative* Traffique which now the Dutch and English share with them: The Examples of the *Mogor* and other Eastern *Princes* may also be alledged, who though Monarchs are very great Traders. And where there is a Traffique, it is undeniable but that, if it be found expedient, there may be a Bank; Or is *Antwerp* a Commonwealth, or the *Monti* at *Rome* planted in a *Popular* Government?

It would not be unfit also that before We consent *to resolve that in such a Territory as England Mony can never overballance Land*, We did a little reflect upon the Successes of our last Wars, and inquire Whether it was not the Mony of the City of *London* which turned the Scales.

Having thus examined what the Influence of Riches is upon Empire, What the Importance of Propriety in Land, and What that of ready Mony, in such a Territory particularly as Spain or England, I may with reason expect not to be thought to have *strained very much at the Doctrine of the Ballance*, much less, *to have been choaked with it*. I confess I cannot swallow it so fast as Mr *Harrington*, but that, it may be, does not hinder Me from digesting it better. *H.* p. 18.

At

At least I have leisure to observe that while He attributes so much to the Ballance, He commits an Error in making an Army depend meerly upon the Riches of those who have the Disposing of it: For though it be true *That an Army is a Beast with a great Belly which subsisteth not without very large Pastures*, It is as true that this Beast is none of those tame Ones that are kept within Fences, or imprisoned in a Severall: When an Army is once on foot, the Incloſure of the Law is too weak to hold it in, And Propriety is no better then an Hedge of rotten Sticks. It was the Observation of Him who had Wit and Experience enough to be the Founder of the Roman Monarchy, *That Men and Mony are the two Things by which Power is acquired and preserved, And that these two do mutually support One another; For as by Mony an Army is brought together, So He that has Arms in his hand need not want Mony.* Thus even after the Settlement of Propriety by Government and Lawes, Force goes a share with Riches, and is not wholly excluded from concurring to the Establishment of Empire.

Dion. Cass. lib. 42.

Nay further, If there comes to be a Contest between Gold and Iron, the Advantage generally remains with the harder Metall, And He that has Arms in his Hand, may when He pleases both command the Mony in his Neighbours Pocket, and also gather the Rents of his Lands: As it of old fell out among the *Thurians*, Where the Nobility had ingrost all Offices and Magistracy into their own Hands, and had bought

(though

(though against the Law) the Lands of the whole Country; Yet the People being exercised & inured to the Wars, proved too hard for the Nobility and their Guard, And dismissed them of their Power and excessive Possessions in Land. From which Example these two Corollaries are evidently deduceable, That an Agrarian Law is not a sufficient Provision for fixing the Ballance, And that the Conformity of the Ballance to the establish't Government does not necessarily secure a State from Changes and Revolutions. *Arist. Polit.*

One thing more remains to dispatch this Question of the Ballance, And that is to produce Examples of such Governments as have been setled contrary to the Ballance in Land; But I find by the whole Course of Mr *Hartington's* Reply to Me, that this way of arguing is of no great Efficacy with Him, For either He takes no Notice of such Examples, or by some pitifull unmanly Cavill seeks to elude them. Wherefore I am put to make use of another Method, that is to bring him as a Witness against himself, and to prove this Point by the Authority of his own Assertions. In the 73 page of his Discourse concerning Ordination against Dr *Hamond*, He has imparted this Lesson to Us; *The People of Egypt till having sold their Lands they came to loose their Popular Ballance, were not servants unto Pharaoh, wherefore when Joseph was made Governour over all Egypt they were Free.*

H. p. 56. And in Consequence to this We are told by him in another Place, That the Ballance of absolute Monarchy or of a Nobility came into *Egypt* by the Purchase of *Joseph*. But it is evident that the Exercise of Sovereign Power was before belonging to the Kings of *Egypt* in a most Absolute manner, seeing the People when not only their whole Fortunes and Estates, but their very Lives also lay at stake by the Extremity of the Famine, had not force enough to break open the Granaries and take out Corne for their sustenance, but were faine to buy it of the King at his own Price. And if the People of *Egypt* had not in the Case of extream hunger (which uses to inrage the most abject and slavish People of the whole World) Power enough to serve themselves when there was enough of Corne in the Land, It is ridiculous to think they could retain any Power or Liberty in reference to the Government. Wherefore the Ballance of *Egypt* being Popular, and the Government Absolute Monarchy, Mr *Harrington* himself has furnished Us with a cleare Example of a Government that has been setled contrary to the Ballance in Land.

I might by this time lawfully hope for a Release from this Dispute of the Ballance, if I were not ingaged by my Promise in the first Chapter, to examine that place of *Thucydides*, which by diverting the Discourse gave Mr *Harrington* the Opportunity of saying something upon a Subject in which He must otherwise have been silent. But what He has there said is so extravagant

vagant and wandering from the true meaning of *Thucydides*, that I must needs think either He has parted with his own Understanding, or believes his Readers willing to part with theirs. Let the first 12 or 14 Pages of *Thucydides*, which serve as an Introduction to his Historie, be considerately perused, And it will be found to be the Author's aime to make it appear, That the Actions he goes about to describe were more great and considerable then any had formerly been performed by the *Græcians*. To this end He relates, *That of old, Greece was not constantly inhabited, but that at first there were often Removals, every One easily leaving the place of his Abode to the Violence of some greater Number. Every Man so husbanded the Ground, as but barely to live upon it without any stock of Riches, and planted Nothing, but made account to be Masters in any Place of such necessary Sustenance, as might serve from day to day. And for this Cause they were of no Ability at all, either for greatness of Cities, or other Provision. And the Imbecillity of Antient Times is not a little demonstrated also by this, That before the Trojan War nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in Common.* This then is Manifest to have been the oldest Condition of *Greece*, That though the People were not absolutely destitute of Civill Society, yet those Societies being of very small Numbers were too weak to improve by Plantation or Traffique, but were forced to abandon their Habitations to the Violence of such whom the fatness of the Soile invited thither. And as

Thucyd. p. 2.

Id. p. 3.

theſe Societies of Men were of themſelves weak and inconſiderable, ſo were they without any League or Union in Common, by which this their Imbecillity might have received a Cure. Sutable to their Condition was their manner of living, *To weare Iron, or be alwaies in Arms, and to count Theeving the beſt means of their living, being a Matter at that time no where in Diſgrace, but rather carrying with it ſomething of Glory. But Minos having built a Navy, Navigators had the Sea more free, For He expelled the Malefactors out of the Iſlands, and in moſt of them planted Colonies of his own. By which meanes They who inhabited the Sea coaſts, becoming more addicted to Riches, grew more conſtant to their dwellings; Of whom ſome grown now Rich compaſſed their Towns about with Wals. For out of deſire of gaine, the meaner ſort underwent Servitude with the Mighty; And the Mighty with their Wealth brought the leſſer Cities into Subjection.* It appeares by this that the firſt conſiderable increment of *Greece* was by King *Minos*, who having ſuppreſt the Pirates, and render'd Navigation ſafe, the Maritime Cities by their Traffique ſoon began to grow Rich, and for their Security fortified themſelves, and by theſe Advantages (People in want flocking to their Service) they prevailed over the leſſer Cities, and grew up to ſome indifferent Force, with which the War of *Troy* was undertaken: *Which Enterprize though of greater Name then any before it was through want of Mony but weake, and in fact beneath the Fame and report which, by meanes*

Id. p.4.

Id. p.5. & 6.

Id. p.8.

meanes of the Poets, now goeth of it. After the Trojan War also the Græcians continued still their Shiftings and Transplantations, insomuch as never resting they improved not their Power. But after a long time Greece had constant Rest, and shifting their seats no longer at length sent Colonies abroad. When the Power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of Mony withall, their Revenues being inlarged in most of the Cities there were erected Tyrannies. (For before that time Kingdomes with Honours limited were Hereditary.) And the Græcians built Navies, and became more seriously addicted to the Affaires of the Sea. Yet was not their Navall force very great, for having spoken of such Fleets as had been brought together either by Tyrants or Cities, and of the Actions performed by them, He concludes, *That if Men consider of the War he describes by the Acts done in the same, It will manifest it self to be greater then any of those before mentioned.* These are the Passages of *Thucydides* out of which Mr *Harrington* goes about, by an unheard of Chymistry, to extract the Doctrine of the Ballance; But He must give Me leave to observe these Errors and False Consequences in his Operation.

Id. p. 9.

Id. p. 13.

First He saies that *When out of desire of gain the Meaner Sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty, It caused Hereditary Kingdomes with Honours limited; As happened also with Us since the times of the Goths and Vandals.* Good! So We will be content to acknowledge this ima-

H. p. 27.

ginary Force of the Ballance, that Prudence which He himself cals Modern, and will have to be first introduced into the World after the breaking of the Roman Empire, shall be allowed to be more ancient then the most ancient Republiques. But I beseech him Where does He find that the Servitude the meaner Sort underwent with the Mighty caused Hereditary Kingdomes? *Thucydides* owns no such Causality, Nor do those two passages of His thus joyned together by Mr *Harrington* appear to have any Reference to one another. Nay on the contrary it is manifest that Hereditary Kingdomes were before that Servitude, seeing that Servitude happened not till after *Minos*, who was a King, had by scouring the Seas of Pirates and destroying their Nests, given Security to Traffique, by which and not by the Ballance of Land these Cities grew Potent.

In the second Place, He attributes the Power of *Pelops* to the Ballance in Land, Whereas *Thucydides* saies expresly, *He obtained this Power by the abondance of Wealth He brought with him out of Asia, to Men in want.* Did He transport his Land with Him? Or is not this a cleare Instance of the Prevalence of Mony against the Ballance in Land?

But then thirdly, He at the same time supposes no Propriety in Land till after the *Trojan* War, And yet makes before that War the Overballancing of the Mighty to be the Cause of Hereditary Kingdomes. This has the aspect of a Contradiction, into which it is likely he slipt,

by

by not having a true apprehenſion of *Thucydides*, who does not affirm there was in thoſe remote Ages He treats of, a time when there was no Propriety, but only that Men being not yet united into great Nations, but living in ſmall Clans, there joynt Force was not ſufficient to defend them againſt the Violence of ſuch who had any ſmall oddes in Number, which was the Cauſe of ſo frequent Tranſmigrations.

Fourthly, He will have the Revenues of *Greece* which were inlarged about the Time of erecting the Tyrannies, to conſiſt only in Land, unleſs forſooth We can ſhew there was Uſurie at that Time: He muſt pardon Me for this alſo, It is enough that there then began to be great Trading, which is plainly teſtified by *Thucydides* where He ſaies *That the Græcians became more ſeriouſly addicted to the Affaires of the Sea.*

Fifthly, He imagines the difference between the old Hereditary Monarchies and the new erected Tyrannies to have been only in the Peoples Apprehenſion of them, who being grown Rich called that Government Tyrannie, which before during their Poverty, They had been content to own for a lawfull Monarchy. This is indeed to be a true Servant to his own Suppoſition, but not to be a faithfull Hiſtorian of the Actions of other Men; For in ſome of theſe Tyrannies the change from Monarchy muſt be attributed to the Princes themſelves, Who upon the increaſe of Wealth having put off the Sobriety and Moderation of their Predeceſſors, and

Ariſt. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 15. & lib. 5. cap. 10.

addicted themselves to *Avarice* and *Luxurie*, or as *Thucydides* expresses it, *Their desire of Mony being improved with their Power*, governed their People with all manner of Insolence and Oppression. But most of the Tyrannies were then at that time first erected, for the old Monarchies having by the failing of the Royall Lines, or by the remissenes of the Princes been changed into Commonwealths, the Supream Power was afterward usurped by such Persons who having no just Claime, were forced to secure themselves by Violent and Tyrannicall Courses.

Arist. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 14. & lib. 5. cap. 5.

Last of all, Because *Thucydides* comparing only the Actions of the old Græcians with those He is about to describe, gives the Advantage to the latter, calling the other *the Imbecillity of Antient Times*, He would therefore have it thought, that the Considerer has made an unlucky choise of *Thucydides* his Testimony. But it is easy for Me to convince him, that though I had on my side no other Testimony (which by the way is untrue, the matter being attested by all the Greek Histories of those remote Ages) but this of *Thucydides* I were upon Terms secure enough: For first *Thucydides* mentions this Imbecillity only in reference to the times before the *Trojan* War, and not the whole time that *Greece* was governed by Hereditary Monarchs; And then again, this Imbecillity is no diminution of the Antiquity of that Government, (which was the sole thing at that time in Debate between

Us)

Us) nor yet any Imputation to the Prudence of it; For it is not to be understood of any Morall or Politicall Imbecillity radicated in the Nature of that Government, but of a Naturall one equally attending the Infancy of all Governments; Arms, Shipping, Mony and the other Provision by which a Nation frees it self from this Imbecillity, being not originall or essentiall Members of any Government, but like Haire the Productions of Age and Grouth.

I could not at a less Expence of Time and Pains satisfie my Promise to consider these Passages of *Thucydides*; To some Readers it will not, possibly, be unacceptable to have been rescued from an Erroneous Apprehension of of that excellent Author; For my own part I gain by it the satisfaction of observing that I am not the only Person who suffer by Mr *Harrington*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Ballance of Empire be well divided into Nationall and Provinciall; And whether these two, or Nations that are of distinct Ballance, coming to depend upon one and the same Head, such a mixture create a New Ballance?

TO make recompence for the length of the last Chapter, this shall be a very short one. The Question was put by the Considerer, Whether there may not be a Mixture of the Nationall and Provinciall Ballance, so that the severall Parts of an Empire may come to poise one another, and by that produce a New Ballance? To this Mr *Harrington* gives a Solution in the
N. p. 22. Negative, by saying that *No one Government whatsoever hath any more then One of two Ballances; That of Land which is Nationall, or that of Arms which is Provinciall.* I might without Prejudice to my Cause abstain from any further Discussion of this Question, for coming just now from digging up the Roots of the Doctrine of the Ballance, these Branches of it must of themselves wither and fall off. Yet to show that I did not at first without Reason propose the Question, this shall be added in Explication of it.

There is scarse any one of the Considerable Dominions of *Europe* which is not (like a rich Fur composed of Tips of Sables) made up of severall

ſeverall Pieces; *Spain* conſiſts of the Crowns of *Caſtile*, *Arragon*, *Navarre* and *Granada*, beſides divers Kingdomes Iſlands and Provinces in diſtant Parts of the World: *France*, though it looks like an entire Piece, is conſtituted by ſeverall Provinces which have by various Occaſions come to be united in that Potent Kingdome: In *Spain* the power of the *Caſtilian* Kings was more abſolute then that of the *Aragoneſe*; In *France* ſome of the Provinces retain Priviledges not injoyed by the reſt, as the Liberty of Aſſembling their particular Eſtates, and the like. The Conſiderer, to prove the Mixture of the Ballance, made Inſtance in the Kingdome of *Arragon*, where ſince the Union with *Caſtile*, the Regall Power is very much advanced, And yet without reducing it to a Provinciall Ballance, ſeeing *Arragon* is ſtill, as to the maine, governed by their own Lawes, and by their own Officers, and not by an Army. This Inſtance is rejected by Mr *Harrington*, becauſe the Ballance both in *Caſtile* and *Aragon* being that of a Nobility, They both, ſaies He, continue Nationall. I am deſirous of giving him all faire Satisfaction, and therefore am Content to lay aſide this Inſtance, and inſtead of it fix upon One in *France* which is not liable to the ſame Objection, And this ſhall be the Imperiall Cities of *Metz*, *Thoul*, and *Verdun*. Theſe Cities were free Members of the Empire, governed in the way of a Republique by their own Citizens, as *Strasbourg* and other Imperiall Cities are at this day, and by Conſequence their

Ballance

Ballance must necessarily have been Popular: They were somewhat more then an hundred yeares agoe surprized by the French, who have since incorporated them into the Crown, the Ballance of which is by a Nobility; And the last King of *France* erected a Parliament there, after the manner of the other Members of that Crown.

Now I am to demand of Mr *Harrington* Whether the Ballance in these Cities be changed from Popular, to that by a Nobility? If He affirms it to be changed, We shall not be obliged to believe him unless He brings Proofs strong enough to overthrow the Vehement Presumption that We may have for the Contrary, by observing that these Cities continue still to be of great Traffique, which must of Necessity keep the Wealth in the People's hands. If He replies that the Ballance of them is Provinciall, It will be very difficult to apprehend the Truth of that Answer, seeing the Inhabitants of them injoy all the Privileges of French Subjects, and are governed by the same Lawes, and the same Forme of Administration of Justice with the rest of France. Tis true indeed they live under the Power of a Governour, but in that They differ not from *Picardie*, *Champagne*, *Languedoc* and all other Parts of that Kingdome, whose Ballance notwithstanding is not therefore Provinciall; Nor can it be denied that they have a Garrison upon them, but in this their Case is the same with all the Frontire Towns in France, which are secured with Garrisons,

riſons, not ſo much out of Jealouſie of the People, as of a Forreign Enemy.

If then the Ballance of theſe Cities can neither be ſaid to be the Nationall One of the Crown they live under, nor yet Provinciall, I had Reaſon to put the Queſtion, Whether there might not be a Mixture of the Nationall and Provinciall Ballance, or a poiſing of one another by the ſeverall Parts of an Empire. Of which We may with facility obtain this farther Conception, That as the pretended force of the Ballance in any one Countrey, ſecures the Power in the Hands of ſuch Perſons on whoſe ſide the Ballance is, So in the Union of ſeverall Countreys under One Empire, the Power remains with thoſe to whom the Ballance reſulting from the whole belongs: And as in one Single Country, Men are neceſſitated to ſubmit to the Ballance, becauſe they deſpaire of Power to Oppoſe it, So in the Union of Severall Countreys, Some one of them may be obliged to live under a Government different from their own Ballance, as knowing themſelves to be outweighed by the Ballance of the Reſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Whether there be any Common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the Parts taken severally; And how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguish't from private Interest.

IF I had not been taught by Mr *Harrington* himself that many Passages of his are to be understood by way of *Similitude* only, not of
H. p. 9. Argument or Probation, I should have been very much at a loss how to answer this Chapter: But now by the help of that Instruction I perceive this is intended for a Chapter of *Similitudes*, And it would be too unkind a Part to oppose a Gentleman in the choise of such *Similes* as He thinks fit to make use of for the adorning his stile. I am sensible of my having already erred in this Point, and justly incurred Mr *Harrington's* Anger, by thinking his *Similitudes*
Chap. 2. included somewhat of Reason in them. Therefore I shall imploy my Care in this Chapter to impart that Caution to the Reader which I my self have received, least He should do these *Similitudes* or their Author so much wrong as to mistake them for Reasons.

The first Place where this Care may be seasonably imploy'd, is about a *Similitude* which, though it be taken from Beasts, We are not to expect should have foure Feet. *Divers of the Beasts* (it is *Grotius* who has observed it) *abstain*

ſtain from their owne Profit, either in regard of thoſe of the ſame kind, or at leaſt of their Young. Mankind then (infers Mr *Harrington*) *muſt either be leſs juſt then the Creature, or acknowledg alſo his Common Intereſt to be Common Right.* Oceana p. 5.

To go about upon this Occaſion to diſcover the Cauſes of that Affection which Brute Creatures beare to their Fœtus, And how a Part ſeparated from an Animal to which it had been long united may by the Perpetuall ſtream of Effluviums emitted from it, continue to have an Operation upon that Animall, would be a Diſquiſition too remote from our preſent Subject. I will rather make Mr *Harrington* a Gift of the whole Inference, and allow That Men have the ſame Affections with the Creatures, And do deny themſelves their own Profit for the Advantage of their Familie: But what will He gaine by this Conceſſion? This will at moſt ſerve to prove ſomething of a Common Intereſt of every Familie within it ſelf, but fals infinitely ſhort of making out a Common Intereſt of all Mankind; And I do juſtly ſuſpect He will not be much gratified with any Inſtances taken from Paternity, or the naturall Adminiſtration or Intereſts of Families, ſeeing there is not in that whole Oeconomy one Particular, which does not largely diſavour the Pretenſions of Popular Government.

And therefore He cals in another *Similitude* to the Reſcue, and tels Us out of *Hooker*, *That even ſtones or heavy things forſake their ordinary wont or Center, and fly upwards, to relieve the* H. p. 24.

Diſtreſs

Distress of Nature in Common. If I should now take this Hint to discourse of *Vacuum Disseminatum*, of Magneticall Motion, of the Gravitation and Impulsion of Aire, of the Protrusion of less heavy Bodies by those that are more Heavy, and of severall other Principles belonging to this Subject, Mr *Harrington* would think Me very Fond of my Naturall Philosophie, and more then ordinarily Covetous of an Occasion to divulge it. It is enough that this is but a *Similitude*, and as such did very well become Mr *Hooker* in a Rhetoricall Exaggeration, Nor shall Mr *Harrington* be denied the same Liberty while He appeares either as Poet or Orator, but when He acts the Legislator's Part, and pretends to fix the Principles of Government, He must not wonder if We remain unsatisfied with such thin Discourses.

Indeed He himself seems to place no great Confidence in them, but has thought fit to
H. p. 25. give Us this *farther Demonstration*: *All Civill Lawes acknowledge that there is a Common Interest of Mankind, and all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man, therefore it is in the Nature of Man to acknowledge that there is a Common Interest of Mankind.* How? Do all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man? This New Maxime will make strange Havock among the pore *School-men* and Authors *de Legibus*, and quite Ruine all their Divisions and Definitions of *Jus Naturale*, *Jus Gentium*, and *Jus Civile*; But of all Men honest *Ulpian* will be in the worst Condition who has had the ill For-

tune

tune to give us this Account of Civill Lawes; *Jus Civile est quod neque in totum à Naturali vel Gentium recedit, nec per omnia ei servit: Itaque cum aliquid addimus vel detrahimus juri communi, Jus proprium, id est Civile efficimus.* Which is beyond Dispute thus far true, That the Obligation of Civill Lawes consists properly in such Things to which Men were not bound by Nature, nor by any other Argument but their Subjection to the Power which constitutes those Lawes; For otherwise the same Civill Lawes must obtain through the whole World, seeing all Men are equally bound to what proceeds from Nature: But though Mr *Harrington's* Assertion were true, the Considerer were not at all concerned in it, For He at first denying there was any Common Interest of Mankind, only with Reference to Mankind before they had voluntarily listed themselves into Societies, and so rendred themselves Subject to Civill Lawes, is not now with any Equity to be oppugned by any Observations taken from the Condition of Mankind after it was become Subject to the Power of Civill Lawes. I must alwaies assert, That though Originally in the State of Nature, and Antecedently to all Society, there was no Common Interest of Mankind distinct from the Parts taken severally; (the Obligation laid upon Families by Paternall Power only excepted) but that every particular Man had Right to prosecute his own Advantage, though to the Ruine of other Men, yet since the Institution

Digest. de Just. & Jur. leg. 6.

on of Government, Men are obliged besides, nay in many Cases above, their own Private Interest, to advance the Publique or Common One: The reason of which is taken from hence, That unless Every private Man does devest himself of his private Interest as well as his private Power, and contribute it to the Publique, the Sovereign Power will be disabled from effecting the Design and Aime of Government; And Particular Men will in vain expect from that Power, which has by themselves been so unwisely limited, Protection and the Benefit of Lawes: By this Protection and Benefit of Lawes, Every Man's Power and Interest which He had parted with, comes home to him again with Increase, the Observation of such Lawes as the Sovereign Power finds usefull for the Preservation of Society being in an Eminent Manner the Interest of every private Man: For Instance, *A man that Steales is put to Death*; This is not only the *Publique* Interest, but the *Private* Interest of every *Particular* Man, who by the Terrour of such a *Punishment* is in some Measure secured from an Invasion on his *Propriety*. This Assertion is I confesse contradictory to Mr *Harrington's*, *That a Man who steales is not put to Death for any Man's private Interest*, in which, as in this whole Thing called Demonstration, I meet with so little Reason, that it pities Me there is nothing in it which might make it pass for a *Similitude*.

H. p. 25.

Seeing then the Addresses of *Reason* have been so unsuccessefull, I do not wonder to find

The

The other Potent Rivall Paſſion, has obtained ſo far upon Mr *Harrington's* Soule. He pretends *That the whole Philoſophie of the Soule which concerns Policy is demonſtrated throughout the Commonwealth of Oceana, And that it conſiſts in depoſing Paſſion and advancing Reaſon unto the Throne of Empire.* But it will not be Rationall to believe this of a Commonwealth whoſe Author and Legiſlator is himſelf a ſlave of *Paſſion*, and not a Subject of Reaſon; And I make my Appeale to all unintereſſed Perſons, Whether through his whole Reply Reaſon or *Paſſion* beare the greateſt ſway with Mr *Harrington*, And in reference to this particular Chapter, I deſire them to Judge, Whether it be not an heap of very *Pitifull Petulancies* and Calumnies. Yet it is not to be thought but that in this Anger He has Wit, of which if any Man be unconvinced, He is to be remitted to that admirable Oration He makes to the two *Girles*, which being a Treaſury of ſuch Rare Conceits, ought in all *Prudence* to be inſerted with the other Speeches into the following Editions of *Oceana*. *Ibid.*

But though his Wit be admirable, his Diſcretion ſtill has the upper hand; To repeat 40 or 50 lines out of his Commonwealth of *Oceana*, was not very troubleſome, but to examine the Reaſons alledged by the Conſiderer to prove that the Caſe of the two Girles dividing and chooſing their Cake was not applicable to the Inſtitution of a Commonwealth, was too ſtubborn a Matter to be wrought to his Pur-

poſe, and is therefore ſilently paſt over. It is but Juſtice that I ſhould have leave to repeat too, and put Mr *Harrington* in mind that He goes upon a falſe Suppoſition; For unleſs the two Girles lived under ſome Power greater then their own, (And if ſo they were Members of ſome Society, and obliged in Diſpoſing of their Cake to behave themſelves according to the eſtabliſht Lawes of it) They would never have divided the Cake, but the ſtronger of the two Girles would have taken the whole, or at leaſt ſo much of it as She thought uſefull to her.

In like Manner, If ſome One Perſon or Perſons who have acquired the Supream Power (by what Method or Artifice is not as to this purpoſe Materiall) ſhall think fit to frame a Government where the whole People ſhall be divided into two Aſſemblies, with one of which ſhall be the right of dividing or Debating, and with the other that of chooſing or Reſolving, there is no great Reaſon to doubt but that this Temper may be effectuall to the attaining the Ends of Government: Yet even in this Caſe, it will be a Neceſſary Caution, That by mixing the Function of the ſeverall Members of the Government, it be not rendered diſputable in which of them the Sovereign Power reſides, For this deſtroyes the Deſign of Government, and muſt frequently reduce things to the State of War. But all this while this is nothing to Mr *Harrington's* Purpoſe, and ſerves not at all to make out the

the Naturall Right of a Commonwealth, seeing this Frame of a Commonwealth depended upon some former Sovereign Power; And to imagine that without the Influence of such a Power, Men unreduced or broken to the Rules of Society, should of themselves contrive themselves into two Assemblies, One of which should divide and the other choose, And that the strongest would not rather engross the whole Right both of dividing and choosing, Is to suppose that which can never be granted, And for which I do not believe there can ever be any stronger Reason produced then Mr *Harrington's* bare Affirmation.

For as for that Notion of a *Naturall Democracy and a Naturall Aristocracy, Or that among twenty Men there will be some few (perhaps Six) excelling the Fourteen in greatness of Parts*, It is altogether Arbitrary and destitute of any good ground in Experience; Among the twenty perhaps there will be but One, perhaps Sixteen, who excell the Rest in Parts: Or if this Proportion of about a third be allowed him, it will not be enough to help him over the stile; For though among *twenty Men* (not related to one another, nor as yet united in any Society) *Six* be apparently Wiser then the *Fourteen*, Must the *Fourteen* therefore necessarily intrust the *Six* with the Debate of such things as concern their Interest? Is it not much more Naturall to every Man to think himself Wise enough to advise about his own *H.* p. 27.

Affaires, and to suspect all Persons of a greater Reach then himself? Indeed upon a Supposition that there were any known Common Intereſt of theſe *twenty* Men, it were not improbable that ſuch of them as by Experience were known to be the Wiſeſt, might be intruſted by the Reſt with their Common Affaires; But it has been already demonſtrated that there can be no ſuch Common Intereſt (I adde now alſo, Nor no ſuch Experience of one another's Abilities) unleſs thoſe *twenty* Men had been before united in ſome Society, that is, reduced under ſome Government. Wherefore Mr *Harrington* ſtands Convict of Obſtinacy in this Paralogiſme, That He by Suppoſition puts the *twenty* Men into a Condition that of Neceſſity infers them to be already reduced to ſome Government, And yet at the ſame time Imagines them free to diſpoſe of themſelves as if They lived under no Government, and did but then begin to think of Conſtituting One.

To go yet a little farther with him, Admit that at firſt by ſome ſtrange Accident a People ſhould happen thus to diſtribute themſelves into two Aſſemblies, a dividing One, or *Senate*, and a chooſing One or *Popular Aſſembly*: Is this Foundation firm enough to ſuſtain the whole Weight of a Commonwealth? May not either of theſe Aſſemblies repent of the Bargain, and indeavour to draw the whole Power both of the Debate and Reſult to themſelves? That the *Senate* may do it by deluding the *People*, and confounding their Judgments in the Choice or Reſult,

Result seems not improbable; Nor is it Antidote enough to say that *The People in a Commonwealth are their own Army*, unless it were also Certain that a more subtle Party never had nor could dispossess a simple and ignorant One of the Power of the Sword. But that on the other side the *People* should not invade the Function of the *Senate* and take upon themselves the Right of Debate as well as of the Result, can not without some shame be denied by him who has complained of the *Athenian*, *Carthaginian*, and *Roman* People for this very thing. It is true None of these *People* did go about to take away the *Senate* wholly, but the difference is not great between dissolving an Assembly, and rendring it altogether Insignificant by robbing it of that Employment for which it was at first Instituted. When the Lion is to choose, the Fox knows his Division must be such as gives all to One side and leaves nothing to the other; If a *People* be once inraged, the *Senate* will find themselves concerned to please them in the Division as well as in the Choice. And this was the Condition of the *Senate* of *Capua* after the Fright they were put into by *Pacuvius*, *Jam verò nihil in Senatu actum aliter, quàm si Plebis ibi esset Consilium.* That whole Scene was laid by *Pacuvius* with a Design to preserve the *Senators* and satisfie the *People*, and by that at once bring them both into a Dependance upon himself; His surprize of the *People* was indeed very Ingenious, but had He given them time to consider, They would without *Liv.*

doubt have found out some among themselves whom They would have thought Wise enough to make a *Senate*: If not, It must have been for want of Instruction in Mr *Harrington's* new Doctrine, *That the pretended Depth and Difficulty in Matter of State is a meere Cheat. From the beginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Commonwealth, where the Leaders having Honesty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true Interest at home or abroad.*

H. p. 133.

By this it appeares, That there is no Common Right or Interest of Mankind (except that of Families arising from Paternall Power) antecedent to the Reduction of Mankind under Government; As also, That the Office of Dividing, or debating, and Chooſing or Resolving, Or the different Functions of the *Senate* and *People* in a *Commonwealth*, are not founded upon any Naturall Right, but meerly upon an Artificiall One proceeding from the Designation of some preceding Sovereign Power. And this being the true Case of a *Commonwealth*, the two distinct Assemblies of the *Senate* and *People* have not as to this any more advantage then is between any Parties who give and take Counsell; Counsell is nothing but Ratiocination about the Affaires of another Man, and Ratiocination is the Addition or Subtraction of Propositions; The Operation belongs to the Person who gives Counsell, and the Proof or *Examen* of it remains in his hand who receives the Counsell: This Mr *Harrington* is pleased to call dividing and chooſing, which in this Sence belongs

longs to a *Monarchy* as much as to a *Common-wealth*; For when a Prince askes any Man his Adviſe (and I think there never was Prince who adviſed not with ſome Body) that Man divides, and the Prince makes the Choiſe; Only here is the Difference, an able Prince if his Counſell has committed an Error in the Operation knows both how to detect and Rectifie it, but a *Popular Aſſembly* being of themſelves unfit for a Debate, are forced to acquieſce in the Diviſion or Debate of the *Senate*.

And what if after all the *Popular Aſſembly*, fixes upon the wrong Member of the Diviſion? To judge of the Utility or Diſutility of a Propoſition in matter of State, is I hope another thing from diſcerning which is the biggeſt or leaſt Piece of a Cake, And a Diſcourſe about which much of underſtanding and Experience muſt be imployed, is not of ſo eaſy and certain Diſpatch, as a Matter which is ſubmitted to the Determination of ſenſe. In one reſpect, the Choiſe or Reſult is an Action of greater Difficulty then the Diviſion or Debate, For an Active Fancie which ſuddenly Ranges over a great deale of ground, may eaſily find out the various Methods of which any Buſineſs is Capable, but to diſcern which of them is the moſt conducing, is the Work of an exact and well-poiſed Judgment. To affirm *That becauſe every Man hath an Intereſt what to chooſe, therefore that which ſutes with every Man's Intereſt, cometh up to the Publique Intereſt*, Is in the firſt Place not true; For it moſt frequently fals out that Particular Men have a Private Intereſt *H.* p. 27.

Interest of their own differing from if not contrary to the Publique One, by which they are more potently inclined then by their Affection to the Publique; But secondly if it were alwaies true the Difficulty is left still remaining; For to suppose that every Man in a Popular Assembly should in a matter of State be able to discern his true Interest, is to suppose the Meanest and most unqualified of the People infallible in those things, where the most Consummate Politicians do often mistake, And is besides repugnant to the Experience of all *Commonwealths*, whose Histories are full of Examples of pernitious Councels which have been embraced by the *People*.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, it must be confessed that a *Commonwealth* gaines one great Advantage by the Debate of the *Senate*; For the *People* being composed of Ignorance, Obstinacy, and Tumult would certainly in a Moment teare to pieces any Business that should be thrown among them; Whereas by reserving the Debate to the *Senate*, the *People* have no other imployment but to let fall a little piece of Linnen at all Adventures into one of two Boxes, So that being thus brought within a Disjunction of the Matter, It can be but an even lay against them that they do Miscarry.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Senatuſconſulta, *or Decrees of the Roman Senate had the Power of Lawes?*

IN diſcuſſing this Queſtion it will in the firſt Place be neceſſary to make known what is to be underſtood by the Word *Lawes*. And though it be eaſy to take up ſeverall Definitions of *Law*, none is ſo appropriate to the preſent Subject as that of *Juſtinian*. *Lex eſt quod Populus Romanus Senatorio Magiſtratu interrogante (veluti Conſule) conſtituebat.* This Definition puts a difference between *Leges* and *Plebiſcita*, which having not been attended to by *Ateius Capito* in *Gellius*, He involves himſelf; For the *Plebiſcita* were ſuch Conſtitutions as without the *Senate* or the Intervention of any *Senatorian Magiſtrate* were framed by the Common *People* under the Authority of their *Tribunes*. At firſt Obedience was due from the *Romans* only to ſuch Lawes as were eſtabliſh't by the Votes of the *People* (including the *Senate*,) and had been propoſed by ſome of the greater Magiſtrates: But after that the *Plebs* or Common *People* had by their Seditions gained ground ſo far upon the *Senate*, as to obtain the *Tribunes* a Magiſtracy elected out of their own Body, They ſoon began to frame Orders called *Plebiſcita*, which at the beginning obliged only their own Order, and concerned not the Nobility, but were

Inſtit. de jur. nat. Parag. 4.

were after a while improved to the full Authority of *Lawes*. whether this were enacted by the *Lex Horatia*, the *Lex Publilia*, or the *Lex Hortensia*, as is by various Authors variously reported, Or Whether the later of these Lawes were any more then a reviving of the former, We shall not be concerned to inquire; It will be enough to take notice that the *Plebiscita* having attained the Power of *Lawes*, *Pomponius* had very good Reason to observe *Quod inter Plebiscita & Legem species constituendi interessent, Potestas eadem esset.*

Digest. de Orig. Juris leg. 9.

As the *Plebiscita* or Decrees of the Common *People* were not *Lawes*, nor ever so called, and yet had the whole Power of *Lawes*, So the *Senatusconsulta* or Decrees of the *Senate* had the same Power. *Senatusconsultum est quod Senatus jubet atque constituit. Nam cùm auctus esset Populus Romanus in eum modum, ut difficile esset in unum eum convocari, Legis sanciendæ causâ; æquum visum est, Senatum vice Populi consuli.* And least *Justinian* should be thought to have lived in too remote an Age, to be a Witness in this Case, We have a much earlier Testimony of *Pomponius* to the same Purpose. *Quia difficilè Plebs convenire cæpit, Populus multò difficiliùs in tantâ turbâ hominum, Necessitas ipsa curam Reipublicæ ad Senatum deduxit. Ita cæpit Senatus se interponere: & quicquid instituisset observabatur. Idque jus appellabatur Senatusconsultum.* With which agrees that of *Ulpian, Non ambigitur Senatum jus facere posse.*

Instit. de jur. nat. Parag. 5.

Digest. sup. eod.

Digest. inf. de Leg. & SC.

To determine at what time the *Senatusconsulta*

sulta attained to the Power of *Lawes*, is more then I will undertake; It is very probable that this was not establish't at Once, but grew on by insensible Degrees. But for Mr *Harrington* without the least profer of any Probation to affirm, *That the Senatusconsulta were not Lawes in that they were Senatusconsula, or proposed by the Senate, but in that They were allowed by Justinian or the Prince, in whom was now the Right of the People*, is to take to himself greater Authority then ever was given to the *Dictator*. For in the first Place it is manifest by the order of the Discourse both in the *Institutions* and the *Digests*, That the *Senatusconsulta* had attained the Power there affirmed to belong to them before the time of the Emperors. And then the Occasion by which the *Senatusconsulta* are said to have grown into that Power, was the Difficulty of Assembling the *People* for making of *Lawes*, by which it is necessarily inferred, That the *People* had not then passed away the Right of making *Lawes*, nor by the *Lex Regia* invested the Emperour with it. *H.* p. 31.

I need not conceale that Mr *Harrington* in this Point walkes in a Path traced out for him by *Hotoman*; Who indeed accuses *Tribonian* of Error or Assentation, And saies that the *Senatusconsulta* had not the Power of *Lawes* before it was given them by the Emperours, who by that thought to fortifie the Power they had usurped over the *People*. But We must be cautious in admitting *Hotoman's* Judgment in these Matters; For He was not

not only a professed Condemner of *Tribonian's* Labours in compiling that Body of Civill Law which is at present extant in the World, but having been during the Civill Wars of *France* ingaged in a Popular Faction, He acquired there some Bitterness of Spirit against Kings, which He frequently discovers in his Writings. If it be *Hotoman's* Authority which must beare Me down in this Point, I shall cover my self with the Authority of *Cujacius*, *Connanus*, *Rivallius*, *Tholosanus*, *Gothofred*, *Calvin*, *Schardius*, and the whole stream of Interpreters who run on the other side: If *Hotoman's* Arguments are thought strong enough to carry it, I must desire they may be examined, and then they will appeare to prove no more then this, That whereas *Cæsar* had left the Election of halfe the Magistrates, with some other small Remaines of Power in the *Peoples* hands, *Tiberius* transferred all to the *Senate*: Which is so far from making good his Assertion, that it is a strong Presumption of the Contrary, Seeing it is not likely that by such an Innovation in Favour of the *Senate*, *Tiberius* would have incurred the Discontent of the *People*, if they had not been habituated in other Cases to see such Power in the *Senate's* Possession.

It was not then by any new Power conferred by the *Emperours*, but only by their Permission to retain an Antient One, that the Decrees of the *Roman Senate* had the Power of *Lawes*, and as such found place in the Compilement of the Roman Lawes by *Justinian*. That the

SC.

S C. *Macedonianum* (which I wonder so great a Master as Mr *Harrington* should call *Macedonicum*, and not have skill enough to distinguish the Adjective derived of *Macedonia*, One of the Noblest Provinces in *Greece*, from that other which sprang of *Macedo* an infamous Usurer at *Rome* in the time of *Vespasian*) is of a younger Date then the first *Roman* Emperour I willingly allow, and make no difficulty in confessing as much of almost all the S C. mentioned in the Body of the *Law*: For the more antient Ones having from time to time been wholly repealed, or in part reformed by succeeding Constitutions, they were omitted by *Justinian* in his Compilement, whose Design it was to cut off all antiquated and useless Lawes, and leave only such new Ones as continued in Force. We are deprived of the accurate knowledge of these Antient *Senatusconsulta* by the loss of that Instrument into which both They and the *Plebiscita*, from the time of their first Institution, were collected by *Vespasian*: Yet it is not very hard to pick out considerable Footsteps of them, As the two *Senatusconsulta* against the passing of *Rubicon* by any Roman Generall with an Army, still extant upon old Marbles; The *S C. Antonianum*, *Fannianum*, and others mentioned by *Gellius*; The Form of the SC. *Summum* or *Supremum*, by which the whole Commonwealth was put into the Hands of One or both the *Consuls*, from whom after that lay no Appeale to the People; The severall *Senatusconsulta* so frequently spoken of by *Cicero*, both

Aymar. Rivall. Hist. Jur. Civ. lib. 3.

both in his Epistles and Orations; And finally in the Body of the *Law* it self (not to hunt after other Places) *Digest. de Colleg. & Corp. l.* 3. The *Senatusconsulta* there referred to were One of them made *A. U. C.* 685. *L. Cæcilio & Q. Marcio* COSS. And the other A. U. C. 697. *Lentulo & Metello* COSS. (both before *Cæsar's* second Consulate from which the Roman Empire beares Date) as is out of *Cicero* and *Asconius* proved by the learned *Gothofred.*

The Solution of this Question may give Birth to a New One, Whether Mr *Harrington* be the better *Civill Lawyer* or *Mathematician?*

CHAP. VII.

Whether the Ten Commandments were proposed by God or Moses, and Voted by the People of Israel?

THis Chapter is a Peculiar, and claims an Exemption from the Ordinary Rules by which Politicall Disputes are Governed; For though God has declared Universally *That by Him Kings reign,* yet in reference to the People of *Israel* He was pleased to own a more particular Concernment, And did by an express Declaration of his Will to and by *Moses,* both at first enact their Lawes and Modell their Government, and reserve to himself the Result of their most important Affaires. So that whereas an

Error

Error concerning the Frame of any other Government amounts at most but to a Deficiency of Understanding or Diligence, a Mistake in that of *Israel* may easily become an Impiety, in as much as it may imply a false or Scandalous Conception of God's Actions. The Consideration of this begat in Me at first a Tenderness in Reference to this Subject, and presently after a Resolution to leave it in the hands of the Clergy, upon whom it had also been obtruded by Mr *Harrington*. At present I must go on to profess that his having in his last Book singled out so weighty a new Adversary, can be no Temptation to Me to change that Resolution, or undertake any part of this Dispute.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the Perfection of the Kind, come up to the Perfection of Government, and have no flaw in it.

I Am not ignorant of the Advantage Mr *Harrington* may seem to gaine in this and the two next Chapters, by having inverted the Order of his own Assertions and my Replies; For passing by the first and second, He fals here upon his third Assertion, and in that fixes upon the fourth and fift Branches. But I am not willing to contend about a Matter of no

greater Consequence, but will rather embrace his own new Method, and take the Question as He has stated it, first examining the fourth Branch or matter of Fact, concerning *Lacedæmon* and *Venice*, And then giving my Opinion about the First, That a Commonwealth notwithstanding all its pretensions to equality, is not secure from being infested with *Sedition*.

Mr *Harrington* was told by the Considerer, That if there appeares to have been a more then Ordinary Calm in the state of *Lacedæmon*, this was not so much to be attributed to the Form of their Government, as to their severe Education and affected Poverty, by which all things that served as Baits to Sedition, were driven out of the Country: So that it can not be Rationall to expect the same Effects from the same Government, where the same Education and manner of Life is wanting. Since He has been content to spare himself the Pains of taking Notice of this, I shall suppose it does not stand in need of any farther Elucidation, unless perhaps in the Discovery of the *Lacedæmonian Agrarian* it prove convenient to insist a little upon it.

To descend then to his Answer to what I had objected about the frequent Insurrections of the *Helots*; He saies that *Lacedæmon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helots, and then she was an equall Commonwealth, or taking them in, and so she was unequall.* This is just the Man in the Fable who inquired of

H. p. 40.

the

the Oracle, Whether the Sparrow in his Fist would come out Dead or alive, when it was in his own Power to make the choise; So Mr *Harrington* will have the Power, according as it sutes with his Occasions, to make *Lacedæmon* an *equall* or an *unequall Commonwealth*. But to make short, If she were an *equall Commonwealth*, What has He to say to the Seditions of the *Helots*? If she were *unequall*, Why did he play the *Mountebanck* in using her as the Example of an *Equall* One?

A second sort of Instances alledged by Me to prove *Lacedæmon* not to have been free from Seditions, were the Contests which have happened about the Succession to the Crown. These, saies Mr *Harrington*, *being determined by the Ephori, that is by a Court of Justice, and not by the Sword, it is most ridiculous to infer from thence that the Government is Seditious.* Hold a little; Can those Controversies be said to be determined by a Court of Justice, when the Interessed Parties make their Appeale to their own Sword, And are able to perswade a Forreign Prince to draw his also in their Quarrell? If any Member of a Commonwealth being discontented have Interest and Power enough to fill his Countrey with Forreign Armies, I think that Man would not seem very Sober who should at that time go about to applaud that Country for not being Subject to Seditions. *H.* p. 41.

But this was after Lysander and the Spoiles of Athens had broken the Agrarian and so ruined *Ibid.*

Lacedæmon. When I first made use of these Examples, I could not foresee that Mr *Harrington* would be so easy in parting with those Advantages which He pretended to draw from the *Agrarian* of *Lacedæmon*: But now that He is willing to allow the *Agrarian* of *Lacedæmon* was not sufficient to preserve that Commonwealth, but was it self overballanced by the ready Mony brought in by *Lysander*, I have no reason but to be content also, and to remit him for my farther Thoughts in this Particular to the Chapters of the *Ballance* and *Agrarian*. Only I must desire Him that when among his Proselytes (whether it be in the *Circle* or the *Ruelle*) he Plumes himself over the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon*, He would be so Ingenuous as to strike all the time after *Athens* was taken, which is a matter of 200 years, out of the Account, And shut up the Glories of that Commonwealth with the Actions of *Lysander*, from which by a Common mistake of Historie, they have hitherto been thought to beare Date.

The Considerer brought Instances of a third sort of Seditions in *Lacedæmon*, which it seems prove not for Mr *Harrington's* Convenience to remember; There is no scarsity in Historie of such Instances, and it will not be unseasonable to commend a few more of them to his Forgetfulness. First the Sedition of those young Men who (Because their Mothers were unmarried Women, such as the state had for greater Population injoyned to make use of a Promiscuous Propagation) were called

called *Partheniæ*, and after they were suppreſt were ſent to inhabit *Tarentum* in *Italie*. Then the Sedition of them who during the *Maſſeniac* War demanded a new Diviſion of the Lands. After that the Attempt of King *Pauſanias* to make himſelf abſolute Maſter of the Commonwealth. And then the two dangerous Conſpiracies in the Neck of one another during the *Theban* Invaſion, in the firſt of which about 200 diſcontented Perſons had ſeized upon the Temple of *Diana*, one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt defenſible Quarters of the City, from whence it would have been very difficult to drive them out, had not *Ageſilaus* by a ſudden Fetch of Wit cheated them out of their Poſt and Reſolution; The ſecond conſiſted of a Caball of *Spartans* of good Quality who had their ſecret Aſſemblies for the Innovating Publique Affaires, And when they were detected, the Senate durſt not bring them to an open Triall, but they were privately executed by the Authority of *Ageſilaus* and the *Ephores*, whereas before that time no *Spartan* had ever been put to Death without the due form of Juſtice. Theſe Inſtances being all either older then *Lyſander*, or immediately upon his time, are not liable to any of Mr *Harrington's* exceptions, but ſerve abundantly to evince, that *Lacedæmon* has not been exempted from the Fate of all other Commonwealths, but has had her Portion of ſeditions.

Ariſt. Polit. lib. 5. *c.* 7.

Plut. in Ages.

As for the City of *Venice*, though ſhe be poſſeſt of ſeverall Advantages by her ſituation, yet ſhe is not at all beholden tô that, if we believe

lieve Mr *Harrington*, for her tranquillity within Doores; For saies he, *she is like a man in a Citadel who thereby may be the safer from his Enemies, but nere a whit the safer from Diseases.* H. p. 41. But before we can allow of this similitude, We must desire him to remember, That as in the Body of man, so in a Commonwealth, some Diseases are like Feavors caused by a Disorder in the Blood or Humors, others like Plagues are communicated by an External Contagion; From the first indeed the situation of *Venice* gives her not any security, but against the last it is a sovereign Antidote, And of this Familie are the Diseases most frequently incident to a State. Of old the *Lacedæmonian* & *Cretan* Republiques scarse differed in their Constitution, the *Lacedæmonian* being but a Copy wrought by *Lycurgus* after the *Cretan* Originall; yet the *Cretans* were never molested with any insurrections of their slaves, from which the *Lacedæmonians*, in any the least Publique Adversity, were rarely free; And the cause of this Diversity assigned by *Aristotle* is, That the *Argives*, *Messenians* and *Arcadians*, all neighbouring States, did continually foment the Discontents of the *Lacedæmonian* slaves, But *Crete* being an Island, no Enemy was neare enough to tempt their slaves to a Defection. In like manner the *Venetian* Republique being comprehended within her Islands, she by that situation is secured from those Practises by which her Enemies might indeavour to excite seditions among her subjects.

Though

Though the City of *Venice* it ſelf is ſeated out of the reach of all Enemies, her Frontire extends to two very dangerous Ones, the great *Turk*, and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, whoſe known Rapacity obliges her to a great deale of Modeſty and Reſervedneſs at home; And though *the Frontires of all ſtates are bounded by the Territories of other Princes*, Yet all have not ſuch Potent Neighbours, againſt whom their whole Care and Power is alwaies neceſſary: Thoſe who have, will in all Probability think themſelves concerned not to weaken their Force by any Domeſtick Tumults, there being nothing more Naturall then That the Feare of a Common Enemy ſhould preſerve Union and Agreement between Friends. This Truth is obſerved to have been very Operative with the *Romans*, who were not overrun with the Seditions of the *Nobility* and *People*, before that by the Deſtruction of the emulous Power of *Carthage*, They were freed from the Feare and Danger of any Common Enemy.

If I produced Examples of Seditions at *Venice*; which are older then the laſt *Reiglement* (this Word was thought no bad Engliſh by the Lord *Bacon*) in the time of *Piero Gradenigo*, I made Uſe of my juſt Liberty, Mr *Harrington* having not any where put in a Bar againſt ſuch Examples: Yet now that He has reſtrained the Inquiry within the Compaſs of that Reformation, I am willing to omit the Mutiny upon Occaſion of the new Impoſitions in Duke *Riniero Zeno's* time, with all other examples which *H.* p. 40.

might be added of Seditions before the Reign of *Gradenigo*. And if the Matter be thus stated, What hurt if We grant him all that He demands? That in the whole World, through the course of all Ages, there may be found one Commonwealth, which by the help of those concurring causes already mentioned, has for something above 300 yeares been free from *Seditions*. Is this that Giant Argument which must extirpate Monarchicall Government out of the World, and in spite of Fate reduce Us all to a Commonwealth?

Yet even this Liberality is more then Mr *Harrington* can with Honesty receive, as long as the Actions of *Bocconi*, *Tiepoli*, and *Faliero*, manifest that *Venice* has been disturbed with Seditions even since her last Reformation. He indeavours indeed to perswade that those Actions do not imply any Sedition in the Government; For saies He, *Bocconi would have killed the Duke and was hanged before he could do it,* *H.* p. 42. *Felton did kill a Duke and was hanged afterwards.* Under favour the Cases are not at all alike; *Felton* (though perhaps animated by zeale) killed the Duke upon a private Revenge; *Bocconi* went about to kill the Duke that he might afterward change the Government; *Felton* made use of no other assistance but his own Arm, *Bocconi* engaged many Complices. If We would find a Parallel in the *Venetian* storie for *Felton's* Assassinate, We must not take *Bocconi*, but *Andrea Contarini*, who being repulsed in his sute for an Employment, grew into that

Vindi-

Vindicative Passion against Duke *Foscaro*, that He attempted his Life, and had undoubtedly taken it away, if the blow had not been diverted by the next Person from *Foscaro's* Breast to his Face. But this being only the Issue of a private Quarrell, He does not find Me making any Advantage of it, *Faliero and his Complices*, continueth He, *would have destroyed the great Councell, but were hanged before they could do it, Vaux and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament but were hanged before they could do it; Therefore England was in this Relation a Seditious Government, else why was Venice?* I do not know that the Considerer ever undertook to prove that the Government of England was alwaies free from Seditions; If He had, that One Instance of the *Powder Treason* had been enough to confute Him. Such attempts, as they are of a more dangerous Nature, so they deserve a Name of more Horror, then Seditions: For Seditions, like storms gathered a far of, give some warning before They fall, There is Roome for Prudence to seek some way to divert them, The Interposition of Moderate and Acceptable Persons does often prevent or soon pacifie them, At worst their Fury may be avoided by a speedy Retreat; But these secret Conspiracies, like violent subterraneous Eruptions, in a Moment destroy all, And if they be not discovered before the Execution (which no state be it either a Monarchy or Republique can by

Sabell. Dec. 3. lib. 1.

by it's Orders have any Security to do) the Publique is involved in an inevitable Ruine.

The Conspiracy of *Tiepoli* Mr *Harrington* confesses *came to blowes, yet can not Venice be called a Seditious Commonwealth. You find no man accusing Rome of Sedition in that she had a Manlius or a Melius who dangerously affected Monarchie, &c.* Yet *Florus* has placed the Account of *Manlius* his attempt under the Title *de Seditionibus*, and *Livy* in relating the same Action imploies the word *Seditio* five or six times: But to let that pass. It would have been fairely done and might have prevented many mistakes, if where He interprets the Words of his *Lexicon*, He had told Us what He understands by this Word *Sedition*. In this Place He seems to limit it very odly, allowing it only to signify, in a *Commonwealth* the Dissension of the *People* and *Senate*, in a *Monarchy by* a *Nobility* that of the *King* and *Nobles*, in a *Monarchy* by *Arms* that of the *Prince* and *Souldiery*, because these only can be derived from the Orders of the *Government*. By this Rule the Contest of the *Fregosi* and *Adorni* at *Genova*, not being between the *People* and the *Senate*, but between two Factions of the *Nobility*, was no *Sedition*; Nor by the same Rule are the late Insurrections at *Naples* and *Moscow* to be reputed *Seditions*, For they were not excited by the *Nobility* or *Souldiery*, but by the Common *People*. This is a very poore Evasion, for there was incumbent upon Mr *Harrington* an Obligation to prove

H. p. 43.

H. p. 84.

prove, *That an equall Commonwealth* (of which he produced *Venice* as an Example) *had no flaw in it, and was such as No Man could have the Interest or Power to disturb with Sedition.* Of this He has not performed the least part, but indeavours to put Us of with an impertinent Nicety about the Notation of the Word *Sedition.* Now for what Purpose serves this Pretension to shut the great Gate of *Sedition*, if so many back Doores of Disorder be left open by which Miserie and Destruction may enter into a Commonwealth? As if it were not all One, if a Man must necessarily receive a Mortall Wound, Whether it be given him with a Scimitar or a Penknife. Besides all this Mr *Harrington* bestows a large Fallacie upon Us in the Application of this Example: For if the Freedome of *Venice* from *Seditions* be only to be understood in reference to the Agreement of the *Senate* and *People*, the Commonwealth of *Oceana* is like to gain very little Credit or Security from it; In *Venice* the *People* (as We are often told) are the *Grand Counsell*, all of them Men of Noble Extraction and Excellent education, not actually armed, constantly residing under the view of the Magistrates, in number not exceeding three thousand, so that the Publique Employments being very many make swift Returns as they circulate through them. In *Oceana* the *People* are no lesse then two hundred thousand, having Arms in their hand, made up of Men of all Ranks and Conditions, inhabiting the face of a wide-spread Countrey,

Countrey, and few of them having Rationall hopes to attain any Considerable Magistracy. Let any Man weigh the Oppositions in the Temper of these Commonwealths, and then judge whether there can be any good Inference made from the Quietness of the One to the stability of the other. To Me the Consequence lookes like that of the Young Gentleman, who because he had never seen a storm upon his Father's Fish-pond, concluded there could not be any upon the *Caspian* Sea.

But though all what has been said concerning *Lacedæmon* and *Venice* should be admitted, Mr *Harrington* is still secure; At most He can but loose a brace of Examples, and be put to say (as He does of *Florence* and *Genua* in a like Case) that if *Lacedæmon* and *Venice* have been disturbed with *Seditions*, then they also must have been unequall Commonwealths: For in generall it is most certain, *That a Government which attains to perfect equality hath such a Libration in the Frame of it, that No man in or under it can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. And the whole Commonwealth of Oceana being the Exemplification of such an equall Government*, If Men are still to seek for a Commonwealth that has been free from *Seditions*, the Fault is their own that they make no more haste to come under so happy a Government. This then is a state of the Question which ought to be determin'd by Experiment rather then Argument; But the Ingredients to the Experiment

H. p. 46.

H. p. 36.

periment (the safety of three Nations) being of two great Expense, We are obliged to better Husbandry, and must be content to make our Judgment of the future Successes of this Government by the Paper Modell of it which has been given Us, And examine Whether that contains any Security, that this Government has no Possibility of being disturbed with *Sedition*: The Truth or Falsehood of which Proposition will best be discovered, by referring the particular Frame of the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, to the Generall Idea of *Government*.

The Apprehension of a Disability in every particular Man (or at least in every particular Familie) of preserving by his own single Power either his Life or any thing usefull to life, was the first inducement of Mankind to come under *Government*; Now it was impossible to establish any *Government* without a *Sovereign* Power vested in some One Man or Assembly of Men, For without that Every particular Man must still have been left to the Protection of his own strength, and must have continued to do all other Men whatsoever Mischief did any way conduce to his own Profit or Preservation, the avoiding the Inconveniences of which Life was that which Men intended by submitting themselves to *Government*; And therefore every Particular Man was necessitated to part with his Native Power and intrust it with the *Sovereign*, whose Actions He did thereby Authorise and make his own. The Sovereignty being thus

thus fixt, The next work was to enact Lawes, or prescribe Rules of behaviour both in Reference of the Service to himself which the *Sovereign* thought fit to require, and the Intercourse or Commerce between every Particular Man united under him. But here it soon began to appear how irregular the Passions of Man are, and how infirm and Erroneous his Discourse, For Men presently indeavoured to resume the Liberty which They had so lately parted with, and violated those Lawes which had been newly Authorised by themselves. Yet the Inconvenience was not great, as long as this Irregularity exceeded not a few Persons, such as were apparently too weak to resist the *Sovereign* Power; For then these Offences, as Murder, Theft, and the like, were presently attended by the Punishments ordained for them by the *Sovereign*, and the Facinorous Persons being made Examples of Justice, served to contain other Men within the Bounds of their Duty.

But if the Number of those who were Desirous to resume the Power they had parted with, or who otherwise by reason of their Crimes were concerned that the Course of Justice should be intercepted, did at any time prove great enough to beare up against the *Sovereign* Power, Then were Matters reduced again to a Condition of War, and *Government* with all the Pacts on which it had been founded trampled under Foot. It may seem contrary to Reason that the Motives which were at first

firſt ſtrong enough to make Men ſubmit to *Government* and Lawes, ſhould afterward prove too weake to inforce their Obedience to them; And without doubt if Men did in all their Actions govern themſelves by Calm and ſolid Reaſon, They would never hearken ſo far either to the ſtimulations of their own Paſſions, or to the Incitements of other Men, as to be ingaged in a Deſign of reverſing the *Sovereign* Power, For the greateſt Miſchiefs that can be ſuffered by any *Government*, are not comparable to thoſe Occaſioned by the Abſence of *Government* when Men live in the Wild and Lawleſs condition of War; Nor can it be any thing but Madneſs voluntarily to expoſe ones ſelf to Miſerie for the taking away a Power, in room of which another equall Power muſt of Neceſſity be ſubſtituted. Yet Experience teaches us that this is too little to make the World Wiſe, at which We ought no more to wonder, then that the Certainty of Puniſhment ſhould not be enough to make men abſtain from violating Lawes, Nor the Feare of Hell Torments (even to thoſe who are ſufficiently perſwaded of the Certitude of them) to keep Men from ſinning. So that the Wiſedome of thoſe Men is a little to be ſuſpected, who think any Governours can be ſecured, by the unreaſonableneſs that would be in their Subjects Diſobedience; For there ever were and will eternally be ſome Men who will miſtake in this Point, and think it their Intereſt to ſubvert the *Sovereign* Power.

This Falſe Opinion has been very much helpt forward

forward by the Sense of those Pressures which are sometimes sustain'd under *Government*; For whilst Men considering only their private Utility expect to live free from all Incommodity, They usually charge the *Government* with those Grievances which are inseperable from the infirm Condition of Humanity, or perhaps are Consequences of their own Inconformity to the true and Necessary temper of Subjection; There being nothing which Men more Naturally forget, Then that the Exercise of *Sovereign* Power requires a large Expence, toward which it is necessary for every particular Man to contribute a Part, thereby to secure the Rest to Himself.

Yet it can not be denied That sometimes there has been much of Iniquity in the Manage of *Sovereign* Power; At first, it is likely, the Person or Assembly trusted with it were known to be of just and Generous Principles, but by Succession the *Power* being devolved upon Men Weak or Vitious, They have frequently trifled away the Lives, Honours, and Fortunes of their Subjects, which They ought not to have imployed but upon just and Probable Occasions. The Desire to prevent this Inconvenience brought forth an Expedient into the World, commonly known under the Name of mixt Government, in which, Though there seem to be a *Sovereign* Instituted, the *People* do not part with their whole Power to him, but retain some Part of it in their own Hands; So as to some Actions in which the Lives and

Fortunes

Fortunes of every particular Man seem most concerned (such are the making Lawes and raising Mony, and the like) the *Sovereign* in appearance can do nothing by himself, but the Consent of the *People* by their Collective or Representative Body is still necessary. But this Expedient (though in some Places it might be for a while by reason of some externall Accidents not unprosperous) fell short of effecting the thing desired, And had besides this irreparable Breach in it, That while the Persons to whom the severall Parts of *Sovereign Power* were thus committed, fell into little Jealousies and Contests about their severall Respective Rights and Privileges, the Government was weakened, and left as it were without Legs or Arms; And when these little Jealousies came to be improved into open Dissensions, the severall Parties assuming to themselves the Exercise of the whole *Sovereign Power*, and the Advantages remaining with either not being conspicuous enough to determine the Matter otherwaies, the Nation which happened to be the Seat of so unfortunate a Controversie was necessarily reduced into a State of War; From which it has seldome been known to have been redeemed, but by destroying that Mixture which was pretended to, and rendring one of the Parties absolute in their Power.

Beyond this I know but of One Artefice to which Humane Invention has pretended, and that is to contrive a way how the People may govern themselves without Instituting any *Sovereign*

vereign, so that the Ends of *Government* may be attained and yet no Man devest himself of his Native Power and Liberty. It is confest by those Men who indeavour to introduce this kind of *Government*, that the *People* in their diffused condition are incapable of all *Government*; ignorant of such Counsels as are necessary to their Preservation, and unable to put the least part of them in Execution: Therefore it is of Necessity that the *People* should be assembled together, that there should be a *Senate* to consult, and *Magistrates* to Execute. But the advantage of this *Government* is pretended to consist in this, That the *People* not parting with their Power, but reserving to themselves the last Result in all Business, They are secured from all Injurie and Oppression, seeing the *People* can not be supposed to agree to do themselves Hurt: And as for the *Magistrates* and *Senate* they can not be Authors of any Violence, because they shall have only a very limited Power, the Exercise of which also is terminated within the Compass of a few Months, after which they are againe to be melted down into the Mass of the *People*, from which They were at first separated. In Fabricating this great Engine, and contriving all the Movements and Resorts belonging to it consists the whole Mysterie of *Popular Government*; Of which the most perfect Modell, that ever was produced Mr *Harrington* assures Us is his Commonwealth of *Oceana*. So that we need only to examine that Commonwealth by the Notions & Maximes already laid down,

down, to know Whether Popular *Government* has that advantage over all other *Governments*, as to have no Flaw in it', and not to be exposed to a Possibility of being disturbed with *Sedition*.

In the first Place it is manifest that Popular *Government* is equally with any other *Government* exposed to this Inconvenience; That Particular Men will have an Interest to disturb it with *Sedition*; For it being impossible there should be any *Government* without Lawes, and all Lawes consisting either in a Prohibition of doing somewhat which before it was free to do, or in a Command of doing somewhat which before might have been omitted, Men must under Popular *Government* also needs regret the loss of that Liberty which was Naturall to them. If it be objected that under Popular *Government* Men give their Consent to the enacting of all Lawes, and therefore can not be rationally thought averse from what was their own Act, It must be remembred that in all other *Government* also, every Man did by that One Generall Act of resigning his Power and Authorising the Actions of the *Sovereign*, give his Consent to all the establisht Laws, which notwithstanding is known to be insufficient for inforcing a Plenary Obedience to Lawes. And it is little less then ridiculous to think, That when under Popular *Government* Men have committed such Crimes as by the Lawes of it deserve Death, They should not apprehend it to be their Interest, by disturbing the *Government* with *Sedition* to secure, if it be possible,

their own Lives. Whensoever therefore under Popular *Government*, the number of those whose offences have rendered them lyable to the severity of Laws, is considerable enough to qualify them for the Attempt, Popular *Government* has no more security than any other of being free from *Seditions*. Of this Originall and Extraction as to the main, was *Catalines* Attempt upon the *Roman* Commonwealth.

Secondly, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of *Oceana* supposing a *Senate* and a *Representative* of the *People* called the *Prerogative Tribe*, consisting of about thirteen hundred Men, I aske Whether that *Representative* (taking the *Senate* and present *Magistrates* with it) be indued with the *Sovereign* Power, that is such as cannot be resisted by any Man or Men within the Commonwealth of *Oceana*? If they have such Power, Then it is manifest They may whensoever they think it their Interest, perpetuate this power, and by repealing the Orders of *Rotation*, render themselves a standing *Assembly*, which dashes to peeces the whole frame of popular *Government*, and puts the publique Affaires (which is contrary to the Designe and supposition of a free Commonwealth) into the hands of a *Sovereign Assembly*. Now that the *Representative* may come to think this their Interest is manifest also; For the Desire of *Power* being Naturall to man, a far greater share of *Power* remaines with every particular Man, when the *Svereign Power* is divided among thirteen hundred, then when the same *Power* is

is divided among two hnndred thouſand men. It is very true, as Mr *Harrington* has obſerved *That the Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater then the Power or Effect of a leſſer people*; But that is not to be brought to account under this Head, For it is not now inquired, Whether the *Power* of thirteen hundred or two hundred thouſand Men be greater, but Whether if the ſame *Power* belong to thirteen hundred or two hundred thouſand men, Every particular perſon of the thirteen hundred will not have more *Power* than every particular perſon of the two hundred thouſand men. And what has been ſaid of *Power* the ſame is to be underſtood of Riches. So that in the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, the *Magiſtrates*, *Senate*, and *Prerogative Tribe* for the time being, have both power and Intereſt to diſſolve the Frame of the Goverment. And that a *Repreſentative* is not incapable of making ſuch an attempt as this, will, (it is not improbable) eaſily find Belief with thoſe who are acquainted with the Actions of theſe laſt eighteen yeares. H. pag 39.

But now let us reſume the other member of the Disjunction, and ſuppoſe that the *Magiſtrate*, *Senate* and *Prerogative Tribe*, have not the *Sovereign* power, but that it remaines ſtill with the Body of the *People in Oceana*. Hence it muſt follow that in the Commonwealth of *Oceana* there is no *Sovereign* power at all, And that the *People* of it are either in a Condition of *Warr*, or ready to fall into it. For the *people of Oceana* being too numerous and too much

dispersed to Assemble Personally in one place, They cannot concur to any Act but by their *Representative*; But that *Representative* not having the *Sovereign* power, there is not any such Power constituted, and consequently every Particular Man is left to the Protection of his own Power and strength, which is the Condition of *War*, and implies the Absence of all *Government*.

It will, perhaps, be replied that the *Sovereign* Power resides in the lesser Assemblies, as the Parish, Hundred, or Tribe, where the *People* personally concur to the Election of their Deputies. But this is not to make One but a great many *Sovereign* Powers, and to shatter One great Commonwealth, into as many little Ones as there are Parishes in *Oceana*. Nor is the Difficulty removed by it, For these lesser *Sovereign* Assemblies being not put into any Method of concurring in any Common Opinion, but by the Deputies they send to the *Representative* or *Prerogative Tribe*, If those Deputies be sent with *Sovereign* Power, the Commonwealth relapses into the Danger before insisted on of being supplanted by that *Representative*.

But if these Deputies be not sent to the *Prerogative Tribe* with *Sovereign* Power, then the *Prerogative Tribe* has no such Power and by Consequence can not make Lawes, or impose any other Resolution upon the Commonwealth; If notwithstanding this the *Prerogative Tribe* does *de facto* make Lawes, the Authority with which they are armed, is not that of the *Representative* it self, but of the lesser *Sovereign* Assem-

Aſſemblies, who in that They do not declare their Diſſent, are preſumed to allow of ſuch things as have been reſolved on by their Deputies. So that upon the Matter, *Oceana*, is not a Single Commonwealth, but a Compunded One made up by a tacite League of ſo many Commonwealths as there are leſſer *Sovereign* Aſſemblies in *Oceana*. Now the Leagues between *Sovereigns* are of no longer Duration then their Common Intereſt, which whenſoever it happens to be divided, ſuch Leagues Vaniſh; And therefore whenſoever the leſſer *Sovereign* Aſſemblies in *Oceana* come to be divided in their Intereſt, the Commonwealth muſt fall in Pieces. But that They may come to be ſo divided is probable, if not neceſſary; Antiently They were divided both in reſpect of the *Saxon Heptarchie*, and the *Welch* Princes under the *Norman* Kings; The difference of Language (One of the greateſt ſeparators of Men's Affections) is not quite worn out; The inhabiting the ſame Iſland is not a ſufficient Argument of Union, for then *Scotland* and We ſhould make but One Nation; In fine, there can be no cauſe aſſigned of the Union of this Nation under One *Government* but the Power of former Princes, which by the Inſtitution of this new Commonwealth is quite obliterated. More then all this, The Concernments of the Severall Parts of this Nation are very different in Reference to Propriety and Riches; ſome Parts ſubſiſt upon Mines and Cole, Others upon Manufacture, Some upon Corne, Others upon the Profits of Cattle,

London and the Sea Ports upon Exportation and Importation; And it is not poſſible but that when thoſe ſeverall things come to be regulated by Lawes, the Different Parts of the Nation muſt neceſſarily eſpouſe very Different Intereſts.

This is alſo very conformable to Experience; *Greece* was a Country much leſs then *England*, The People of it (with an inconſiderable variety of Dialect) ſpoke the ſame Language, They had the ſame Common Enemy the *Perſian*, and were united in many other particular Intereſts: Yet all this was not enough to reduce them into one great Commonwealth, but We find among them almoſt as many Republiques, as Cities. The Condition of *Sicilie*, *Magna Græcia*, and the Coaſts of *Aſia* ſerve alſo to make good the ſame Obſervation. Nay in *Iſrael* (which Mr *Harrington* will have paſs for a Commonwealth) though the Countrey was ſo Narrow, the People all deſcended of one Familie, and cemented together by a Million of common Concernments and Obligations, this Thing is very apparent alſo; For though it did not produce a totall Diſſolution of the *Government*, yet It for ſome time ſuſpended it, and threw the People into a Civill *War*, as in the Caſe of *Jephthah* between the Men of *Ephraim* and *Gilead*, and in that of the Levites Concubine, between the Tribe of *Benjamin* and the reſt of *Iſrael*.

Jud. cap. 12. *&* 20.

There is but One imaginable caſe more to be put concerning the *Sovereign Power* in the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, Which is, That though the *People* have parted with their Power, They have

have not intruſted it all in One hand, but have ſo equally divided it among the *Magiſtrates*, *Senate*, and *Prerogative Tribe*, that No publique Action can be performed without the Concurrence of all; Now there is nothing more improbable then that all theſe ſhould concur to the Oppreſſing the *People*, changing the *Government*, or diſturbing it with *Sedition*; Then which greater Security is not attainable in Matter of *Government*. But all this riſes no higher then the Caſe of mixt *Government*. For the Power being wholly paſt from the *People*, and divided equally among theſe ſeverall Perſons, This equality of Power muſt upon their Diſagreement reduce the Commonwealth to a Civill *War*, ſeeing it is not otherwaies to be judged which of them has the *Sovereign Power*, and by that a Right to the Obedience of the Reſt. Now that they cannot long Agree, is a Conſequence of that Deſire of Power which is confeſt to dwell with Man, and will not permit him to reſt ſatisfied with Part of that *Sovereign Power*, which He may fairely hope to poſſeſs Intire. And if there are any Examples of Perſons thus Poſſeſt of equall Power, who have for a while maintained a good Correſpondence with one another, and ſo preſerved the Commonwealth in Peace, This muſt not be attributed to the Frame or Temper of the *Government*, but to ſome externall Cauſe, ſuch as the Apprehenſion of ſome Common Impending danger, Or an over high Eſtimation of one another's ſtrength, by which there is generated in them a mutuall Fear of one another:

another: As two Armies when neither of them has any Visible Advantage of strength, do very often forbeare engaging out of a mutuall doubt of the Success, which notwithstanding is not a state of *Peace*, seeing both are intent upon the Opportunities of procuring one anothers Ruine.

It having been thus Proved, That the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, which was given us as the Example of a most equall Commonwealth, is which way soever the Case be stated, liable not only to Sedition, but which is more, to a totall Dissolution, It is at the same time evinced, *That a Commonwealth coming up to the Perfection of the kind, comes not up to the Perfection of Government, but has a Flaw in it.* I do not suspect that after this Mr *Harrington* will any longer think fit to accuse Me of *hudling things together* or *neglecting of Principles*; It is true I can not admit of his *Principles*, because, as I have often told him, They are meerly Effects & Consequences of *Government*, that is no *Principles* at all. And while He thus goes astray in the *Principles*, His Labour must needs be unprofitable, both in examining the Models of Former Commonwealth's, and in proposing New Ones of his own; For at this Rate New Models of Government may be contrived with as much ease, as a French Tayler invents new Fashions. It is the Foundation of *Government* upon undeniable *Principles*, and the Diductions from them, which render Politiques a Compleat Science, without which the greatest Conversation with particular Commonwealths can but at most make Men *Empiricks* in Policy.

H. p. 40.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Monarchy coming up to the Perfection of the Kind, come short of the Perfection of Government, and have some Flaw in it?

IT can not be with reason expected that I should assert *Monarchie* to be so far Privileged as not to have a Flaw in it; For having in the preceding Discourse laid it down for a Maxime, *That Men will eternally mistake the Point of Government, and think it their Interest to Subvert the Supream Power*, I should now contradict my self by affirming that of *Monarchicall Government* in particular, which I before denied of all *Government* in Generall. Yet does not Mr *Harrington* gaine any Advantage by this, For though I confess that *Monarchie* comes not up to the imaginary Perfection of *Government* which He dreams of, but is indeed neither in a *Monarchie* nor a *Commonwealth*, nor yet in Nature, I am not at all diffident of making Good, That a Supream Hereditary *Monarchie* attaines to a greater Degree of Perfection, and has fewer Flaws in it, then a *Commonwealth* or any other kind of *Government*.

I do not think it needfull to repeat either the Principles or Conclusions of the last Chapter, Only it will be usefull to examine somewhat more at large the Causes or Reasons why Men are not content with the *Government* they live under,

under, but do by a continuall Indeavour to ſubvert the *Sovereign Power*, diſturb it with *Sedition*. Of which in Generall three Reaſons may be aſſigned.

The firſt is a Deſire of Immunity from Puniſhment in ſuch Perſons as have by their Crimes render'd themſelves obnoxious to the Lawes; For it being impoſſible as long as Men are ſubject to Paſſions, but that ſuch Faults will be committed as the *Sovereign Power* has thought fit to puniſh with Death or the loſs of Eſtate, The Perſons who have commited thoſe Faults will indubitably ſeek to avoid the Puniſhment, which can not be done but by raiſing a Party able to reſiſt the *Sovereign Power*. And as Criminall Perſons ſeek to avoid Puniſhment for Crimes already committed, So Perſons extreamly in Debt or Indigent, who being deſtitute of that Induſtrie which might procure them a Subſiſtence in a Regular Way, know not how to live but by Rapine and Invading other Men's Propriety, deſire to diſturb the Government that they may find Security in thoſe Crimes which for the Future they reſolve to Commit.

The ſecond is a Want of Judgment to diſcern the Miſeries which attend War; For when a People have ſo long injoyed Peace that the Memory of the wretched Effects of a Civill War is defaced, They are very Frequently deafe to the Admonitions of Wiſer Men, to the Hiſtories of former times, and to the Example of other Nations, And ſo out of meer Wantoneſs throw away their own Happineſs, by ſuffering themſelves to

be

be ingaged in a War against the *Sovereign*, the Consequences of which they had never taken the least pains to Consider. And to this they are very easily brought, whensoever those Men who are by some other Motive ingaged to seek the subversion of the *Government*, have Credit enough with the People to impose a Cheat upon them, by making Use of the Names of Religion or Liberty, or some other like specious Pretence.

The third is that Desire of Power which Men commonly understand by the Name of Ambition; This seems so twisted with the being of Man that it is thought naturall to him, and no more separable then his Affections or Passions. Yet if any Ambitious Man should take himself to a strict Account, and demand a Reason of his own Thoughts and Actions, If He should contemplate Power with all the Dangers, Cares, and Inquietudes intayled upon it, And strip it of that gawdy Dress with which the Deluded World has adorned it, He would find his Pursuit of Power extreamly Irrationall, unless so far as it did necessarily conduce to his own Preservation. The Desire of self Preservation was (as I said formerly) the first step to *Government*, and the Institution of *Sovereign Power* was the Caution that every Man had of every other Man for his Preservation; Yet this did not satisfy, because it quickly appeared that though good Laws were ordained for every Man's Protection, yet they could not alwaies come in time enough to prevent particular Mischiefs, So that Men judged it Rationall, besides the generall Protection they injoyed

injoyed from the *Sovereign*, to arme themselves with a particular Power against particular Dangers. Nor did Men stop here, but out of their incurable Suspition of all other Men, They became as much afraid of the *Sovereign Power* as they were before of one another, And so continually endeavoured to acquire such Power as might even defend them from the *Sovereign*, which Design could never be thought fully attained by them untill the *Sovereign Power* it self was in their Possession.

The Desire then of such a Power as may preserve a Man, in such Cases where the Laws are not sufficient to do it, from other private Men, implying a Submission to the *Sovereign*, and acting in a Method not prohibited by him, can never bring danger to *Government*. But the Desire of a Power able to defend them from the *Sovereign*, is properly that Ambition which is the Fountaine from whence flow the chiefest Dangers that threaten *Government*, And is alwaies an just though more or less condemnable according to the Temper of those who injoy the *Sovereign Power*; For if They are just and Vertuous Persons, and use not to make any Invasions on the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects, this Ambition is the more Criminall because the first Motive to it was false and Irrationall; But if they are known Oppressors of the People, and such who consider not that They injure themselves by trampling upon the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects, it is a little more excusable, being an indeavour (though

by

by an unjust Method) of preserving such Things as deserve not to be wilfully thrown away.

I have studiously abstained from reckoning the Desire of Riches among the Causes of *Sedition*; For if it be a Desire of Moderate Riches such as are subservient to the Necessities or Conveniences of Man's Life, or to the attaining Innocent and Honest Pleasures, They may with far greater ease and Probability be acquired by private and Legall Industrie then by disturbing the *Government*; And it is in Experience that those Men who are most taken up with this Design, are of all People the least turbulent, and do most abominate Commotions. But if it be a Desire of excessive Riches, such Riches can not be desirable in themselves but only as They are the Instruments of Power; And so this Desire is to be reduced to the Desire of Power.

If Revenge, Love, or any other Passion has sometimes given the first Impulse to the Dissolution of *Government*, these Accidents are so Particular and Infrequent, that they can not deserve to have Place in a Generall Discourse.

Having thus in generall discovered the first Causes of *Sedition* in all *Government*, the next Work must be to show by what Art or Providence the *Sovereign* may prevent the Mischief, and suspend the Effects in their Causes. And for obviating the first Cause of Sedition, many particular Cares are necessary; As the diligent Execution of Lawes, that so every Offence may be overtaken by the Punishment; then the Encouragement

couragement of Manufactures and Traffique which fetching Wealth from abroad, cure the Subject of Want and Necessity at home; After that a Prohibition of Excess in such things (as Gaming, Clothes, and the like) by which Men go in Chace of Poverty; And last of all, When notwithstanding all these Cares, Criminall and Indigent Persons grow Numerous, A seasonable Dreyning of them away by a Foreign War or Plantations.

The Prevention of the second Cause of *Seditions* consists in having the People sufficiently instructed in the Sad and Miserable Consequences of a Civill War, in Comparison of which the greatest Pressures under the worst of *Governments* are no Evils. But it must be confest that this is a Text upon which the Wise part of the World has used in vaine to Preach to the Fooles, And therefore there is a mixture of Fortune in it, which very much secures those Princes who come in just upon the last Act of a Civill War; For there being no Man then alive in whom there is not a fresh Memorie of the Calamities of War, They have them in such Detestation, as that They are willing to suffer any thing rather then be a second time plunged into that miserable Condition.

Against the third Cause of *Seditions*, the Virtue and Innocence of the Prince is a Grand Remedy; for if his Subjects find Protection from him against all other Men, and have no just ground to suspect any Prejudice from him in their Lives or Fortunes, It would be despe-

rately

rately unreasonable to enter into any Diffidence of Him, or out of an Ambitious Desire of Power, to seek to subvert the *Government*. Yet because all Mankind are not Philosophers, And a great part of those over whom *Sovereign Power* is to be exercised, are not guided by Reason, but misled by Passion and false Consequences, It will be necessary to arm a *Sovereign* with somewhat more then his own Innocence, and give him a Power sufficient to repress those Brutish and Irrationall Subjects.

Here then it will concern Us to inquire what are the Advantages of the *Sovereign* over his Subjects. It is manifest that these consist not in the personall strength of a *Monarch*, nor yet of a *Sovereign Assembly*; For the first is but the strength of one Man, and the other but of a few Men, who beare no Proportion to those who are to be governed by them: Therefore the Advantages of the *Sovereign Power* proceed from this, That their Subjects have given up their particular strengths to be imployed at the Discretion of the *Sovereign*, So that in the *Sovereign* the diffused strength of a Multitude is united in One Person, which in a *Monarchy* is a Naturall Person, in a *State* an Artificiall One procreated by a majority of Votes. The Desire in particular Men of retracting this Gift, or Reassuming the Power they had conferred upon the *Sovereign*, (which proceeds from some of the Causes already mentioned but most particularly from the third) is the beginning of all *Sedition*; This at first can be the De-

fire of but One Man, who upon discovery of Symptomes of like Inclinations may impart it to some Few, and they afterward Communicate it to more, so as at length to be able to form a Party sufficient to disturb the *Government* with *Sedition*. So that in Effect, the Advantage of the *Sovereign* over his Mutinous Subjects, is the same that an United strength has over a divided One, or an Army over a greater Multitude of dispersed and Scattered People. In consequence of which it may be inferred, That the Great Art of Governing (next to that of withdrawing the Causes and Matter of Sedition by the Virtue & Innocence of the Sovereign's Actions) consists in being verst in those Methods by which a Number of Discontented Persons may be hinderd from becoming a Party, that is framing such a Correspondence among themselves as to be able to Act with one Common Consent and Design.

To discourse of the Vigilance of the *Sovereign* in observing all the Motions of his Subjects, or of the Intelligence He ought to maintain for discovering all their *Cabals*, belongs not to this Place; These things are according to the different Complexions of Times and Affaires infinitely various, and depend every where upon the particular Sufficiency of the Ministers. Only I may observe, That where there are constant *Assemblies* of any considerable part of the People which depend not wholly upon the *Sovereign*, both as to the times of their Convention and Dissolution, and as to the Matter and Manner

Manner of their Consultations, such *Assemblies* do easily become the Cradles of *Sedition*, and are therefore very Dangerous, and scarse to be with Prudence permitted by the *Sovereign*.

Let Us therefore consider a *Sedition* as ready to go alone, and just fitted to walk abroad and take the Aire. The first Steps of it must necessarily be infirm and staggering, For They who first Discover themselves are sure to be immediately attaqued by the United Force of the *Sovereign*, against which They can have little hope to prevaile; For their own Party being unsetled and Raw, And that of the *Sovereign* formed beforehand the Oddes must needs be very Great; And therefore the Broachers of *Seditions*, are generally Men altogether Desperate, who despise the Certitude of those Dangers by which all Considering Men are deterred. This then is the Grand Security of all *Sovereigns*, whether single Persons or Assemblies, That the united Force of their Subjects with which They are invested, is sufficient to suppress the Beginnings of all *Seditions*, And beyond this No *Government* has any Amulets that can preserve it; For if some *Seditions* have been suppressed after they were broke out into actuall Civill Wars, That has not been by any Virtue of the *Government*, but is to be attributed to the same Causes that serve to determine the Successes of Wars between distinct *Sovereign Powers*. And therefore No *Sovereign* ought to expect his safety from any Frame or Temper of the *Government*, or from the settled orders

of the Commonwealth, but from his own Virtue in withdrawing the Matter, his Prudence and Dexterity in preventing the Contrivance, And his Celerity and Resolution in suppressing the Beginnings of *Seditions*.

What then remaines is only to take a View of the particular Method which a *Monarch* is capacitated to observe, in order to his Security, And to Compare it with the Methods of other *Governments*. Seeing the first Compact of every Man to part with his private *Power*, upon which *Sovereignty* was founded, is by experience found too weak to support the *Government*, All *Monarchs* have found it necessary to communicate some *Part* of this *Power* with which themselves are vested, to some subordinate Ministers who by this have a more peculiar Interest in the safety of the *Monarch* then the rest of his Subjects, and therefore are more likely in any Danger to stand by him: This *Power* according to the severall Intentions of the *Monarch*, either upon the Death of the Person to whom it was committed reverts again to the *Monarch*, or is transmitted to his next Heire, as one from whom the *Monarch* has reason to expect the same Services; This last Case is the Generation of a *Nobility*, who use to be distinguish't from other Men by such Titles with which the *Monarch* has thought fit to adorn them. And becaus Riches (whether in Land or other Revenue) are a principall Fountain of all such Power as is subordinate to the *Sovereign Power*, either the *Nobility* uses to have considerable

considerable Riches conferred upon them by the *Sovereign*, or else such Persons as by their own Industrie have attained considerable Riches are advanced to be of the *Nobility*. Thus has a *Monarch* attained the first Degree of his Security, That there are a considerable Number of Persons who being intrusted with some Portion of Power by him, have by that both an Ability and Interest to defend him against all such as go about to disturb the *Government* with *Sedition*; For some of these Persons being present in all Quarters of the Dominion, and injoying by the *Monarch's* Authority an united Power, can not be supposed to faile in suppressing the Weake and Disjoynted beginnings of all *Seditions*.

It has been and still is a Question, Whether it be most advantagious for a *Monarch* to communicate this Power only by Commission to such Persons as He finds most capable of doing him Service, and that without any Promissory Obligation upon himself either to continue it to their Posterity, or to themselves longer then his Good Pleasure, Or whether it be best for Him to transmit it to their Posterity, and by that to constitute a *Nobility*. But I think it will not be hard to determine the Question in favour of a *Nobility* out of these Considerations.

First, That there is more Safety in a *Nobility* then in the other way of temporary Commissions, against a Forreign Enemy; Seeing it is the Interest of the whole *Nobility* to defend

to the utmost Extremity that *Monarch*, from whom They and their Posterity injoy a greater share of Power then They have Reason to expect from a Conquerour.

Secondly, That even against his own People the Security a *Monarch* gains by a *Nobility* is greater then He can have the other Way; For there being a radicated Power in a *Nobility*, the Impressions of Awe and Reverence upon the *People* are greater from them, then they can be from any temporary Commander.

Thirdly, It being so naturall to all Men to desire the Welfare of their Posterity, a *Nobility* has greater Interests to preserve the *Monarch* by whose Favour both They and their Children are possest of a considerable Power, then They can have who wanting a Promise from the *Monarch* for the Continuation of this Power, may justly look upon themselves as Tenants at Will, And so may have a Concernment to endeavour by some Innovation in the *Government*, to ascertain this Power to themselves.

Yet this is not to be taken Absolutely and without Restriction; For seeing a *Nobility*, is subject to the same Passions with other Men, a *Monarch* is not to make Account that the Greatness of the Benefits They injoy by Him, should be enough to keep his *Nobility* within the Bounds of Duty: Nay farther, That Ambition which We have Defined to be a Desire of Power sufficient to defend one from the *Sovereign Power*, is chiefly incident to the *Nobility*, because They possessing Much, are most apt

apt to think themselves a Prey considerable enough to tempt the *Sovereign's* Avarice. And therefore as a *Nobility* is a *Monarchs* Guard against the *People*, so a *Monarch* may stand in need of another Guard against the *Nobility*, to secure him against such Dangers as otherwise He might incur from their Ambition.

These Dangers are of two kinds; For either They proceed from some particular Persons of the *Nobility*, excelling the rest of their Order in Power or Dignity, Or they arise from the whole Body of the *Nobility*. If a *Monarch* has out of the Consideration of neerness of Blood, or his own Affections, or Greatness of Merit, conferred a large share of Power upon one Person or Familie, with leave to transmit it to their Posterity, this Power may easily become Matter of Danger, if not to Him, at least to his successors. Thus the Successors of *Charles the Great* in *Germanie*, and this *Hugh Capet* in *France*, by conferring upon some of the *Nobility* an Hereditary Power over Provinces large enough to raise and maintain an Army, broke those two great *Monarchies* into a Multitude of little Ones, though the latter of them has had the Fortune to recover, and be again consolidated into one great Empire. At first, no doubt, there were some such Duties reserved by the supream *Monarch* as served to manifest the Dependance of these lesser Ones upon him, But they easily degenerating into Matters of meere Forme and Ceremony, and the *People* wanting Eyes to look beyond the next Object, These

Dependant *Monarchs* were by their Subjects soone considered as Absolute Ones, and thought to shine by their own Native Light though it were at first derived to them from the great Luminary of the *Sovereign Power*. Where the Error of former *Monarchs* has thus deformed the Naturall shape of Empire, and rendered Government a Monster with more Heads then One, It is it vaine for the Prince to expect Security, or for the Subjects to hope for Peace and Tranquillity: For if the exorbitant Power of these Great Ones among the *Nobility* can not be retrench't, the State can have no Assurance of Safety but that casuall One which is obtained from the Content and Satisfaction of these Great Persons; And that is not like to continue longer then they are taken up with some considerable Imployment abroad, they being in this like tame Lions, whose Keepers are no longer out of Danger of being torne in Pieces, then they maintain them full gorged.

The Dangers that arise from the whole Body of the *Nobility*, are when the Nobility is possest of a Right to Assemble themselves for the Electing a Successour to the *Monarchy*, or for making of War and Peace, or for nominating the great Ministers of State, or for performing any other Act which by the Nature of it is inseparable from the *Sovereign Power*. This Happens either when the *Monarch* did at first, out of Covetousnes of Reigning, accept of the Kingdome with a less share of Power then was necessary for attaining the Ends of *Government*, or has

since parted with this power out of an erroneous beliefe, That *Sovereignty* could subsist without it. And if in these Cases the Government has been *Seditious*, this can be no Argument against a *Soverign Monarch*, because those Cases suppose the Prince to want that power which was requisite to make him *Sovereign*. Though even in these Cases, there want not examples of some able Princes who by their Artifice in Ballancing the severall Factions of the *Nobility*, have for a long time preserved themselves and People in safety.

Where neither some few persons of the *Nobility* are possest of excessive power and Command, nor where the whole body of the *Nobility* has a Right to assemble for the ends before mentioned, It is not imaginable how a *Nobility* should be dangerous to a *Monarch*; For though the *Nobility* are not so great a multitude as the *People*, yet they are a multitude, and by Consequence exposed, in proportion to the same Difficulties and Dangers in carrying on a Designe for disturbing the *Government*; & the same remedies are applicable against them, which were by them made use of against the *People*.

These Remedies are in generall two; First that the *Monarch* have continually in pay a sufficient *Militia* to be alwaies ready to march for suppressing the first motions or tendency toward a *Sedition*; Secondly that seing every Country has some places of strength where a few may be secure against a great number, these Places be kept at the Monarch's Devotion by

by a convenient proportion of Souldiers, for in this case the *Nobilty* wanting places of Defence to secure themselves at the beginning of their Attempt, And knowing assuredly that they shall be exposed to the danger of being cut in pieces by the *Militia* entertained by the *Monarch*, They cannot be supposed so Irrationall as out of vain and uncertain Hopes of greater power to incur the forfeit of that of which they are already possest.

To assign the number of this Souldiery can never be done, not only because Different *Monarchies* stand in need of Different Proportions, but the same *Monarchy* may require Different proportions at different times; Only in generall, it may pass for a necessary Maxime, That this *Militia* ought not to amount to a compleat full Army; For besides that the Expence would devour any *Monarch*, The experience of the *Roman* and *Turkish* Emperours and all other *Princes* who have kept great Armies as a guard to their Persons and Empire, teach us that this is to walke upon precipices, There being no possibility of preventing such an Army (especially if they lye still without Imployment) from acquiring an Interest distinct from that of the Prince. Therefore this *Militia* must be so instituted as that it can have no Interest besides the Pay it receives from the *Monarch*, nor any hopes of being safe in their own strength if they should withdraw themselves from the Service and Obedience due to him.

This

This is that mixture of a *Monarchy* by a *Nobility*, and a *Monarchy* by *Armes* in which consists the perfection of *Monarchicall Government*. Nor do I enter into despaire of living to enjoy my share of the Felicities which will belong to the Subjects of such a *Government*, though *Mr Harrington* be positive in asserting, *That the wit of man never found, nor shall find this Monarchy, there being no such thing in Nature.* *H. pag. 72.* And his Reason for this most Tyrannous Confidence, is only this *That there is nothing in Nature that hath not had a naturall effect by some example.* *H. pag. 72.* I believe *Mr Harrington* would not think himself sincerely dealt with, if he should be told, There is no such thing in nature as an equall Commonwealth, because there is nothing in Nature that hath not had a Naturall Effect by some Example; But the Commonwealth of *Oceana* is (by his own Confession) *the first example of a Commonwealth that is perfectly equall.* *Ocena. p. 23.* It is his own Argument for a *Commonwealth*, and therefore I doe not understand how he can prohibit me the use of the same Logique in Defence of *Monarchy*, *That it is the Government which if it have been seditious, it hath not beeen from any Imperfection in the kind, but* for want of this mixture *in the particular Constitution; which where ever the like hath happened must have* wanted this mixture. *ibid.*

He is willing to suppose that I understand *France* as an instance of this mixture; But that *France* cannot be an Instance of it is manifest by this, That the Princes of the Blood do there *H. pag. 70.*

possess

possess such an excessive power, as I have declared inconsistent with this mixture, a consequence of which power have been all the considerable seditions of *France* in this last age. In many other things I allow that *France* is not far remote from this mixture, much of which also may be discovered in the *Castilian Monarchy*, in the administration of the Duke of *Florence's Government*, and the *Pope's* Temporall Domiuion in *Italy*. But it must be remembred, That to make good the possibility of this mixture, I am not obliged to produce the Example of a *Monarchy* that has continued free from *Seditions*, since I have endeavoured to prove that it is impossible any *Government* should be altogether free from them: It is abundantly enough if the Reigns of able *Monarchs* have not been troubled with *Seditions*, or only with such as have been immediately suppresst, For the art of apprehending and preserving this mixture is not attainable by any universall Rules or Frame of Policy, bnt is a personall Effect of the Capacity and Experience of every *Monarch*; And therefore to expect that a weak Prince can long continue to Govern securely by the maximes and Constitutions of a wise predecessor, is all one as to imagine that the Tools of some excellent Artificer falling into the Hands of an ignorant person should serve to make good worke.

And this seems to be the only considerable objection against us, That this mixture cannot be durable, because *the Nobility in this case would* *H.* p. 72.

not

not keep down the People, but fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that together they might weigh down the Army; which is the infallible Consequence of this mixture. Where the *Nobility* has already got too great Head, and where the Prince by the unseasonable application of an Army goes about to reduce them, I deny not but this may perhaps be the Consequence; But then this Case supposes the *Nobility* possest of a power from which They will be excluded by this mixture; And as this mixture takes from them the power so does it the Interest also, it being impossible for the Nobility to League with the People, or *fetch them up into their scale*, without loosing some part of that power which by the *Monarch* they injoyed over the *People*. This Case of the *Nobility* and *People* uniting against the Monarch can never happen unless the Monarch is at once become through his own Vices and Cruelty universally odious, and through his Imprudence and Irresolution universally contemptible; And I doe with much readinesse confesse, That such *Princes* are not to look for security, it being not in the Design of God or Nature, or in the power of Art to make those men Happy who will not cooperate toward the attaining their own Happiness.

This Temper of a Monarchy is the High-water Marke beyond which no Government can rise; That all other Government must needs fall a great deale short of it I am in the last place to make Evident. And that a *popular Govern-*

ment

ment or *Commonwealth* must doe so is apparent by the last Chapter, where it has been proved That this kind of *Government* is necessarily exposed not only to *Sedition* but totall Dissolution. For a *Government* by a *Sovereign Assembly* or *Aristocracy*, As it is exposed to all the same Originall Causes of *Sedition* with a Monarchy, so it wants the Remedies which consist in Secrecie and Celerity, that are the peculiar Advantages of a single person's Administration: Besides, this Inconvenience belongs particularly to a *Sovereign Assembly*, that one or more persons of it carrying on a secret Design to change the Government may have Credit enough in the Assembly to corrupt their Consultations, and so make the *Assembly* an Instrument to their own subversion. Lastly for a *Monarchy* either by *Armes* or a *Nobility* taken singly, This Mixture of both curing the Infirmities of each must necessarily have the Advantage of them.

If Mr *Harrington* be of Opinion that I ought to have laid down a particular Modell of this kind of *Government*, I must in this also acknowledge the Difference of my Judgement from his; For though a Generall Discourse concerning *Government* may fairly become any Gentleman, the proposing (or imposing rather) a particular Modell seems to relish too much of a Design, and wants that Modestie and submission that ought to be in all Private Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by her selfe, were ever conquered by the Armes of any Monarch.

IN this Chapter Mr *Harrington* is forced to be of the Considerer's mind, though to keep up his Credit, He seems to be upon high Contradictions with Him. For He tells Us that *He is not to be argued against out of the little Cities in Asia, which having no considerable Army, if they should be subdued by some potent Monarch, concerns the Government no more then if they had been overwhelmed by some Inundation or swallowed up by some Earthquake.* This is perfectly conformable to the Considerers sence, who has declared that He thinks the Inference Fallacious which is made from the successe of *Arms* to the perfection of *Government*. But it concerned Mr *Harrington* to have thought of this sooner, it being now too late to Retreat with Honor, or to clog that Proposition with Restrictions which had before been so positively and universally laid down by him, *That a Commonwealth was never conquered by any Monarch from the beginning of the world unto this Day.* H. pag. 75.

Yet that the Considerer may have no Temptation to be proud, Mr *Harrington* lets Him see how he lies at Mercy, and how his project of a Monarchy (whensoever it shall be thought fit

fit to use so killing an Argument) may be to-
H. p. 74. tally ruined by the Example of the *King of Yvetot*: I acknowledg the great importance of that Argument, and am willing to come to termes with him about it; And so long as he will consent to suppress this Example of *Yvetot* in exchange of the kindness I promise him not to draw any Argument for the Advantage of Monarchy, from the Antient and Illustrious Reign of King *Oberon*.

But the Considerer must not seem to be left in the possession of any truth, And therefore the first generall Answer will not serve Mr *Harringtons* turn, but he goes on to deny that there is any truth in the instances which I brought to prove that *Commonwealths* have been conquered, by *Monarchs*. The first of those was taken from the *Commonwealths* of the *Grecians* planted on the Coasts of *Asia*, concerning which I am chalenged to shew that they
H. p. 75. came under the power of the *Lydian* and *Persian Monarchs* by Conquest, or otherwise then by the purchase of *Croesus* his mony. I am ashamed that Mr *Harrington* should thus go on to oblige me; He has taught a new way by Me never thought on, for the dissolution of a *Commonwealth*; Let a People be united into a Republique, Let their City be fortifyed with Walls, let them have Armes in their Hands, Nay let the Ballance be fixt by an *Agrarian* Law; To what purpose serves all this? There comes one with a little ready Mony in his purse, and He for twenty yeares

Purchase

Purchase or thereabouts) buyes Lands, Ballance, Lawes, Liberty and all; And as Larks are caught with Daring, this People being dazled with a little Gold, are of Free Men content to become slaves to a Monarch. This is so pretty, that I am sorry I can not leave it thus, but am obliged to examine what *Herodotus* has said in Reference to the way by which *Cræsus* obtained the *Asiatick* Cities. *This Cræsus was the first Barbarian We know of who forced some of the Græcians to become his Tributaries, and made others of them his Friends; The Jonians, Aeolians, and Dorians which inhabit Asia, He forced to pay him Tribute, and the Lacedæmonians he made His friends But before the Reign of Cræsus all the Græcians were Free.* This for their Subjugation by the Lydian Monarch, concerning the Persian We will once more trie our Fortune with a Testimony out of *Thucydides*; *As others by other meanes were kept back from growing great, so also the Jonians by this, That the Persian Affaires prospering, Cyrus and the Persian Kingdome, after the Defeat of Cræsus, made War upon all that lieth from the River Halys to the Sea side, and so subdued all the Cities which they possessed in the Continent*; *And Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phœnissian Fleet did the like to them in the Islands.* Both which Testimonies are summed up by *Strabo*, where He tels Us, *That the Persians were the first who obtained Dominion over the Græcians, For though the Lydians had Com-*

Herod. lib. 1.

Thucyd. lib. 1. Pag. 10.

Strabo. l. 15.

mand of them, it was not through all Asia, but only of a small part of it which lies within the River Halys, and that only for a small time during the Reigns of Crœsus and Alyattes. But they being overcome by the Persians, lost to them whatsoever Glorie they had gained. For the Persians as soon as they had subdued the Medes, presently made themselves Masters of the Lydians, and brought into Subjection the Græcians in Asia. Upon the Defeat of *Crœsus* the *Asiatick* Republiques had, it seems, recovered their Liberty so far, as to be in a Condition to dispute it with *Cyrus*, which is clearly implyed by *Herodotus*, when having related the Successes of that War, He sales *It was the second time those Græcians were brought into Servitude.* And though during the prosperous Fortune of the *Europæan Græcians* many Attempts were made to free the *Asiatick* Ones from that Yoake, They were finally necessitated to submit to it, being by an expres's Article of the Peace concluded between *Artaxerxes* and the *Græcians* (which from the *Lacedæmonian Envoyè* who negotiated it was called the Peace of *Antalcidas*) left under the Power of the *Persian* Kings. With Permission then I say it, This *Example does more then presume.* It concludes as firmly as can be done by Historicall Proofs; And what Mr *Harrington* has so confidently assumed, *That these Cities can not be shewn to have had the Command of any Considerable Army* will not serve to enervate it. Of the *Jonians* were eleven or twelve Cities, of the

Xenoph. Gr. Hist. lib. 5.

H. pag. 74.

the *Aeolians* as many, of the *Dorians* five, with their Territories, all united by Leagues and Confederacies; Now by granting that these had no considerable Army (which lies under a great Suspition of Falshood, for they had one good enough to venture the hazard of a Battle with *Harpagus* one of *Cyrus* his Lieutenant Generals) He grants the Vanity of his own Conceit, That military Virtue should be the necessary Effect of *Popular Government*, Or that *Commonwealths* have meerly by Virtue of their Policy been preserved from being conquered by *Monarchs*.

In the Example of the *Sicilian* Republiques which I next made use of, Mr *Harrington* saies *there is not so much as a Presumption in my Favour*; But either his skill or his Fidelity in point of Historie is so slender, that We can not rely upon his Word. The Condition of *Sicilie*, in the Age We dispute about was not unlike that of *Greece*, the Seacoasts being planted with severall Populous and Opulent Cities, which injoying their Liberty, made so many distinct Commonwealths subsisting by themselves, and joyned only by Leagues not durable, but transient and changing according to the Exigence of Affaires. The chief and most considerable of these was *Syracuse*, which knew so ill how to conserve her Liberty, that for the greatest Part she lived under the Power of Absolute Princes, Whom the *Popular Græcians*, then the only Masters of Appellations, taught the World to call *Tyrants*, though some of them *H. pag.* 75.

are known to have been Princes of excellent Virtue and Goodneſs. That theſe were intruſted by the *Syracuſians* themſelves, and ſo can not be accounted to have come to their Power by Conqueſt I have no need to deny, For Mr *Harrington* erres very much if He thinks theſe are the Examples I at firſt intended; I ſhall only inſiſt upon ſuch Acquiſitions as have been made by theſe abſolute Princes of *Syracuſe* over the *Sicilian* Republiques, in reſpect of whom their Arms were Forreign, and their Succeſſes pure Conqueſts. It being only a piece of Oſtentation to heape together a multitude of Examples, I will neglect ſuch as the Reigns of *Gelon* and the firſt *Hiero* do furniſh, and fix only upon thoſe of *Dionyſius* the Elder. This Prince, 'tis true, did from meane beginnings clime up to a great Fortune, and at length juggled himſelf into the Throne; But yet his Government was ſignaliſed by many great Actions, againſt the *Carthaginians* eſpecially who had newly begun to ſettle in *Sicilie*: But that in which We are concerned, is the Advantage he obtained over ſome of the *Sicilian* Commonwealths, three of which, *Naxus*, *Catana*, and the *Leontines*, He reduced in one Expedition, deſtroyed their Cities, and tranſplanted the People into other Places. A while after the *Tauromenians*, abandoned by the *Carthaginians*, did not run a much gentler Fortune. From thence let Us follow him into the Southern part of *Italie*, (which, though in the ſtile of a later

Diod. Sic. lib. 14.

Age,

Age, is *Sicilie* too), and there We may observe him Defeating in a very great Battle, the *Crotoniates* with the Confœderate Forces of all the *Græcian* Republiques in *Italie*, the Ruine of one of which called *Caulonia*, was the first consequence of his Victorie. The yeare after, *Rhegium* a Commonwealth so powerfull as to have a Fleet of threescore and ten Gallies at Sea, was after an obstinate Siege of eleven Months forced to surrender to Him, and those Inhabitants which survived the War and Famine, were put to their Ransome, or sold for Slaves. These are the Instances by which the *Sicilian Commonwealths* are truly asserted to have been conquered by the Arms of a *Monarch*.

To these many other Examples out of ancient Historie might easily be added, but that Mr *Harrington* is not in a Disposition to profit by them. The severall Republiques conquer'd by *Darius* might be enumerated, The Cities of *Cyprus* and *Phœnicia* that were subdued by *Euagoras* might be inquired into, The Commonwealths in *Asia* (One of which that of the *Sambestans* brought an Army of sixty thousand Foot and six thousand Horse into the Field) that stoop't to *Alexander's* Victorious Sword might be insisted on; But they shall be all let pass, since it is not the Number but Evidence of Arguments by which Truth is established.

The two Modern Examples of *Genova* and *Florence* remain; Concerning the first of which Mr *Harrington's* Confession that She was subdued saves Me the Pains of proving the Matter

of Fact: What He has to object is but this,

H. pag. 76. and 77. First *That though she has been under, being yet standing she can not be said to be conquered, but remaineth as she was before Doria was born:* And then *That there is nothing plainer then that this Commonwealth was subdued by her own Sedition.* But if a Commonwealth has been subdued by a Forreign Prince, has by her Magistrates sworn Fealty to Him, has received a Governour and Garrison, and has lived under this Power many yeares, (all which things concurred in the case of *Genova*) Shall she still be said not to have been conquered, Because by the Assistance and Protection of another Forreign Prince she afterward happened to recover her Liberty? We may as well maintain that because the *Israelites* were restored to their Country and law by the *Medes* and *Persians*, They can not be said to have been conquer'd by the *Assyrians.* Nor does *Genoa remain as she did before Doria was born*, as will be apparent to him that will take the Pains to examine the Histories of those times and Actions: Of doing which there is the more need because Mr *Harrington*

H. pag. 6. (I will not give him one of his own Compliments, and say *he does it, as is usuall with him, falsely and fraudulently*) has confounded the Distinct and different Conditions of this Republique before and after the Restauration of it by *Doria.* To the next Point, *That this Commonwealth was subdued by her own Sedition*, I have no more to say, but That this Reply is fitted for all Arguments, and would serve for

a

a Million of Instances (if so many could be produced) as well as for this, there being no vanquish't State which has not in some Measure cooperated to it's own Ruine. In the mean while I know not whether I should laugh at or Pity my self, for being put to deale with a Man, who thinks his own and a Commonwealth's Credit secured by such Answers.

The History of the *Florentines* and Familie of *Medicis* is not so sincerely deduced by Mr *Harrington*, that We should abstain from making some Remarques upon it. Though *Cosimo* and *Laurence* of *Medicis* had, for a Commonwealth, obtaind a very extraordinary Power at *Florence*, And though *Peter* had indiscreetly stretcht it farther then the other two had done, yet was that Familie far from being absolute Masters of *Florence*, their Power being all this while *Sotto nome, & con dimostrationi quasi civili*; The *Signorie*, the Supream Magistracy of the Commonwealth continued still on foot, which upon the first Discredit that *Peter's* Affaires were fallen into at the approach of the French Army, had Authority enough to proclaime him Rebell, and drive him out of the City. *Peter de Medicis* being thus banished, *Florence* returned to a *Popular Government*, which had faire leisure to settle it self, meeting with no disturbance from the *Medici* except one little Conspiracy not well managed, whose Detection served only to confirm the Government by the Execution and Exile of *Peter's* best friends. But in the yeare 1512, and 18 yeares after

Guicciard. lib. 1.

after the expulsion of the *Medici*, yet before *Leo* was Pope or *Charles* Emperour, (for *Leo* was not made Pope till after the first Restitution of his Family to *Florence*, and was dead before the second, So that He could not be, as Mr *Harrington* has represented him Author of either) the *Medici* were restored to *Florence* by the Arms of the King of *Aragon* under the Conduct of the Viceroy of *Naples*: For it being perceived that there was no Possibility of withdrawing the *Florentines* from the Friendship of the *French* unless by altering the Government, the Viceroy suddenly fell with his Army into *Tuscany*, and having by the storming of *Prato*, made the *Florentines* despaire of being able to defend themselves, the City came to an Accommodation with him; And He to secure his Master of their Affections for the Future, restored the *Medici* to the Power their Familie injoyed before the yeare 1494, yet still with an Appearance of a Commonwealth, a Counsell of about 50 Persons (some Authors make them more) being constituted in whom should reside the Power of the whole People. The succeeding Reigns of Pope *Leo* the tenth, and *Clement* the seventh, both of the Familie of *Medicis*, conduced not a little to the Confirmation of their Power in *Florence*; Yet all was blown up againe in the yeare 1527, When the *Florentines* animated by the Sacking of *Rome* and Pope *Clement's* Imprisonment, revolted

H. pag. 77.

Jovius.

revolted from the *Medici* and reestablisht their *Commonwealth* which continued in being untill the Mysterious and unexpected Reconciliation of the Pope and Emperour; In consequence of which the Emperour having by a difficult War, brought the *Florentines* to submit upon Discretion gave the Command of the City to *Alexander de Medicis*, and his Heires for ever. It is now 127 years that they have continued in possession of this power, And if Mr *Harrington's* thoughts had not been wholly taken up on the other side the *Apennine* at *Venice*, he could not but have observed, That as the Authority of the Prince is scarse any where more absolute, so the Peace and Prosperity of the People is no where greater. *Hist. del Concil. Trident.*

What does he mean then to tell us, *That the purse of Cosimo had done that long before which is here attributed to the Armes of the Pope and Emperour*? To state the matter with the greatest advantage to him, We will imagine that those summes which *Machiavel* saies the Considerable Men of *Florence* had received from *Cosimo*, were still unpaid and might be demanded by his Heires; But this would have made it the Interest of all those particular Men to maintain the Commonwealth, and keep out the *Medici*, because by that Course they would also have avoided the payment of their own Debts: And in Effect, When after the Death *H.* p. 75.

of

Machiav. Hist. lib. 7. of *Cosimo*, his son *Peter* did by the advice of *Dietisalvi Neroni* call in those summes his Father had freely lent, It excited such a Tempest in *Florence* as came within a little of sinking him and his whole Familie. The mony that was borrowed of *Cosimo* having been thus repaid to his son *Peter* it must needs be impertinent to attribute to the purse of *Cosimo* such good Fortune as befell his Posterity fifty yeares after his Death, before which time the Riches he left behind him were so much dissipated, that *Machiavell* assures us, the Comuonwealth was faine to assist his Grandchild *Lawrence* of *Medici* with a great summe of Mony. I doe not see how it can be avoided, but we must believe the Purse of *Cosimo* had besides the mony, an old Charme in it, which made the *Florentines* let fall their Armes, and suffer the *Medici* to reassume the Government: Without doubt there is somewhat of Witchcraft in it, For if the Purse had wrought it by any naturall virtue, It had been much more easy to have kept the *Medici* in their possession, then to restore them when they were fallen from it.

Hist. lib. 8.

Guicc. lib. 2. But is it not still more strange that *Florence should not deserve the name of a Commonwealth*? Had she not her private Councels debating, her Great Councell resolving, and her Magistrates Executing? Was not the Rotation too provided for by the Annual Election of her Gonfalionere? All these things which sound so big in *Westminster Hall*, in *Florence* are not to be counted such Orders as deserve the name of a

Com-

Commonwealth. Truly it is not generously done of Mr *Harrington* thus to adde to the Afflictions of a poore unfortunate Lady Republique. But to what purpose do we dispute any longer? If *Genova* be shewn to have been conquered by a Monarch, We are told *She was subdued by her own Seditions*; If *Florence* has run the same Fortune, *she had never attained such Orders as deserve the name of a Commonwealth*. What pitty is it that a worthy Patriot should be forced to take Sanctuary in a Mousehole? In this posture I confesse I know not how to come at him, but must leave him as a fit imploiment for the formidable Rat-catcher of his own Erection. *H. in Epist.*

After so liberall a tast of Mr *Harrington's* ingenuity in reference to these examples both Ancient and Modern, I am never to be perswaded He meanes Good Faith when he calls for *Reason and Experience* to decide the Question about the Fate of Empires. *H. p. 77.* In Humane Actions the Dependance of Effects upon their Causes is so obscure, That the wisest Historians doe but make conjectures when they indeavour to penetrate into them; Nor can any Discourse of that Nature be so convincing from which so great a Master of Cavils as Mr *Harrington* may not find an Evasion. Yet if I were to convince any Rationall unintereſted Person, That the Fate of Empires has not born a proportion to the Perfection of their *Government*, I need onely put him in mind that the *Chineſe* and *Perſians* did for perfection of Government very far excell the rude *Tartarians*, by whom they have been

been more then once conquered; That the *Greek Emperours* had a better Policy then the wild *Arabians*, to whom they lost so great a part of their Dominions; That the very *Roman* Empire can not be thought to have been at such a decay of Pollicy and *Government*, but that it was still at a better passe then the Barbarous Nations by whom it was rent in pieces; For by that time it was pretty well cured of its worst Maladie, the Insolence of the Souldiers, who were grown less dangerous after the Empire came to be in a manner Hereditary.

ibid. But He proceeds to tell us, *That the Armes of Israel were alwaies victorious till the death of Josua, whereupon the Orders of that Commonwealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be seldome prosperous.* Had it not first been fit (seing the state under *Josua*, Be it what it will from the first to the last was but of ten yeares) He should have torn the History of *David's* forty yeares succesfull Reign out of his Bible? *The Arms of Rome during the popular Government were at such a pitch as if Victorie had known no other Wings but those of her Eagles.* How then came it about that *Augustus* and *Trajan* brought the *Parthians* to Reason, who had destroyed *Crassus* and the Commonwealth's Army? *Alexander with an* *H.* p. 80. *handfull of freer men overcame the hugest Armie, the most vast and populous Empire in the world.* But with what did he overcome the *Thebans* who were freer men than his? Or why was He not overcome by those several

rall thousands of freer Grecians who under *Memon the Rhodian* & *Chæredemus* served *Darius*? I wonder that a man should take such pains to be ridiculous, and should not rather apprehend this easie distinction, That though success belongs to valour and Military discipline, Valour and Military Discipinle belong not to one forme of Government or Policy, but are attainable in any,

What he observes out of Sr *Francis Bacon* about the *French* and *English*, comes to little more then this, that the one affecting to fight on horseback and the other on foot, the *French* have had a good Cavalry, and the *English*, a good Infantry; Though that too be now almost out of Date, for at present the *English* fight well enough on horseback and in *French* on foot. The successes of the *English* in *France* were never durable enough to have any thing of this Nature inferred from them; And we may observe they always followed the Person of the Prince: With us *Edward* the third, and *Henry* the fifth wise & valiant Princes gaining, *Richard* the second and *Henry* the sixt weak Princes loosing; With them *John* and *Charles* the sixt Men of no Ability loosing, *Charles* the fift and *Charles* the seventh Brave Princes recovering. Nor does Mr *Harrington* now stand in need of being taught that during the Wars between the *English* and *French*, *France* was scarse half what she is now, We then alwaies finding a Duke of *Britain* or *Burgundy* to take our part.

In

H. p. 97. In one point Mr *Harrington* has dealt very discretly, when putting off the Robe of *Legislator*, He takes to him the Mantle of *Prophet*, and with as little remorse as an Almanack-maker when he plays the interpreter to a Comete, predicts what shall befall *Europe*: For this not belonging to the present Age, will not be to be confuted but by our Great-Grand-children. Yet I am not aware of any Reason he can have to enter into so Tragicall an Humour for if he be offended that the Wars of *Europe* are of no more Dispatch, *Paruta's* Discourses would have furnisht him with severall Reasons for it, of which this is one, That *Europe* being parcelled out into severall States, all Armed and watchfull over their own and their Neighbour's Interest, the grouth of any one State is presently ballanced by a League of some of the other; At which worke the Ministers of state are every where become so expert, that to keep *Europe* equally poised, is little more with them then to trim a *London* Wherry. If I were disposed to take my turne of Prediction, I might let Mr *Harrington* know that when by the Accession of some Marriage, or any great unthought of Revolution, the Houses of *France* and *Austria* cease to be a drawn Match, then will he see those great changes in *Europe*, which before it will be but in vain to expect. In the meane while he ought not to impute this to any Defect of Policy either in *Germanie* or *Europe*, more then of old in *Greece*, when being Canton'd

ton'd into a multitude of Republiques she did from the *Peloponesiac* War to the Reign of *Alexander* fight so long time to so little Purpose.

For *Ragusa* and *San Marino*, Mr *Harrington* takes them by the wrong handle; They were not by Me made use of to shew that a *Commonwealth* has been conquer'd by the Arms of a *Monarch*, but only to prove that the Success of *Arms* has no necessary Dependance upon Perfection of *Government*, Seeing these *Commonwealths* have a good *Government*, yet never were successefull in Arms. Which part of the Argument is by Mr *Harrington* left untouch't and in full Force.

There has been enough said to evince the Falsehood of Mr *Harrington's* first Assertion, *That a Commonwealth was never Conquer'd by any Monarch from the beginning of the World to this Day*; In discussing which, Occasion has been also given to manifest the Vanity of another of his Conceptions, That the Success of *Arms* depends upon the Perfection of the *Government* or Policy. His second Assertion was, *That a Commonwealth was the Government, which hath frequently led mighty Monarchs in Triumph.* This the Considerer replied was to run upon the Foile, it being only the Conversion of the First: Upon this Mr *Harrington* Triumphs too as well as his Commonwealth, and would have it thought that the Considerer took this for a Logicall Conversion of the Terms. But where did the Considerer reveale this to Him? If *H. pag.* 80.

Mr

Mr *Harrington* had not been at such Enmity with *Mathematiques* and *Mathematicians*, He might have learn't there is a Conversion of Proportion, or of the Consequence of things; And that this is not such an one He will never be able to shew till he has made new Lawes of Ratiocination as well as of Government.

If any Man should chance to wonder how Mr *Harrington's* last Paragraph comes to belong to this Chapter, He is to be advertised that the Coherence is both Elegant and Naturall, And consists in this, *Burning the fingers*, and *Blistring the tongue*, Blistring, You know, uses to follow Burning. This Blister forsooth, is raised upon the Considerers tongue for having intitled Mr *Harrington* to this Assertion, *That the Senate of Venice at the first institution took in the whole People*, Whereas he affirmed it not of the *Senate but Commonwealth of Venice*. But in doing this I wronged my selfe more then Mr *Harrington*, it being neither my intention nor concernment to disprove that Assertion to be true of the Senate, but of the *Grand Counsell* in which consists the *Commonwealth*. Now that
H. p. 81. tha *Grand Counsell or Commonwealth did not, even at the first institution, take in the whole People of Venice*, will appeare to be more then *Perhaps*. *Gianotti* does by very many and those concluding Arguments make it out, That the first Institution of the *Grand Counsell* was in the Reign of *Sebastian Ciani*, which began Anno 1175, And the bringing of it to Perfection in *Gradenigo's* time who entred upon the Go-

vernment

vernment Anno 1297. This *Councell* never consisted of more then 4500 Persons, And that these should be the whole *People* is repugnant to all Histories of the Increase and Power of the Commonwealth at that time. *Giannotti* also saies plainly, That it took in only such of the People as were considerable for Estate and Quality. Nor is it materiall that *Machiavel* whom Mr *Harrington* followes is of the contrary opinion, for his Discourse carries its own Refutation along with it, in as much as He supposes the *Grand Counsell* or distinction of *Gentlemen* and *People* to have been made at the very Institution of the Commonwealth, whereas *Giannotti* has proved it to be of a later Originall by many hundred yeares. A great part of the *People* being then excluded from the Government, which in respect of them was unequall, The inquiry was how these were kept in Obedience, of which an account was given out of *Contarini*. This account Mr *Harrington* cannot accuse of any thing but an improper speech (for the intention plainly looks another way) whilst I attributed that to the *Senate* which belongs to the whole *Commonwealth*; For which also He saves Me the paines of making any Apologie, since He confesses it to be a way of Locution made use of by very good Authors.

Mach. Disc. lib. 1. cap. 6.

CHAP. XI.

Whether there be an Agrarian, or some Law, or Lawes of that Nature to supply the Defect of it in every Commonwealth: And whether the Agrarian as it is stated in Oceana, be equall and satisfactory to all Interests.

BEcause it concerned Mr *Harrington* to shew his utmost Activity in this Chapter, That the Reader might take the less notice of the Slights and Tricks that were to be put upon him, he first of all confounds the state of the Question, by complicating severall distinct Particulars; These I have untwisted & they resolve themselves into three Questions, Of the *Agrarian* in every Commonwealth, Of the Lawes supplying the Defect of it, Of the *Agrarian* as it is stated in *Oceana*. To each of which separately.

I do not intend to be so far carryed out of the way by keeping Mr *Harrington* Company, as in this place once more to repeat the Doctrine of the *Ballance*; It will be enough to reflect how in that Chapter it has been proved, First That Riches do put in part, & that dependantly upon the *Soveraign Power* wch constitutes Propriety, conduce to Empire; And secondly, That so far as Riches doe conduce to Empire, it is to be understood indifferently of all sorts of Riches and not to be restrained to Propriety

or

or the *Ballance* in Land unless in such places where there is no considerable Wealth but what arises immediately from the Revenne or Cultivation of Land. This I might justly plead as a Privilege to exempt Me from handling this Chapter, seeing Mr *Harrington's* Propositions about an *Agrarian* are no otherwise Materiall, then upon a supposition that his Doctrine of the *Ballance* remains firme and unconfuted.

Yet not to refuse any leap Mr *Harrington* sets Me, I will in the first place examine *Aristotle's* opinion of the *Ballance*, whom Mr *Harrington* does here pretend to bring to his side by helping the Translation a little. And that the *Gentleman* has indeed been a Translator of *Poets* is not unknown, but that he should in translating a *Philosopher* in Prose use a Liberty more then *Poeticall* seems not very alowable. He will have the *words* ἀρετὴ, and Δύναμις πολιτικὴ *rendred by the Words Politicall Ballance, understood as He has stated the thing.* Let him then produce one Interpreter of *Aristotle* or one *Lexicographer* who is of his mind, and I will yeild my share in the Question; Nay let him shew how it is possible this should be *Aristotle's* meaning, when He has directly condemned, not without Derision, *Phaleas* the Chalcedonian for having introduced the *Ballance* and *Agrarian* into his Commonwealth. If He can do neither of these, He must give Me leave to tell Him, that He offers an Intollerable violence to the Text and Sence of *Aristotle.* This he does

H.p. 85

Arist. Polit. lib. 2. *c.* 7.

as often as he cites *Aristotle* in this Chapter, but let one Instance serve for all. *Inequality is the source of all sedition, as when the Riches of one or a few come to cause such overballance as draws the Commonwealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; For preventing of which the Ostraciſm hath been of use in divers Places as at Argos and Athens*, The words of *Aristotle* run thus; διὰ ὑπεροχὴν (the Verb σασιάζουσι or the like must be understood) ὅταν τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων, ἢ εἷς, ἢ πλείους, ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς πολιτεύματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἰώθειν ὀλιγαρχία ἢ δυναστεία· διὸ ἐνίαις εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ὃν Ἄργει καὶ Ἀθήνησι. Here he renders τῇ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς πολιτεύματος, by *Riches that came to cause an Overballance*, though nothing can be more manifest then that *Aristotle* in this place is not to be understood of Riches only but of Interest, Reputation, Command, and all other things which may any way contribute to supreme Power. This will be put past all Contradiction if we observe that *Aristotle* in this place speaking of a Disease in a Commonwealth, gives an account also of the Cure, For by the Method of the Cure the Disease may be certainly known: And for this excesse of power, this δύναμις that was greater then suted with the δύναμις of the Commonwealth, We are told that at *Athens* the *Ostraciſm* was prescribed. Now the *Ostraciſm* both by the Institution and Practise of it is known not to have been levelled at the Riches of men only, but at any extraordinary

traordinary Power, Credit, or Interest they had acquired in the Commonwealth; *Aristides* was banished by the *Ostracism* for having rendred himselfe Popular by his equity in arbitrating Law sutes, And when he dyed He was so poore that the City was fain to be at the Charges of his Funerall, and to give his Daughters Portions. Again, How could the *Ostracism* be a preservative against the Overballance in Riches, when notwithstanding the *Ostracism* a man retained the possession of his whole Estate? It is therefore evident to be against all Reason that Mr *Harrington* should *render the words* Δύναμις πολιτικὴ *by the words Politicall Ballance*, understood as He has stated the thing; And his own *Dilemma* recoiles upon him, For He will not have the more of Authority in this point of the *Ballance*, since *Aristotle* knew of it only to disapprove it, Nor yet the les of Competition in it, because it was so long since stumbled upon by *Phaleas* the Chalcedonian. *H.* p. 85

Having thus traduced *Aristotle*, in the next place he does as much for the Considerer, whom he accuses for *throwing onely at Israel Lacedemon and Oceana, when he had set him all the Commonwealths in the World.* But is it faire play to say He set Me that which while now He kept in his sleeve? Are there in *Oceana* any examples of Commonwealths proposed that are pretended to be equall in their *Agrarian*, except *Israel* and *Lacedemon*? Is it not expresly said by him *that Athens and* *ibid.*

Rome

Rome were unequall as to their Agrarian, that of Athens being infirm, that of Rome none at all? For those new examples of *Venice, Germanie*, &c. which Mr *Harrington* does at present pretend to set Me, I may with great Reason refuse to throw at them, as being false mony; Not one of them amounting to an example of an *Agrarian*, but at most of such Lawes as have been instituted to supply the Defect of one.

Oceana. p.26.

I pass on then to make good what has in the Considerations been objected against the *Agrarian* of *Israel* taken in Mr *Harrington's* sence; And that is reducible to these Heads. 1. That the Division of the Land of *Canaan* was not a Politique Institution intended as the Basis of the Government, but was an Effect of Gods Promise to *Abraham*, that He would give that Land to his seed after him; 2. That this is manifested by the Law of the *Jubile*, which otherwaies had been a weak provision, neare fifty yeares time being by that afforded for any man to multiply his Lot to that Height as would necessarily have subverted the Government; 3. That the Government of *Israel* had subsisted forty five yeares without the pretended *Agrarian*; 4. And finally, That in the Division the Lots must needs have been very unequall, it being else impossible there should on the one side have been hereditary Princes of the Tribes, and on the otherside men so extreamly poore as to sell themselves for slaves.

The first of these propositions he playes with very

very wantonly, and askes, *If the Right of an Oceaner unto his Land muſt derive from the Promiſe of God unto Abraham?* Now to aske him again, Who ſaies ſo? Is no toying, but very good earneſt. And Mr *Harrington*, if he had intended to deale fairely, might perceive He was bound to ſhew, That the like diviſion of the Lands in *Oceana* is neceſſary, notwithſtanding there be no ſuch cauſe, as was the promiſe of God unto *Abraham*, upon which the Diviſion of *Canaan* inſeperably depended. But he continues his gay Humour, and (as Tumblers divert the Company with an *Hoope*) friſks about this Circle, He propoſes the Diviſion of the Lands in *Iſrael* as an equall *Agrarian* on which their *Popular Government* was founded; He is told by Me, That this diviſion of the Land look't not at the Government, but followed the promiſe of God unto *Abraham*, And that there is not any Footſtep of the other Deſign in the whole Bible. He replies, *That God in ordaining the Ballance of Iſrael having ordained the Cauſe, ordained alſo the Effect which was Popular Government.* Thus ſuppoſing at all adventures that *Government* to be *Popular*, he will have the *Agranian* (that he Fancies) to be the Cauſe & Foundation of it, And at the next ſtep to ſhew that this *Agrarian* is the Cauſe, He ſuppoſes *Popular Government* to be the *Effect*. What can any Reaſonable man deſire more of a new Beginner? But he muſt pardon Me, I am ſtill upon the ſame Ground: He muſt by ſome expreſs place of Scripture (for that place *Num.* 26. 53. going no farther then

H. p. 87.

Oceana p. 26.

Tribes

Tribes or at most then Families fals short of doing it as I have shewed Consid. pag. 57.) prove, That the division of the Lands by Lot was intended for the foundation of the Government, Or He must not think by such weak and precary Diductions from his own Notion of a *Ballance* to perswade us that God had any such Design in it.

What he answers about the *Jubile* is meere Cavilling; For it belongs not to Me to shew how in fifty yeares one Lot might be so increased as to subvert the *Government*, but to him to shew that the possibility of this was prevented by the *Agrarian* Law contained in the *Jubile*. Yet a man may without giving occasion to be accused of boasting, own *Mathematiques* enough to demonstrate how if not one, yet a few men (which as to to the present subject creates no Difference) might come to be owners of the whole Land of *Canaan* in the time between two *Jubiles*. For the *Israelites* being no where forbid Merchandise, let it be supposed that some few of them addicted themselves to Traffique, and by the success of it annually improved their estates twenty in the hundred, which among Merchants is not reputed an immoderate gaine. The increase of 20 per *Cent.* in 50 yeares which is the distance of two *Jubiles*, multiplyes an estate 7676 times, as will be manifest if in a Geometricall Progression of 50 Terms, according to the proportion of 100 to 120, or 5 to 6 the last Terme be found out. Now the whole Number of Lots in the Land of *Canaan* was 600000

H. p. 86.

600000, which being divided by 7676 gives Us 78 for the Number of Men who might in the time between two *Jubiles* acquire the Propriety of the whole Land. But it is enough to possess three Parts in foure to cause an overballance, Wherefore Sixty Men might notwithstanding the *Jubile* come to overballance the rest of *Israel* and by that overthrow the *Popular Government*; By which it appeares that the *Jubile* could not be intended for an *Agrarian* Law, to lie at the Foundation of the *Government*. *H.* p. 12.

Nor is his Exception against the Argument drawn from that space of 45 yeares during which the *Government* of *Israel* subsisted without this pretended *Agrarian*, fraught with any honester meaning: It is not to be doubted, that the *Israelites* received many Lawes in the Wilderness that were not to be put in Execution, till after their Settlement in the Land of *Canaan*, Of which that was one, *Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy Gates*. But He has taught Us to put a Difference between the *Foundation* and the *Superstructures*: Therefore though the *Government* of *Israel* subsisted well enough in the Wilderness without an Order that depended totally upon their locall Distribution in the Land of *Canaan*, This is no Argument that it might do so without an Order which is represented as Necessary and Fundamentall to the *Government*. Before they had Gates, They neither could have nor needed Judges in them, but that does not make the Wonder cease how their *Government* could subsist 45 *H.* p. 88.

yeares

yeares without an *Agrarian*, if that must be reputed the Basis of their Commonwealth. And whereas Mr *Harrington* saies, The *Israelites* under *Moses* were an Army, What is that to purpose unless this Army must be thought to have been governed by Him by Martial Law? Which can never be affirmed by Mr *Harrington*, who has made their *Government* beare Date, and exemplified in some of the most important Orders of it, so many yeares before.

Ocean. p. 16.

But all the Considerer's Faults have been hitherto but *Peccadillos*, He is now accused of no less then *taking part with the Divell*, and that for having said He was not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the *Israelitish* more then any other Republique. If any Man will take the Pains to look upon that Passage of the Considerations pag. 39. He will find two Advantages of Authority expresly there set down by Me, which the *Jewish* had above all other Commonwealths; If there be any more, Mr *Harrington* would have done Honestly to inform Us; But not having been able to do that, and yet to charge Me with the quite contrary of what I asserted, will leave it out of Dispute which of Us *takes part with the Divell*, who We know, *was a Lyer from the Beginning*.

H. pag. 90.

For as to his Distinction of the Power and Authority of a Commonwealth, it is in it self Insignificant, and as to this Place and Purpose, Impertinent; The whole Authority of the *Jewish* Republique is included in those two Points by

by Me explained in the Considerations. And what if the *Romans* being resolved to erect a Popular Government, to save themselves the pains of contriving, were content to borrow their *Twelve Tables* of the *Athenians*? Must We therefore be inforced to have recourse to the *Jewes*, though We neither have Need of nor Roome for any of their Particular Constitutions? This may give just cause to suspect his Design is to introduce the *Judaicall* Law, And that there is nothing to choose between *James Harrington* Legislator, and *William Medley* Scribe. Concerning the *Jewish Agrarian* then, it is enough that Mr *Harrington's* Replies to the Considerer's Objections are thus manifested to be unsatisfactory.

All that is alledged in Opposition to the Considerer's Apprehensions of the *Lacedæmonian Agrarian* is so Insignificant, that I can have Nothing to reply; For of Nothing is produced Nothing. I will therefore make use of this Leisure Mr *Harrington* affords Me, to make out a little more fully, from the Historie of *Lacedæmon* my former Assertions about the *Agrarian* of that Republique.

Lycurgus when he had begun to new Model the Commonwealth, finding the greater part of the People to be desperately Poore, and some few very Rich, out of a Design to banish on the one side Envy and Insidiation, on the other Insolence and Luxury, and together with these, Riches and Poverty, the Mother Diseases of a Commonwealth, He perswaded them to come

to

to a New and equall Division of Lands; And that for the future they should live upon equall Terms with one another, not aiming at Priority in any thing but Merit, and reputing there ought to be no difference between Man and Man, but what arises from the Praise of Virtue and Reproach of Vice. After He had accomplish't this, They say that passing through the Countrey in Harvest, and seeing the Shocks of Corne all of a size, He smiled and said the Countrey look't as if it belonged to Brothers who had newly parted their Inheritance. In setting out these Lots He seems to have look't only at fitting the People, by a bare and necessitous Life, for the Trade of War; without that He might have made their Lots as large againe, having Territory enough (χώραν πολλοῖς πολλὴν, δὶς τοσοῖς δὲ πλείονα) for twice as many People, the surplusage of which, perhaps, lay wast, or was injoyed by their Slaves. Nor was it lawfull for any *Spartan* to improve this *Lot* to the best, by living upon it, for they were strictly prohibited all Occupations, even that of Agriculture, and their Hinds or *Helots* paid them only an Annuall Quantity of Corne, Wine and other Fruits. This Institution had served to little purpose, if it had been free for the *Lacedæmonians* to possess what Personall Estates they thought fit, and therefore *Lycurgus* (having failed in attempting a like Division in Moveables) first forbid the Use of Gold and Silver, and then by the extream debasing of their other Coine, cut off all possibility of Traffique with

ibid.

Plut. in Solon.

Plut. in Lyc.

with their Neighbours; So that No Man of any Art or Trade tending to Elegancy, Vanity, or Luxurie could have any hopes of gaining a Livelyhood at *Sparta:* And withall such Offences as are every where committed out of Desire of mony, did of themselves soon cease, Mony it self being become of so little worth. In all other Points also the Institution of the *Lacedæmonians* was very severe, and serving meerly to accustome them during Peace to the Incommodities of War. Therefore the Raillery of that *Italian* was sharp enough, who said the *Lacedæmonians* did no great matter in being so daring in the Wars, if it were only to free themselves of a laborious and miserable Life. *Plut. in Pelop.*

Though these things had been with so much Care provided for by *Lycurgus*, his Lawes were exposed to the same Fate with those of all other Legislators, and wanted a Power to make themselves be observed. It was very early, in *Cræsus* time, that the *Lacedæmonians* began to cast amorous Glances upon Gold, for being corrupted by him, they connived at the Slavery he brought upon the *Græcian* Republiques in *Asia*. Their *Agrarian* also, so far was it from being the Immoveable Basis of the Commonwealth, was soon confounded as well as those of the *Argives* and *Messenians*, and that, as *Aristotle* intimates, by the defect of *Lycurgus* his own Lawes; For though he forbad Men to alienate their Lots by sale, He left it free for them to give and *Paus. Messen* *Polit. libr. 2. cap. 9.*

Arist. Pol lib. 5. c. 7. and bequeath what they thought fit. So that during the *Messeniac* War, a sedition was raised of them who demanded a new Division of the Lands. I know that is generally held these innovations were of a much later Date, & *Plutarch* names *Epitadeus* one of the *Ephores* as author of them, But the obligation is Mr *Harrington's*: not mine, to reconcile these Authors; However it is manifest, that this Breach in their Laws was soon taken, for they preserved themselves in the Integrity of their Manners and Institution, till after the taking of *Athens* by *Lysander*. But the Booty gained in that War being very great, *Lysander* prevailed, that the Gold and Silver might be brought to *Sparta* for the erecting a Publique Treasury, without which it would be impossible to carry on the Design of making themselves the Captaines and Leaders of all *Greece*, This was with some reluctancy consented to, yet not without this previous Caution, That the mony should serve only for Publique Uses, and that it should be Death for any private man to have Gold or Silver in his house; which Law was put in Execution upon the person of *Thorax*, But it was in vaine to forbid that in Private, which was allowed in Publique; For with the possession of mony immediately entred Covetousness, & after that an inclination to Ease and Luxurie, which presenly overthrew the sober and masculine temper of their Commonwealth. Instead of that Probity toward their Friends and Neghbours which accompanyed

Plut. in Agid.

Plut. in Lysand.

panyed their Poverty, now Pride, Insolence and Avarice took Place. So that becoming weake & Effeminate at home, & Odious abroad, their Commonwealth soon fell from all its Virtue and Glory. And this shewed the Providence of *Lycurgus* who knowing that the equality of their scant Lots was not a sufficient Bar to the mischiefs produced by Riches, had at the beginning condemned the use of Gold and Silver; for these miseries befell the State a good while before they grew so expert at breaking of Lawes as to violate their *Agrarian*. At length that went after the Rest, and the Commonwealth being totally abandoned to Luxurie and Corruption (having first made a weak attempt or two to revert to her ancient Discipline) came to utter Ruine.

Thus have I given you a *Crayon* of the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* in reference to her *Agrarian*; which appeares to have been instituted by *Lycurgus*: only as a necessary Provision for attaining that Poverty and Virility, which he intended to incorporate with his Commonwealth. Against this Mr *Harrington* will scarle have any more to object then he has done already, which is in effect just Nothing. He brings indeed *Aristotle* and *Plutarch* to a false Muster, but *Aristotle* has been already rescued from his Abuses, and the Place of *Plutarch* is the same (excepting only his want of sincerity in citing it) with that I first produced in this Discourse.

I am now delivered from this first Question

of

of the *Agrarian*, and, according to the Method I proposed, the second Question which belongs to Such Lawes as supply the Defect of an *Agrarian* in severall Commonwealth's, comes to be discussed; In doing which I shall not have occasion to spend much Time.

H. pag. 86. The first Instance Mr *Harrington* gives, is of the *Ostracism which supplied the Defect in the Grecian Cities of an Agrarian.* That the *Ostracism* was not inflicted upon Men for their excessive Riches, so much as for diminishing the Power and Credit which by their Virtue and Great Actions They had attained to in the Commonwealth, I have already made appear; And by Consequence Mr *Harrington's* Fancie that it supplied the Defect of an *Agrarian* taken in his Sense must needs be without Ground. To which it will only be needfull to adde, that when the *Athenians* thought of putting *Nicias* to the *Ostracism*, (then the Richest Subject of *Greece*, and most obnoxious to a Law that studied to prevent excess of Wealth) their Motives were, His reserved, stately, and unpopular Manner of Life, together with his Firmness in adhering to the Publique Good, and opposing the rash Desires of the People: And though his Riches also are mentioned by *Plutarch* among the rest, yet so as that they were the Object of their Envy rather then their Fear. I wonder why Mr *Harrington*, who goes off Fist after every Flie, did not mention the *Petalism* of *Syracuse* as well as the *Ostracism* of *Athens* in imitation of which it was invented:

But

But it is to be presumed he abstained from it because of the Success, which discovered how pernicious this Device was to the Publique. For upon the Institution of this Law, the *Syracusans* of better Quality (a People, it seems, not of so unquiet and enterprizing a Temper as the *Athenians*) who by their Wisdome and Experience were capacitated to have served the Commonwealth, retired themselves from all Publique Affaires, thereby to avoid the danger of Banishment. And so the Care of the Publique being abandoned to the most indigent and Impudent Persons, who took care of nothing but how to flatter the People in their Orations, the Commonwealth was plunged into so many Disorders and Seditions, that there was no hopes of her Recovery, unless by repealing the *Petalism*, to invite Men of worth to resume the Conduct of Affaires. *Diod. Sic. lib.* 11.

For what concerns the *Agrarian* of *Rome*, Mr *Harrington* has long since said it was *none at all*, and in effect saies now the same; For if They did but strive for it, it is evident they never obtained it. *Ocean.* p. 26.

That at *Venice* the Officers of the *Pomp* should supply the Defect of an *Agrarian*, will scarse be believed by him, who knows how slightly the Accurate *Giannotti* passes over the Description of that Office. I think also it will not be easy to comprehend how a Law that preserves the *Nobility* from laying themselves out upon vain and Gawdy Apparencies should tend to the li-

H. pag 86. miting their Estates. But, he saies, *a Venetian that should keep a Table or have his house furnisht with Retainers would be obnoxious.* Does any *Italian* affect that expensive way of Popularity? Or how should a *Noble Venetian* need to do it, when he may notwithstanding entertain in Pension eight or ten *Bravos?*

Follow him to the *German Republiques*, and You will find *they have no more to supply the Defect of this Law, then that Estates descending are divided among the Children: And grant this in Oceana, and You grant the whole Agrarian.* By these *Republiques* sure We are not to understand *Nuremberg, Strasburg*, &c. but the Princely houses of *Austria, Saxonie*, the *Rhine*, &c. all which maintain this Custome: But these are all *Monarchies* by a *Nobility*, or at least Members of that Great one the Empire. Wherefore Mr *Harrington* commits a great Error in his Apprehension of the *German Agrarian*, or has incurred a far greater one in his Modell of a Commonwealth, in proposing that *Agrarian* as fit for an equall *Commonwealth*, which by his own Confession belongs to a *Monarchy* by *Nobility.*

And this brings Me to the third Question, concerning the *Agrarian* as it is stated in *Oceana*; Which as it has no community with that of *Israel* in the originall of its institution, so has it very little Resemblance with that of *Lacedæmon* in the aime and Method of its Establishment. This was acknowledged long since by the Considerer, and Mr *Harrington* could not but

but see it, though He makes so pitifull an Endeavour to mistake my Meaning. But I am at a Loss; The Dialect of the next Pages makes Me think I am fallen into the Company of Cheats, And that it is not *Aristotle* or *Plutarch* that can now bring Me off, but that the late Act of *Parliament* against Gaming must do it. This is at least made evident by it, That Mr *Harrington* is conversant in the Mysteries of other Boxes besides Ballotting Ones, and is no less Qualified for Secretary to the Comb-makers Ordinary, then to a Commonwealth. I envy not his high endowments, but I must soberly let him know, that though, while he maintains the Dignity of a Philosopher, and a Gentleman, I count my self obliged to return him a Serious Answer, When he thinks fit to play the Buffoon, I can laugh as unconcernedly as any other Man. And to Laughter only (my Pity excepted) am I disposed by seeing how he disports himself in shaking the 15 false Dice he pretends to find in one of my Throwes. Gentlemen, (for it is necessary I should appeale to the Lookers on,) the Dice I threw were all true, for which he has in taking them up, set down these False Ones; Not any one of those 15 Absurdities belongs to Me, but are all framed by himself, either by a willing Mistake of my meaning, or by a childish Distortion of my Words. My first Argument therefore, That his Model of an *Agrarian* is unjust, remains unconfuted, and is not ever to be answered by any Man who, like Mr *Harrington*, makes Propriety the Ground *H.* p. 93.

of Government. He ventures indeed to say, that his *Agrarian* does not alter Propriety, but only obliges a great landed Man to divide it among his Children: But he ought to have remembred that the Liberty of disposing as a Man thinks fit of his own, is Essentiall to the Propriety We now Dispute of; And if it be the Piety of dividing the land among all the Children he is taken with, his Hypocrisie may be a little suspected, in regard he has made this Law only to concern the Surplusage of 2000l. p. an.

The second Argument which in the Considerations I made use of against the *Agrarian* of *Oceana* was this, That the Rate of 2000. l. p. an. at which it is stated can never be fixt, but that it will continually be in danger of being still brought lower, till at length it be so far debased, That the keeping it from going any lower will be the Concernment of a greater Number of Men, then They make up who have an Interest in the further debasing of it. This Argument Mr *Harrington* has thought fit to anticipate, by pretending to answer it in his eight Chapter. I must therefore go back to that Place, which I find to be not only dislocated, but so strangely shattered, that it will be very hard for Me to Splinter up the broken confused Pieces of it. But to make as much of his Answer as I can, He seems to say in the first Place, *That the People are naturally incapable of such a Design as Levelling or reducing the Standard of Estates to the lowest Rate, seeing*

H. p. 44.

ing never any People (except a faint Attempt of the Romans) went about it; And if there be any such thing familiar with the Nature of the People, why appeared it but once, and vanished without Effect? This Method of arguing *à non esse ad non posse*, or affirming becauſe a Thing has not yet been it can never be, is peculiar to Mr *Harrington*; But there is ſome reaſon to doubt, other men will not look upon this as ſufficient Security, eſpecially if They conſider how the *People* are now taught Principles before unknown to them, *That the Ballance of Dominion in Land is the Naturall Cauſe of Empire*, And *That the Ballance ought to be fixt by an Agrarian Law.* For in *Oceana* every Man (who is not a Servant) above 18 yeares of age being obliged to have Armes, and every Man above 30 being capable of Magiſtracy, the People finding the Empire in their own hands, muſt of neceſſity conclude the *Ballance* ought to be there too, and conſequently muſt endeavour to take down the ſtandard of the *Agrarian* ſo low as that the Land may come to be divided among the whole Body of the People. And if the People in other *Governments, for Example under the late Monarchy, did never ſo much as think of Levelling the Nobility*, It was partly becauſe They did not then apprehend it, as They will do now, to be a thing juſt and neceſſary; And partly becauſe They wanted Power to do it, their Arms depending upon the *Nobilitie*, And their Vote in the Commons houſe being inſignificant *H. pag.* 44.

nificant without the Consent of the King and Lords. But in the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana* the People can not want Power and Interest to effect it, either by the way of Arms or Vote: By the way of Arms, the People amounting to 200000 armed Men, with Commanders and Officers chosen by themselves out of their own Body, and having a certain *Rendezvous* appointed in reference to their Musters, need but declare their Resolution to have the *Agrarian* taken down to a less Rate then 2000l. p. an. And the whole Business is dispatch't. For They who can have an Interest to keep it up at that Rate, not being above 5000 Men, can not possibly resist so much a greater Multitude, that is already armed and formed into a Body. So that the People of *Oceana* ought not to be deterred from this Attempt by the Feare of a Civill War, and the Loss they may sustain by it, (Though, by the way, If that Reflection were enough to keep the People Quiet, there would be little need ever to feare their stirring) seeing the 5000 Men can not do otherwise then immediatly submit, as being apparently too weak to maintain themselves in the State of War. But if the People of *Oceana* choose rather to manage this Design by the way of Vote, They may with more ease effect it; For the Elders or Men capable of Magistracy in *Oceana*, being 100000 in number, And they who possess 2000l. p. an. being but 5000 in number, The same Proportion, according to an equall

Calculation,

Calculation, muſt hold in the Deputies at the *Prerogative Tribe*; Wherefore in the *Repreſentative* or *Prerogative Tribe* there will be twenty for one who will have an Intereſt to Vote the *Agrarian* down to a lower Standard. Yet I do not think that this will come to abſolute Levelling, or giving to every Man (as Mr *Harrington* computes it) ten pounds a yeare; But I do not ſee how it is poſſible it ſhould ſtay ſooner then at about 200 pounds a yeare; But that being made the meaſure of the *Agrarian*, or the greateſt Eſtate which any man can poſſeſs in Land, there can not be leſs then 50000 Perſons concerned to keep it from going lower, which number will, it is likely, prove conſiderable enough to fix it at that Rate. *H. pag.* 45.

In his Anſwer to my third Argument, He takes Pleaſure in ſtraying out of a plain Way, and will underſtand Me as if I had ſaid, The old *Jewes* during their being Inhabitants of *Canaan* were great Traders. I am not aware that any Ambiguity in my Words could give him an Occaſion of this Thought; But howſoever, I am content to explaine my ſelf better by declaring that I meant this of the Modern *Jewes*, who though diſpoſſeſt of *Canaan*, are every where ſo Rich, that unleſs perhaps in *Solomons* time, their Anceſtours could never have compared Eſtates with them. And as They having no Land are all Merchants, ſo in *Oceana* the Poſſeſſion of Land being limited, Men who aimed at farther Riches or

Power, would convert their stock into Traffique, by which *Emporium* would be increast beyond the Proportion consisting with the Security of the *Commonwealth*. These were the Considerer's thoughts, which Mr *Harrington* seems not to disallow of, but only in the last particular, that the greatness of *Emporium* can prove dangerous to the Commonwealth of *Oceana*. To make this Probable, I must begin a Good way off. Of *Commonwealths* both Antient and Modern, some have been founded upon one Great City, in which are Resident not only the *Magistrates* and *Senate*, but also the whole Body of the *People* which constitues the *Commonwealth*; Such were of old, *Athens*, *Syracuse*, *Carthage*, *Rome*, at present *Venice* and *Genoa*. These Cities are both the Heart and Head of their severall *Commonwealths*, In them the Principall Actions of Life are performed, and from thence Bloud and Spirits are conveyed into all the Parts: Their Increase is the Augmentation of the whole, and as long as they continue in Health, the *Republique* can not die. Hereupon have all wise Legislators contrived and incouraged the Increase of these Cities both in Population and Riches, for the whole *Commonwealth* being in a manner comprehended within their Walls, their inlargement can never cause any inequality or Danger to the Publique. If it be thought that I commit an Error in placing *Rome* in this Classis of *Commonwealths*, seeing her Rustick Tribes were the most considerable both

Ocean. p. 147
H. p. 98.

both for number and Reputation. My inducements to it were, Firſt that at the Inſtitution of the Ruſtick Tribes they were ſo neere adjacent to the City, that there was ſcarſe any difference, as to the facility of Aſſembling together, between them and the Inhabitants of the City it ſelf; And then ſecondly, That before *Rome* had attained any conſiderable Greatneſs, the Tribes were no longer to be taken in a Locall acception but only as ſo many diviſions of the *People*, to ſome one of which every Citizen whereſoever inhabiting muſt neceſſarily relate; As with us every freeman of *London* muſt be of ſome one of the old Companies. And it was in this ſenſe that the *Patricians* choſe to be of ſome Ruſtick Tribe, which is no more then that my *Lord Major* is a Skinner or a Merchant Taylor. But thirdly though *Rome* had her Ruſtick Tribes, and *Athens* her Δῆμοι or Populations in the Country, none of theſe had Right to aſſemble within their own precincts, for chooſing Magiſtrates or nominating Deputies to repreſent them, nor had any capacity of dealing in Publique Affaires, unleſs They in perſon repaired to the Capitall City, ſo that this City ſtill remained the Seat of the Commonwealth, all Publique Buſineſs being tranſacted within her Walls.

Other *Commonwealths* have not been raiſed upon the greatneſs of one City, but have conſiſted of the Confederacy or League of many, of which ſort ſo many examples occur among the *Grecians*

Grecians it is needlesse to name any; Of Modern ones the Union of the *Netherlandish* Provinces is of this Nature. And in this case no one City can acquire an extraordinary Greatness without danger to the Liberties of all the rest, or at least of Dissolution to the Union: Thus the City of *Thebes* being grown Powerfull, took away the Liberty of the *Bœotians* their Confederates: And thus the *Elians* being inrich't by the Conflux of People to the *Olympian Games*, incroch't upon the Privileges of the Neighbouring Towns. That *Amstredam* of late yeares hugely advanced by Traffique, is in a Condition to do as much for the United States, and has in part attempted it, was intimated by the Considerer: The Actions are fresh, and those Relations and Discourses which are Published, make every man a judge; If Mr *Harrington* be satisfyed that *their actions resisted not the Interest of Liberty, but of a Lord*, He may deserve a pension in communicating this satisfaction to them of *Zealand*, *Frizeland* and *Overyssell*.

H. p. 98.

A third sort of Commonwealths are those which consist not of Leagues or Unions, neither are seated in some one great City, but are diffused through a whole Nation, and are not to be assembled but by the Mediation of a Representative Body: Of this kind you are not to expect many Examples; *Israel* (when it shall be evinced to have been a Commonwealth) must needs have been such an one, and such an one is the proposed Modell of a *Commonwealth* for

Oceana.

Oceana. In these the disproportionate Greatness of any one City, becomes still more dangerous, for now this City is no longer to be reputed the Head or Heart, but the Spleen or Liver, whose overgrowth brings the rest of the Body to Decay or Ruine. Any one City so overtopping the Rest constitutes *Rem-publicam* in *Republica*, and the Inhabitants of it will alwaies stand united in reference to their own Interest even when it looks a squint upon that of the *Commonwealth*. In *Israel* indeed they need not to feare this Inconvenience, for it does not appeare that before the establishment of the *Monarchy*, any one City had so much advantage over the rest as to claim the Dignity of a *Metropolis*. But in *Monarchies* the Mischief has been frequent; *Paris* both formerly and in our time has been the Rise and Retreat of severall Rebellions, *Ghendt* and *Liege* have more then once done as much for their Princes, In *Spain* the War *de las Communidades* took its beginning from *Toledo*, *Valladolid*, *Valentia* and two or three more great Towns. And that the mischief should be multiplyed in a *Commonwealth*, I have one reason more to think, wch is that a *Monarch* can by the Residence of his Court, that brings so ample profit to a City, lay an obligation upon them, which in a *Commonwealth* can amount to very little, or rather Nothing. To make an end, the City of *Emporium* is already so Potent That it may will be doubted whether she will be content with that portion Mr *Harrington* has allowed her in his *Commonwealth* of *Oceana*,

and

and whether when she looses the Honor of obeying a Prince, she will not think her *Common Councell* as good as the *Prerogative Tribe*, and her *Commander in Chiefe* as the *Strategus of Oceana*.

Therefore those of the Nobility who have disposed of their Sons in the City may fairely expect to see them Princes, The rest may doe well to consider whether the Beare's skin will keep them warme while it is upon the Beares back, and whether they can live upon the reversion of those Estates Mr *Harrington* has promised them in the first Provinces his *Commonwealth* conquers.

H. p. 100.

The fourth Argument was taken from the difficulty of making the *Agrarian* equall and steddy in reference to the inconstant value of mony: But this saies He, *was sufficiently provided for where it is said that a new survey at the present Rent being taken, the Agrarian should ordain that no man should thenceforth hold above so much Land as there is valued at the rate of* 2000*l. per an.* Though this was omitted in the Order, I deny not that it was hinted in one of the speeches; but this is to recompence one errour by committing another that is greater, or to cure an Ague by a Feavour; The value of mony 'tis true is alwaies in motion, but not in so swift and irregular one, as the Improvement of Land I speak not of the improvement of Rent, or the advantage the Landlord makes upon the Farmer, but of that Naturall one which sometimes consist in the Meliorating of the soile

H. p. 101.

it

it self, as by derivation of Water; Sometimes in the Discovery of a profitable Minerall; And sometimes by Imploying the ground to a new Husbandry as the planting Tabacco, Hops, and many other things which have already and may for the future be invented. By all these waies, the value of Land may come to be many times multiplyed, and consequently the *Agrarian* notwithstanding this Provision must soon recede from the first Design of its institution. He need not now have been put in mind of this, if he would have learn't this Lesson of *Aristotle, That those Orders in a Commonwealth which relate to the Census or Valuation of Estates, must be renewed and adapted continually to the Census through all its shiftings and Changes, and this at furthest once in five yeares.* *Pol. lib. 5. cap. 8.*

That the *Agrarian* does not stem, but follow the Tide of Custome in this Nation, will scarse meet with Belief, notwithstanding Mr *Harrington's* undertaking, as long as We have before our eyes so many examples of Elder Brothers and great Purchasers. But I mean not to trouble him with any Discourses about keeping or breaking old Customes; That would be as to this subject but a Common place of talke, and if the *Agrarian* be a thing so customary, his paines in discovering of it, merit the less of thanks from the Publique; For thogh we usually give Mony to those who shew Us an Hare or Patridge, it has not been made a fashion to reward such as bring Us to a Crow or a Jack-Daw.

After

H. pag. 102. After all this, *that an Agrarian is necessary unto Government be it what it will, and as much to Kings as unto Commonwealths*, I can not give my assent; The Reasons of my not doing so, have been made out abundantly, unless I have had the ill fortune to throw away all that has been said in this Chapter and that of the *Ballance*. I doe not deny that these Notions are of good concernment, if taken in generall, and without this severe Restriction to Estates in Land. I lay it for a ground that Princes ought to consider Riches as one of the principall instruments of Governing; That in order to this They should not think a Crown worth wearing, unless provided with a Constant Revenue, (or at least a way of raising it) large enough for all Publique Occasions; That they weare the Key of their Treasury, with the same Jealousy as their Sword, permitting neither to be taken out of their own hands. For the rest, That they take care those men whose interest is dependant upon the Prince's may be possest of such estates as shall bring them a Returne of Respect and Power. The favour of the Prince, the Profit of Offices, the Advantages arising from Publique Imployment both Military and of State, joyned with other Arts of Governing, will in a *Monarchy* put faire for attaining this, without the necessity of an *Agrarian* Law: Nor on the other side does a Prince stand in need of that help to abate the Power of any Subject that is grown dangerous, but is readily presented with some more silent way of effecting it from the

the present Juncture of Businesse. And indeed universally *Monarchies* have this advantage over *Commonwealths*, that *Commonwealths* are like Engines which being wound up can not in the greatest necessity vary from the Designation of the Artificer, but *Monarchies* are animate Bodies, moving and acting according to all exigencies by vertue of their own Soules: The former like the wooden Eagle which met the Emperour limited in her flight by the will of the Engineer, The other has Wings of her own, and when she sees the Quarry, failes not to make a gallant flight.

CHAP. XII.

Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary to a well ordered Commonwealth, &c.

IN this long Chapter the Considerer has a very small share. It is intended against another sort of People who though they are passionate Doters on a *Commonwealth*, profess to dislike the Introduction of a *Rotation*. This has proceeded so far as to cause a Schisme among the *Commonwealths-Men*, For whilst some of them think that without the *Rotation* a *Commonwealth* must (like *Pharoah's* Chariots) clog and drive heavily; others suspect this continuall whirling would produce nothing but giddinesse and a Danger of overturning. Yet there is some

Reason

Reason to doubt this Difference is not rooted in their Judgements so much as in their Interests: They who expect to fill a place in a standing Counsell, are not pleased to think of resigning, after a certain Terme, their Cushions to new Commers; But such who despaire of that advantage, rather then be wholly shut out would willingly take Turns, governing themselves by the Advice of our wise Ancestors, rather to be content with halfe a Loafe then have no Bread.

But this being matter of conjecture, I will let it pass, lest I happen to mistake their meaning as much as Mr *Harrington* does mine; Who all along this Chapter treats me as one of those who maintain a *Commonwealth* while she is fixt upon standing Counsels and Armies, to be better ordered then when she goes upon *Rotation*. But this is manifest; That I concede *Rotation* to have been the practise of Ancient *Republiques*, and I doe not any where discover that I think a *Commonwealth* can be safe without it. It is true that judging *Rotation* to be in it self not very just, and often prejudiciall to pnblique Affairs, I can not approve of that Government which stands in need of such an Order; so that my Quarrell lyes not against *Rotation* where I find it in a *Commonwealth*, but against *Commonwealths* because they are by the necessary care of their Preservation, forced to embrace *Rotation*.

The Examples therefore of *Israel*, *Athens* and *Venice* do not any way concern Me: Though it were an easie matter to shew that the

the Proofs of a *Rotation* in *Israel* are very wild and unconcluding, if I had not an Obligation upon Me to abstain from inquiring any further into that Government. Concerning *Venice*, as He has brought forth nothing that's new to one who is not a stranger to *Giannotti*, so will his Riddle easily meet with a Solution out of that Author. If he would make 2 or 3 dozen of these Riddles, and put them into Rime, (which to him cannot be difficult) if they did not please the Counsell of State, they would at least be admirably usefull to the new *Junta* of Politicall Ladies, who by them would find Diversion for Winter Evenings, without descending from the Gravity of their new affected studies, *Lawes* and *Government*.

All then that I need to do is to make good this Assertion, That *Commonwealths* have by the Observation of their *Rotation* been put upon great and Dangerous Inconveniences. To prove this the Examples of *Veturius*, *Varro*, *Mancinus* and other weak and passionate Commanders imployed by the *Romans*, were insisted on by the Considerer: Which Mr *Harrington* interprets most extravagantly as *if there were but three weake or unfortunate Generals in the whole course of Rome.* He that names three, with the addition of a generall clause comprehending the rest, is not, I conceive, with any Honesty to be understood, as if he thought there were but three in all. If it be any pleasure to Mr *Harrington* to view a List of unfortunate *Roman* Generals, let him cast his eyes upon the *Fabii*, *H. pag.* 122.

Sulpitius Longus 2. *and P. Servilius, Claudius Pulcher, Sempronius, C. Flaminius, Vitilius, Plautius, Popilius, Manilius, Lentulus, Piso, Hypsæus, L. Cassius, Scaurus, Cæpio, Rutilius,* and many more which might be reckoned up if it were my design to count the black daies in the *Roman* Calendar. I selected those three because by their want of Experience and Conduct *Rome* received the greatest and most ignominious defeats that ever befell Her.

Veturius (or *Posthumius* if he will needs lay the miscarriage chiefly upon him) threw away himself and the *Roman* Army very ridiculously; For having taken no Care, by Spies or Intelligence of his own, to be informed of the Posture and Condition of the Enemy, He relied wholly upon the Report of Prisoners, which is alwaies uncertain and very often Suborned. Being thus put upon a long March with a thought to find that Enemy at *Luceria* who was then close by him, he engaged the Army in a deep Valley shut up on every side with steep Rocks and thick Forests, accessible only by two narrow and difficult Passages: And here he committed an Error far more gross and withall irreparable; For either he did omit, contrary to the known Maximes of War, to discover the Countrey through which his March lay, or knowing it (as is more probable) he neglected, by a strange Stupidity, to secure himself of either of the two Passes; So that finding the furthest guarded and barricadoed by the Enemy, before he could get back the other was surprized

Liv. lib. 9.

surprized also, and the whole *Roman* Army caught in this Trap. Now it is evident that this loss befell the *Romans*, not by the Valour or Experience of their Enemies, but meerly by the Insufficiency of their own Commanders, who probably had never been imployed, but for the Orders of their *Rotation*; The Commonwealth had at that time *Fabius*, *Papyrius*, and many other brave Commanders, who in submitting to the *Rotation*, were fain to resign the Conduct of the Army to such raw Men as could Court the Suffrages of the People for the *Consulship*.

As for *Varro*, it is observable that his Election (like that of *Flaminius* the Consul of the former yeare who lost the great Battle at the Lake of *Thrasimene*) was carried meerly upon a Faction against the *Nobility*, without any other Merit in the Person, then his Sycophantry in accusing the Conduct of the *Senate*, and flattery to *the People* in promising them to put a sudden end to the War: In his yeare was that Stupendous defeat received at *Cannæ* which is by *Polybius* wholly imputed to his ill Manage We may fairely take notice that the Dangers into which *Rome* was so often precipitated during the War with *Annibal*, took their Rise from the frequent Change of Commanders; For there is just ground in the Histories of those Actions of believing that if *Scipio* the elder, *Fabius*, or *Marcellus* had had the sole manage of the War, *Hannibal* could never have setled himself in *Italie*, but being consumed by want and *Liv. lib. 22.*

ſmall Skirmiſhes muſt preſently have abandoned the Countrey; Whilſt on the other hand, the Commanders being changed every yeare, unexperienced Men came to be at the head of the Army, who hoping to get Honour, at the Charges of the *Commonwealth*, put things upon the hazardous Iſſue of ſet Battles And this is naturally and directly to be charged upon their Orders of *Rotation*.

Concerning *Hoſtilius Mancinus*, the foulneſs of his miſcarriage appeares in this, that having 30000 Men he was defeated by 4000. *Numantines*; And that the fault was only in the Generall, was the Judgment of the *Romans* themſelves, who therefore committing the care of the War to *Scipio* (though expreſly againſt their Lawes of *Rotation*) he made an end of it with the ſame Forces which had been ſo often beaten. But it can not ſcape our wonder, that Mr *Harrington* ſhould think fit to communicate the Guilt of thoſe Miſcarriages to *Pompey the Great*, who had no being in the World till thirty yeare after: It is true that *Q. Pompeius Rufus* received a foile from the *Numantines*, *Anno V. C.* 616. but by what ſecret Participation of Guilt can this concern *Cn. Pompeius Magnus* who was not born till about the yeare *V. C.* 647? We might with equall Juſtice make the Tranſlator of *Virgill* be reſponſible for all the faults in the Tranſlation of *Orlando Furioſo*.

Florus & Brev. Livii. lib. 55. & 57.

H. p. 125.

Having thus ſufficiently proved that theſe three great Defeats befell the *Romans* meerely through

through the weakneſs of their Commanders, as alſo that theſe weake Commanders could not, (in all Probability) ever have come into that Imployment but through the Orders of *Rotation*, it would be altogether uſeleſs to accumulate any more Examples out of the *Roman* Stories. I may then go on to confirm the ſame Obſervation out of the *Athenian Hiſtorie*; Which Commonwealth beſides the annuall *Rotation* of her Generals, was good at another Trick often made Uſe of by Republiques out of a Jealouſy of truſting too much Power in one hand: This was to confer the Command, not upon any one Perſon, but to place it upon many, or in a Commiſſion, ſo that They have frequently had at once in one Army ten Generals. At *Aegos-potamos* they were no fewer, and their Sottiſhneſs as well as their Number conſidered, I can not ſtudy out any Term to fit them ſo properly as that of a Rabble. *Conon* was indeed a brave Commander, but his ſingle Vote could not prevaile againſt the Obſtinacy of his Companions. At that time *Alcibiades* was the only Man who had credit and Ability enough to have ſaved the *Athenian* State; But He out of the Peoples Jealouſy of him, and by the Orders of their *Rotation* being laid a ſide, *Tydeus*, *Philocles*, and as many as ſerved to make up the halfe Score of Generals, were intruſted with the whole Navall Power then remaining to the *Athenian* Commonwealth, which

Thucyd. l. 6.

Plut. & Xenoph.

which they totally loſt at *Aegos-potamos* by one of the moſt Palpable and wilfull Errors that perhaps, was ever committed in War. It is not to be expected I ſhould bring another Example from the *Athenian* Hiſtorie, ſince this Error was one of thoſe which can not be committed twice, and *Athens* it ſelf being a while after taken in Conſequence of this Defeat, They had not any more Fleets or Armies to throw away by their *Rotation*.

But, replies Mr *Harrington*, *had there been formerly no Rotation in Athens how ſhould there have been Men of Valour and Conduct to lie by* H. pag. 125. *the Wals? And if Rotation thenceforth ſhould have ceaſed, how could thoſe Men of Valour and Conduct have done other then lie by the Wals? So this unavoidably confeſſeth, that Rotation was the Means whereby Athens came to be ſtored with Perſons of Valour and Conduct, and They to be capable of Imployment.* In Anſwer to this goodly Argument, let Me inquire of him, What *Rotation* was there in the Armies of the *Netherlands?* Yet we know there was a time when almoſt all the able Souldiers of Chriſtendome came out of that Schoole. Or let him ſhow Me the Orders of *Rotation* at preſent in *France*, which Crown notwithſtanding abounds with more Perſons capable of high Commands, then all *Europe* beſides. In ſmall Imployments, it is not *Rotation*, or the paſſing through many hands, that can beget able Men, and in great Actions Men of great Abilities will grow up without the help of *Rotation*; So that if *Athens*

thens or Rome have produced ſuch Illuſtrious Examples, it is very Impertinent to attribute this to *Rotation* or the *Integrity of Popular Suffrage*, but to the great Imployments, in which by reaſon of their continuall Wars, thoſe *Commonwealths* brought up their Subjects. *H. pag.* 126.

Since He has mentioned the Integrity of *Popular* Suffrage, it muſt not be let paſs without our Animadverſion, where he ſaies *That the Ballot bars Canvaſing, beyond all Poſſibility of any ſuch thing.* No doubt the Secrecy introduced by the *Ballot*, is a faire Guardian of Liberty in Voting; but if We examine the matter more narrowly, We ſhall eaſily perceive that this hardly extends to more then a removing the Awe impoſed upon Men by Feare, and that all the Engagements of Affection, Flattery, and Bribery are not in the leaſt weakened by the *Ballot*. And therefore We may juſtly infer that the Orders of *Oceana* are in this point Defective, (for the Proviſion in the ninth order fals far ſhort of a Cure) as were thoſe of *Venice* before the Introduction of the *Cenſor's* Office: For till then, notwithſtanding the *Ballot*, the *Gentlemen* held ſecret Correſpondences for the mutuall gratifying one another's Ambition, and ſome directly ſold their Votes; which makes *Giannotti* judge, That, without the *Cenſors* who have power given them to prevent it, This ſingle Diſorder had been enough to have everted the Commonwealth. And conformable to this is the Experience of the *Conclaves* held for *Ibid.*

Electing of the *Popes*, where since *Gregory* the 15, all waies of making the *Pope* are forbid, but that of secret Scrutiny which is so managed that in effect it is the same thing with the *Ballot*: And yet the Examples of succeeding *Conclaves* testifie, That the Power and Influence of the Heads of Factions over their Creatures, is scarse at all diminished by this Course.

Relat. Ital. M. S. delli Conclavi.

To returne to *Rotation*, As the mischiefs by it derived upon a Commonwealth are apparent, in the next place I am to show how it has not been counted so Sacred, but that it has often been sacrificed to the Publique Exigencies. *Machiavel* furnishes Me with the early Example of *Publilius Philo* at *Palepolis*. When the *Numantines* had by the bravery of their Resistance provoked the Rage and Disdain of the *Roman* People, not to trifle out the War any longer under weake Commanders, The People gave *Scipio* the *Consulship*, though he were then uncapable of it by the Law of *Rotation* which required a Vacation of ten yeares between two *Consulships*. The *Lacedemonians* indeed were more Hypocriticall, while out of scruple of violating their *Rotation* they cheated themselves with the Name and outside of things; The case I refer to was in *Lysander*, who had in the yeare of his Admiralty laid great Designs for carrying on the War against *Athens*, and rendered himselfe very acceptable to the *Lacedemonian* Confederates on the coasts of *Asia*; At *Sparta* there was a Law that no man should be twice Admirall, and yet it being highly expedient for their

Brev. Liv.

Plut. Xenoph.

their Affaires to give *Lyſander* the Command again, They fell upon an expedient ſomewhat ridiculous in the hands of Wiſe men; *Aracus* an inconſiderable Perſon was made Admirall, and *Lyſander* had the Commiſſion of Viceadmirall with the whole Power and authority of Admirall. Such ſhifts are thoſe States put to who think the ſupreame Publique intereſt can be regulated by any certain Lawes?

If then the Lawes of *Rotation* have ſo frequently vailed Bonnet to the Ambition or Deſire of Acquiſition in Commonwealths, it cannot ſeem ſtrange they ſhould doe ſo in caſe of neceſſary preſervation. In all the courſe of the *Roman* Affaires We can ſcarſe meet with a time more deſtitute of great Actions, and by conſequence of great Commanders, then that immediately following the third *Punick* and *Numantine* Wars: Yet in that time the blackeſt and fierceſt tempeſt broke upon the *Romans* that ever they were expoſed to, except that which ſome hundreds of yeares after ſhipwrackt their Empire; The *Cimbres*, *Teutons*, and *Ambrons*, fierce Northern Nations, to the number of at leaſt 300000 fighting men; beſides an æquall Company of Women and Children to ſupply them with Recruits, poured themſelves down upon *Italy*; Foure *Roman* Armies had been defeated by them, nor could the *Alpes* and Winter to boot, be any obſtacle to their March; In this condition what ſhould the *Romans* doe? They had but one Commander *Plut. in Mar.*

C. Marius

C. Marius, to whom in the Publique Judgment the manage of the War could be with any safety committed, And he was at that time uncapable by the Laws of *Rotation*: Should they violate the Law? Or suffer the Barbarous Nations to come up to *Rome* without Opposition? The grave Statists were for the observation of the Law, but here it was the *Peoples* turn to be wise, and their feares were their best Counsellers. They thought fit to make bold with the Law for the Publique Utility, and gave three Consulships together to *Marius*, in whose hands only they counted the Commonwealth secure. *Actum erat*, saies *Florus*, *nisi Marius illi sæcula contigisset.*

Brev. Liv. Lib. 3. cap. 3.

That this Prolongation of Empire to *Marius*, was the first step toward the Destruction of the Commonwealth is observed by Mr *Harrington* out of *Machiavel*; And yet it is the consent of Historians that without the help of *Marius* the Commonwealth had then been destroyed by the *Cimbres*; This does beyond all Exception fortify my Notion, That a *Commonwealth* is an Imperfect forme of *Government*, since she may be reduced to that Exigence as by either observing or violating her Lawes to plunge her self into a certain Ruine. If *Machiavel* has observed no other *Dilemma* in this, then *That if a Commonwealth will not be so slow in her Acquisition as is required by Rotation, She will be less sure then is requisite to her Preservation*, I am not responsible for his Inadvertency: But it was reasonable for me to expect that Mr *Harrington*, when I had

Eng. 126, 127, & 128.

had presented him with a paire of Spectacles should have seen a little better and have taken notice that the prolongation of Empire to *C. Marius* was not in order to Conquest or Acquisition, but to the Preservation of *Italie*, and *Rome* it self.

We have all this while advanced very little, if this Flaw which in Reference to *Rotation*, has been discovered in *Commonwealths*, be no less discernable in *Monarchies*; For then it is not a weakness seated in one Limbe or Member, but a Disease that has seized upon the whole Body of *Government*: And this Mr *Harrington* insinuates when he tels Us, *That a Prince whose Providence supplies not the defect of Rotation with something of like Nature, exposeth Himself if not his Empire as much unto Danger as a Commonwealth.* Here I must put him in mind of the Difference, formerly observed by Me, between the Actions of a *Prince* and a *Commonwealth* even when they do the same Thing. A *Commonwealth* having no eies of her own is forced to resign her self to the Conduct of *Lawes*, which are blind too, though in a known Road they faithfully and without wandring performe the part of a Guide; But if a stone be laid, or a pit be digged in this Path, the Blind leading the Blind, they both fall, and then she runs a danger of her Neck. If in this Case a *Commonwealth* be beholding to some hand to lead her to avoid the Danger, it is oddes she will never be able to free herself of the new Guide, who carrying her through unknown Waies in the end ravi-

H. p. 129.

shes

shes or strangles her. But a *Prince* having his Eyes about him chuses his own Way, and though for the Generall he keeps on the High Way of *Lawes*, yet when that leads to a Precipice, he can see how to goe about, till having scaped the Danger, he may safely returne to the common Road. In disposing then of Publique Imployments a wise *Prince* observes no other *Rotation* but what is measured by the Ability and Integrity of the Person's imployed, the present Necessity and future security of his Affaires, from the due mixture of all which results the *Princes* behaviour as to the Placing, Displacing and Transplacing his Publique Ministers whether Military or Civill; And all this is performed without being lyable (unless by a particular error of the *Princes* Judgment) to mistake or Danger. Whereas a *Commonwealth* that is tyed up by the Lawes of *Rotation*, knows not how to refuse the service of her weakest Subjects, or to imbrace her most Able and Faithfull ones (even in her greatest Exigencies) during the time of their *Vacation*, unless at the same moment she open a Gap to the Ambition of such men who will of servants indeavour to become her Masters. And this befalls a *Commonwealth* as shee is a *Government of Lawes*, which being framed upon an universall prospect, can not possibly, be fitted to particular incident occasions; so that a Government making profession to regulate it self in all things by *Lawes*, must need be sometimes at a Loss, and is not unlike the great Land Grabs in some parts of *America* which

which walke alwaies in a strait Line, and will rather then vary from it, climb over an house or a Tree.

To what purpose then serves the Pompous Enumeration of such *Princes* as have been supplanted by their Favourites, or deposed by the Generals of their Armies? Yet it must not pass without Animadversion, That this Tragicall List is in great Part made up of such Persons (as *Sejanus*, *Perennis*, *Ruffinus*, *Stilico*, *Wallestein* &c.) whose unsuccesfull Ambition serves for an excellent Lesson to keep great men within the bounds of Duty and Moderation. But at worst, if some weake and careless *Princes* by neglecting the Oportunities of their own Safety, have faln by the hands of such as they trusted, this is no more an argument for *Rotation*, then it would be for going unarm'd because some men have been killed by their own swords. I rather suspect that upon this occasion Mr *Harrington* intended a secret blow at the Head of *Monarchy*, by shewing how lyable that *Government* is to be ruined by the Usurpation of such Persons to whom Princes commit any extraordinary Power either in Civill or Military Affaires. But this he will find to be a common Calamity, not to be prevented by the Orders of any *Government*, but only by the particular Dexterity and Prudence of a *Prince*: I adde not, Or of the Chief Ministers of a *Commonwealth*, because the Cure in a *Commonwealth* is in a manner Desperate, it being scarse Possible that any Citizen should arrive at so much Power as

H. p. 129.

to

to become Dangerous, but that at the same time he will have Barricadoed all waies tending to the publique Preservation, since those Counsels where it is to be debated, will be filled with his Friends and Dependents. And therefore we may put in the other scale, a great Heap of Instances of such Commonwealths as have been oppresst by those Persons to whom they had committed the conduct of their Affaires. Thus *Pisistratus* became Master of *Athens*, *Cypselus*, and after his Familie *Timophanes* of *Corinth*, *Dionysius* and *Agathocles* of *Syracuse*, *Panætius* and *Icetes* of *Leontium*, *Cleander* of *Gela*, *Anaxilaus* of *Rhegium*, *Theagenes* of *Megara*, *Abantidas* of *Sicyon*, *Aristomachus* o *Argos*, *Polyphron* of *Larissa*, *Machanidas* and *Nabis* of *Lacedæmon*. By this *Cæsar* was enabled to convert the *Roman Commonwealth* into a *Monarchy*. And after that out of the Ruines of this *Monarchy* (like some goodly Palace pulled down to build Tenements) severall *Republiques* had been erected, They almost all were exposed to the same Fortune. Thus *Pisa* came under the Power of *Vguccione della Faggivola*, *Lucca* of *Castrucio Castracana*, *Siena* of *Petrucci*, *Florence* of the Duke of *Athens*, *Milan* of the Count *Francis Sforza*, to omit the Examples of all the smaller *Commonwealths*. If I can not follow Mr *Harrington* into the East, it is because that wiser Quarter of the World have not been known to own any other then *Monarchicall Government*.

But let other *Commonwealths* answer for their

own

own Follies or Misfortunes, the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana* is promiſed better ſucceſs, and aſſured that ſhe ſhall never want Men of Honeſty and Ability to lead her to her true Intereſt at home and abroad. Nay more, Her Education for her Subjects is ſo excellent, that three yeares Experience *will ſerve to make them all very able Leaders.* Is this a wounder to you? *It is a meer Cheat this pretended Depth and Difficulty in matter of State*; The Buſineſs reſts upon the skill in managing the *Balloting* Box, and if a man have but the the Wit to know the Difference between White and Black, & Red, What can hinder him from being a very expert Stateſman? Though no man can continue longer then three yeares in any Magiſtracy, his going of the Stage will but make roome for one as able as himſelf, otherwiſe how came it about *that in Athens and Rome, where every body preſſed forward toward Magiſtracy, (which with them was annuall) the Magiſtrates were for illuſtrious Examples, more in weight and number then are to be found in all the reſt of the World?* Of this I have newly given an account, and will only adde, That at *Rome* the *Senate* (which bred the able men) was perpetuall, and both in *Athens* and *Rome* the Body of the People inhabiting within the walls of thoſe Cities, they might continually be converſant in Buſineſs, and have a ſhare in all Publique Tranſactions: Whereas in *England* the People being diſperſed throngh the whole Nation, are incapable of Buſineſs unleſs by their *Repreſentatives*, which being all limited to

H. p. 183.

P. 130.

Terms

Terms and *Vacations*, their Time of acquiring Experience may with very probable reason be thought too short. The only proper Judge of this Controversy is Experiment, and in that I think Mr *Harrington*, as well as the Nation, very Fortunate, that He is delivered from all Probability of seeing his Project reduced to Practise, For that would be more Terrible to Him, then a thousand Reames of Objections, and would easily detect those Errors and Defects in his Modell of *Government*, which at present are but lightly viewed in passing, or not at all discovered.

FINIS.

A N

APPENDIX

By way of reply to what Mr Harrington *cals A full Answer to all Objections.*

IT is a pretty Artifice in Mr *Harrington* to insinuate that because no man has gone about to discover any Contradiction or Inequality in the Model of his *Commonwealth*; therefore it must be taken for granted his *Commonwealth* has not any such in it, and must consequently be void of all Internall causes of Dissolution. By this he indeavours to draw the world into an Opinion that his *Commonwealth* is Invulnerable, and at the same time to fix a Disreputation upon the Author of the Considerations, as if he had failed in making out what he undertook. For what concerns Me as Author of the Considerations, having at the beginning made profession to restrain them to the first Preliminaries of *Oceana*, Mr *Harrington* is injurious in accusing Me in neglecting that which was no part of my Business, and which I alwaies declared I did not intend to meddle with.

But before that other Men make a ſurrender of their Judgement to Mr *Harrington* and believe upon the credit of this Argument that his *Commonwealth* has attained unto full Perfection, It will be convenient They ſhould reflect, That in a Modell of *Government* the Conformity of the ſeverall Parts to one another is not a ſufficient argument of the Perfection of the whole; For as in a Fiction, the ſeverall Members may be ſo contrived as not to give one another the Lie, but be all contained within the limits of veriſimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the leaſt ſyllable of Truth; Or as for the Explication of any Motion in Nature, various Hypotheſes may be excogitated including no Abſurdity within themſelves, and yet perhaps, not any one of them prove to be the true Method of Nature; ſo in *Government*, It is not difficult to invent variety of Formes, the parts of each of which taken ſeparately, may maintain a faire Correſpondence and Agreement among themſelves, and yet the Whole be far enough from attaining to Perfection.

The Materials of *Government* are Mankind, and the Architect wo diſpoſes of theſe Materials is man alſo; ſo that *Government* is nothing elſe but an Art by which one part of Mankind diſpoſes of the other for attaining the Common Utility of both, which conſiſts in ariving at ſuch a Degree of Plenty and Security as Mankind is capable of by ſociety.

ſociety. This Art is not obliged to one ſolitary Method for attaining the End and Deſign propoſed to it, but has ſometimes made uſe of a *Monarchy*, ſometimes of an *Ariſtocratie*, ſometimes of a *Democratie*, and in all theſe of ſeverall Frames and Models. But this art of Governing has a very diſadvantageous Difference from all other Arts, for in them the Artificer makes choice only of ſuch Materials as have the greateſt aptitude for his worke but in *Government* the Artificer is obliged to his Materials, and muſt grapple with all the Stubborneſs and Reluctancy He meets with in them; And it is an Error very incident to Mankind, that every particular Man thinks *Government* was inſtituted for his peculiar Advantage, which if he meets not with in a degree ſutable to his Deſire in the *Government* He lives under, He preſently indeavours to ſubvert that *Government* out of hopes to meet with it in the next: Which is juſt as if the ſteele of which the Index of a Watch is compoſed ſhould refuſe to move out of a Diſcontent it was not imployed about the Spring or Ballance; and at this rate I believe the ableſt Watch-maker would deſpaire of giving us a true movement. So that though it ſhould be allowed Mr *Harrington* that his *Commonwealth* has no Inequality in it, yet it would faile of attaining the perfection of *Government*, ſeeing there is an inequality in the Nature of Man, which is not rectifyed

by the Modell of his *Commonwealth*. What this Inequality consists in, how far it is capable of Cure, and how Mr *Harrington* has failed of performing it, was the subject of my 8th and 9th Chapters, and therefore is not now to be repeated.

I doe not intend to imploy my selfe in picking the Feathers off Mr *Harrington's* Cloake, or going in search of the Inequalities or Contradictions in the orders of his Modell; but I would be glad to know, Whether He be not unequall to Himself as well as the *Nobility* in such orders as particularly concern them. Having by his *Agrarian* reduced the *Nobility* (under which name I also comprehend the Gentry of higher Quality) unto the Condition of clypt Mony, He notwithstanding appeares very solicitous They should still be currant, and not be refused in the uses of the *Commonwealth*. To This purpose distinguishes the whole people into *Horse* and *Foot*, making the *Horse* to consist of such as have above one hundred pounds a yeare, and has provided that the *Horse* shall have diverse advantages as that (to omit the lesser ones) the *Senate* and *Great Magistrates* shall consist of Knights elected out of their Number. But this favour to them is all this while but an handsome piece of Dissimulation; For though there be care taken that at the Assembly of the *Hundred* and *Tribe* such and such *Magistrates* shall

Ocean. p.25.

ſhall be elected out of the *Horſe*, there is no neceſſary proviſion there ſhould be any *Horſe* there, out of which to elect; For the Deputies at the *Hundred* and *Tribe* conſiſting of the Deputies elected at the *Pariſh*, It is a meer chance if in the *Pariſh* there were any *Horſe* at all elected: The Elector or Propoſer at the *Pariſh* are deſigned by the hap of drawing a Golden Ball out of the Urn, and theſe Electors or Propoſer nominate the reſt of the Deputies to be propoſed to the *Ballot*, ſo that unleſs one of the *Horſe* chance to prove an Elector by drawing a Golden Ball, the nomination is wholly in the power of the *Foot*, who would be very ſenceleſs, by nominating any of the *Horſe* to part with that power which Fortune has put into their Hands. Now what ſmall probability there is that any of the *Horſe* ſhould chance to draw a Golden Ball, will appeare by the great diſparity in number between the whole Body of the People and ſuch as may only be capable of being of the *Horſe*; It is confeſt by Mr *Harrington* there is nothing in the Nature of the *Agrarian* to hinder, but that the whole Land in *Oceana* may come into the hands of 5000 Men; But the *Elders* or Men capable of Election are confeſt to be 100000 Men; Wherefore the 5000 Men or the *Horſe* (thongh they ſhould as is moſt unprobable, be all of 30 yeares of Age and ſo Capable of *Election*) are but a

twentieth part of Foot, and by Conſequence it is twenty to one that at every Election of the *Pariſh* not any of the *Horſe* come to be elected. By which it is evident there is a very great inequality in his *Commonwealth*, ſeing by the orders of it Matters may with great Probability be reduced to that paſs, That thoſe men who have the whole Propriety in Land may be wholly excluded from having any ſhare in the *Government*. It is apparent alſo, That the upper Roomes of his *Commonwealth*, ſuch as are the *Hundred*, *Tribe*, *Senate* and *Prerogative*, are built upon a moſt ruinous Foundation, the Baſis of the *Pariſhes* being too weake to ſupport them, Thus having reduced the *Nobility* and *Gentry* to 2000l. per an. and having deveſted them of all the Advantages of Birth and Deſcent, He leaves them alſo after all at the diſcretion of their good Neighbours with the High ſhoon, in reference to their whole intereſt in the *Government*.

But for all this he has dealt more kindly with the *Nobility* and *Gentry*, then with the three Faculties of *Divines*, *Lawyers* and *Phyſitians*; For though the *Ballance of Land*, prove unprofitable to the *Nobility*, yet the *Ballance of Beef* remaies ſtill with them, And if againſt an Election Day they Feaſt my *Lords* of the *People* handſomely, They may ſtill have hopes to be nominated by ſome of them; But the other are beyond all Poſſibi-

lity

lity of retriving it, excluded from having any ſhare in the *Government*; And that for this generall Reaſon, *They who take upon them the Profeſsion of Theologie, Phyſick or Law, are not at leiſure for the Eſſays whereby the Youth commence for all Magiſtracies, Offices and Honours in a Commonwealth.* It ſeems that he who has under a ſtall imployed his Life in the Reparations of old ſhooes is qualifyed to fall to worke with the Breaches of the State; And he whoſe converſe has been nothing but whiſtling to Horſes, has a ſufficient Capacity to give Law to Mankind; But if any mans Education has been laid out in Purſuit of Truth and in a Familiarity with ſuch Univerſall Notions & Reaſons of Things, as tend to the advancement of Humane Nature, If He has afterward addicted himſelf in particular to ſuch Studies upon which depend the ſafety of every Man in private, and of ſociety in Common, That man muſt be depoſed from the Privelege of a Citizen, and forfeit that Liberty which is the Foundation of all *Popular Government*, That every Man ſhould concur to the making thoſe Lawes by which He is to be governed. *Ocean.p.224*

The Clergy then or Divines will have Occaſion to make uſe of all the Patience and Humility they preach to others, in reference to their ſubmiſſion to a *Government* which treats them as People uncapable of the Common Privileges of Men; The Quality of

Embaſſadours

Embaſſadours from Heaven which is uſually attributed to them ſeems to be underſtood litterally by Mr *Harrington*, For He conſiders them as Aliens, and ſo denies them the Libertie due to all Engliſh Men; And he has made a little bold with the *Apoſtles* argument, by changing the Inference of it, That becauſe *They ſerve at the Altar*, therefore they are to be uſed as Slaves and Helots.

For the poore *Phyſitians* Leaſt of all underſtand why They ſ ould be ſhut out from the *Government* whilſt their *Apothecaries* are admitted to it, And why the *Farrier* ſhould be made a better man then the *Doctor*. But there is no Help, They muſt be content to ſwallow this Pill, unleſs They can out of hand find Hellebore enough for our new Legiſlator.

As to the *Lawyers*, there is a particular reaſon why they ſhould have nothing to do with making of Lawes, becauſe it is enough for them that they can underſtand them when they are made; Yet there may be ſome cauſe to doubt, whether the whole Bench, and all the Innes of Court could find the way to underſtand ſuch Lawes as would be made by thoſe men who are themſelves obliged not to underſtand any. Howſoever Mr *Harrington* has that good perſwaſion of the whole profeſſion of *Lawyers*, that He thinks they would betray the Publique good, to the profit of their own Practiſe, and there-

therefore reſolves to baniſh them from all Intereſt in the *Government*; ſo that the *Lawyers* are in this, at leaſt, highly obliged to Him, That he has given them faire leiſure to turn their Books.

Though every branch of theſe Orders be fertile of very deſtructive Conſequences, I do not intend to proſecute any of them, but am Content in generall to obſerve, that the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana* which pretends ſo much to Equality, does wholly ſhut out the Profeſſions of *Divinity*, *Law*, and *Phyſick* from any ſhare in the *Government*, and leaves the *Nobility* and *Gentry* in a great probability of being reduced to the ſame Condition.

While

WHile a Government is under Diſpute, the Liberty of propoſing one's ſence about it ought not to be denyed; But if it come once to be ſetled, Private men have nothing left but obedience. Having through the whole Book acted by the firſt Branch of this Maxime, it is fit I ſhould now ſhew how I can comply with the latter. And being conſcious of a Diſability in ſerving the Commonwealth of *Oceana* in any more important matter, I deſire to ſhew a reſpect to the Gentlemen of the *Academy* of the *Provoſts* by preſenting them with theſe following Collections.

A Catalogue

a Catalogue of ſuch pieces of Wit in Mr Harrington's *laſt Book which (though in themſelves inimitable) may ſerve as a Pattern for the Gentlemen of the* Academie.

Ocean. p. 130.

THE Conſiderer hath doft his conſidering Cap, *in Prefat.* A pig of my own Sow, *p.* 13. Monti and Bankes, Mountebanking. *p.* 17. A man to be made of Gingerbread, and his veins to run Malmeſy. *p.* 21. You tumble Dick upon Sis. *p.* 23. The Oſtraciſm of Billinſgate, *p.* 26. Paralogiſm and Pankeetiſm. *p.* 28. My Hypotheſis, his Hypothites. *p.* 30. Sons of the Univerſity, Brothers of the Colledg, Heads and Points. *ibid.* If ſhe who ſhould have ſome care of the Vineyard of Truth, ſhould lie pigging of wide bores to grunt in this manner and feare with the Tuſh, and I happen to ring ſome of them, (as I have done this Marcaſſin for rooting) there is nothing in my faith why ſuch tryall of their Noſes ſhould be ſin. *p.* 76. *Beſides theſe a great number of choice Metaphores from Bowling, Carding, Dicing, and the like.*

An

An account of ſeverall Formes of Complement and Addreſs uſed by Mr Harrington, *which may be ſerviceable to the great Deſign of improving Civility and Converſation, which is intruſted with the* Academie. *Ocean. p. 130*

PRævaricator, Infidell, Wretch, Rude fellow, Uulucky Boy, Tom Thumb, Beſtia, Parrat, Ape, Tinker, Neither Honeſt Man nor good Bowler, Cheat, Blind Bayard &c. *theſe are applicable to a perſon. For a Book ſuch appellations as theſe may be uſed.* Moſt victorious Nonſenſe, Slanders, Fopperies, Vagaries, Knavery, Tittle tattle, Verjuice. *A Doctor is to be ſaluted thus*; You are a Doctor of fine things, Your Cap is ſquarer then your play, you have more in your ſleeves then the ſcarlet, &c. You are a Bog, Informis limus, ſtygiæque Paludes, *This would do admirably to our neighbours of the Low Countries.* You jole your preſumptuous head not only againſt ancient prudence but againſt God himſelf. You take part with the Devill &c.

FINIS.